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Introduction 
On the bright morning of August 8, 2008, my family and I were having breakfast 
on the terrace of our cabin in Southern Central Siberia, near my hometown of 
Krasnoyarsk. As always, we turned on the radio to listen to the morning news, and to 
what we expected to be the main news of the day: the opening of the 2008 Olympic 
Games in Beijing. However, the newscast did not start with the Olympics that day. 
Instead, we were told that hundreds of Russian citizens were being killed in South 
Ossetia – a breakaway region on the Russian-Georgian border – as a result of a military 
attack by Georgia that was attempting to regain the region.  
The news updates were broadcasted continuously throughout the day. By the 
evening, it was clear that Russia had made a decision to enter the war in order to protect 
its citizens in South Ossetia. I returned to the city the next day, and my first move was to 
check what the foreign, and especially American, media had to say about the conflict 
between Georgia and South Ossetia. 
 “Russian Air, Ground Forces Strike Georgia; Military Action Follows Georgian 
Offensive to Reassert Control Over Separatist South Ossetia,”1 “Stopping Russia; The US 
and Its Allies Must Unite Against Moscow's War on Georgia,”2 “Russia and Georgia 
Clash Over Breakaway Region,”3 proclaimed the headlines of some of largest and most 
influential US news media – apparently placing the blame on Russian aggression.  
                                                 
1
 Peter Finn, “Russian Air, Ground Forces Strike Georgia; Military Action Follows Georgian Offensive to 
Reassert Control Over Separatist South Ossetia,” Washington Post, August 9, 2008, A01.  
2
 “Stopping Russia; The US and Its Allies Must Unite Against Moscow’s War on Georgia,” Washington 
Post, August 9, 2008, A14. 
3
 Michael Schwirtz, Anne Barnard and C.J. Chivers, “Russia and Georgia Clash Over Breakaway Region,” 
New York Times, August 8, 2008, A1.  
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I was shocked, confused, disoriented but also certain that something was not quite 
right with the media coverage of the conflict. Russian and American news media told 
different stories. Moreover, as I kept reading the news reports, I couldn’t help noticing 
how both Russian and US news media evoked the memories of the Cold War in their 
narratives. Whether it was the New York Times stating that “global politics have breathed 
new life into the conflict, making it a flash point for resurgent tensions between former 
cold war rivals”4 or the Russian newspaper Izvestia insisting that “Georgian military 
power has been gained largely due to the help of Georgia’s western friends,”5 media in 
both countries framed the conflict in terms that reminded the readers – more than twenty 
years after the end of the Cold War – of the proxy wars and the east-west geopolitical 
struggle. I kept wondering what kinds of political, historical and ideological forces 
clashed in the world’s media scene while the military forces clashed on the battlegrounds 
of the Northern Caucasus?  
This project examines the role that the Cold War discourse plays in informing and 
structuring the Russian and US mainstream and alternative news media narratives about 
international events and controversies that occur in the post-Cold War time but trace their 
historical roots to the Cold War geopolitical struggles and expose disagreements between 
Russia and the United States in the 21st century. This project also seeks to identify what 
other discourses of global politics and international affairs are interwoven in media 
narratives examined in this study and how their interactions with elements of the Cold 
                                                 
4
 Michael Schwirtz, Anne Barnard and C.J. Chivers, “Russia and Georgia Clash Over Breakaway Region,” 
New York Times, August 8, 2008, A1.  
5
 Dmitryi Litovkin, “Kak Gruziya Gotovilas’ k Voyne i Kto Ei Pomogal,” Izvestia, August 8, 2008, 
http://izvestia.ru/news/339510. This and all further translations from Russian are made by the author.  
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War discourse work to create meanings for these media’s audiences in the post-Cold War 
era. The Cold War discourse is defined here as a way of talking/writing about events and 
issues that explicitly or implicitly contextualizes them – through a set of corresponding 
references, metaphors and associational chains – within the oppositional dichotomies of 
“communism versus capitalism,” “authoritarianism versus democracy,” “East versus 
West,” the confrontation between the “two great powers” and the division of the world on 
“spheres of influence.” It is important to examine the role and place of the Cold War 
discourse in the post-Cold War news media narratives because media narratives influence 
in one way or another the public understanding of the world around us and of the roles 
that different actors play in global politics;6 media narratives also help create and sustain 
political and intellectual environments that enable the emergence of concrete policies that 
determine the “rules of the game” in global affairs. 7 As Giovanna Dell’Orto put it, “the 
press matters in global affairs because the images of national identities it helps create and 
negotiate influence expectations and consequently policies.”8 The tragedy of the Cold 
War was rooted, among other things, in fundamental misunderstanding and 
miscommunication of American and Soviet state identities to each other and to their own 
populations as fixed and monolithic rather than as nuanced and fluid. Mass media in both 
states played important roles in constructing and disseminating the narratives that shaped 
                                                 
6
 See, for example Robert Entman, “Framing US Coverage of International News,” Journal of 
Communication 41, no. 4 (1991): 6-27; David Perry, “The Image Gap: How International News Affects 
Perceptions of Nations,” Journalism Quarterly 64 (1987): 416-433; Yahya Kamalipour, ed. Images of the 
US around the World (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999).  
7
 For comprehensive review of the scholarly literature on media-foreign policy relationship see Derek B. 
Miller, Media Pressure on Foreign Policy: The Evolving Theoretical Framework, First Edition (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).  
8
 Giovanna Dell’Orto, American Journalism and International Relations: Foreign Correspondence from 
the Early Republic to the Digital Era, Reprint edition (Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
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these identities.9 The end of the Cold War presented an opportunity for discursive 
transformation through re-articulation of state identities and re-imagining of the overall 
interpretive framework of international affairs and global politics. Indeed, on the one 
hand, the material reality of geopolitics changed drastically. The USSR collapsed and US 
– Russia relations do not constitute the centerpiece of global politics anymore; 
communist ideology not only doesn’t structure life and politics in Russia, Eastern Europe 
and former USSR states but the region embraced a capitalist model of development 
domestically and is actively involved in global economy; the borders are open, making 
travel as well as educational and cultural exchanges a reality for all people (not only the 
political elites as during the Cold War); Russian and American astronauts explore space 
together and the two countries have made significant progress on mutually reducing their 
nuclear arsenals.10  
Yet on the other hand, a number of events and controversies following the conflict 
in South Ossetia – from the Russia-US standoff at the UN Security Council in 2011-2012 
over the peace resolution in Syria, to Russia’s decision to provide refuge to NSA 
whistleblower Edward Snowden in 2013, to an ongoing Russia-NATO debate over the 
missile defense system in Europe and to the most recent conflict in Ukraine – have kept 
prodding frequent speculations as to whether “the Cold War was back.”11 The escalation 
                                                 
9
 James Aronson, Press and Cold War, Expanded edition (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970); 
George R. Urban, Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War, 1st 
edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997); Thomas Doherty, Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, 
McCarthyism, and American Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005); Louis W. Liebovich, 
The Press and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1947, First Edition (New York: Praeger, 1988). 
10
 Department Of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. The Office of Website Management, “New START,” 
November 1, 2010, http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/.  
11
 See for example Eve Conant, “Is the Cold War Back?,” National Geographic News, September 13, 2014, 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/09/140912-cold-war-geography-russia-ukraine-sanctions; 
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of tensions associated with these events and the growing mutual discontent have been 
reflected both in the most recent policies accompanying US-Russia relations12 and in the 
public opinion of the Unites States in Russia and of Russia in the United States.13 While 
there is a growing body of work by international relations scholars14 and foreign policy 
analysts15 addressing the question of the Cold War political discourse resurfacing in the 
post-Cold War political environment, no studies thus far focused on the role of news 
media in this process. This project aims to fill this gap. 
Case studies 
To analyze the role of the Cold War discourse in structuring Russian and US news 
media narratives, and thus to a certain extent structuring the post-Cold War environment, 
this study examines three events that speak to different aspects of the Cold War discourse 
and also take place in three different regions of the world that used to comprise the Cold 
War battlefields.  
                                                                                                                                                 
Simon Tisdall, “The New Cold War: Are We Going back to the Bad Old Days?,” The Guardian, November 
19, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/new-cold-war-back-to-bad-old-days-russia-
west-putin-ukraine; Robert Legvold, “Managing the New Cold War,” Foreign Affairs, August 2014, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141537/robert-legvold/managing-the-new-cold-war.  
12
 The latest economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the US serve as a vivid example; on Russia’s side, 
the most well-known examples include the “Foreign Agents” law (2012) restricting the work of foreign 
NGOs in Russia, as well as the “Dima Yakovlev” law (2012) prohibiting the adoptions of Russian children 
by the US citizens.  
13
 See, for example the following reports:  Mark Adomanis, “Russian Opinion Of The United States Is At 
An All-Time Low,” Forbes, February 16, 2015. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/markadomanis/2014/07/23/russian-opinion-of-the-united-states-is-at-an-all-
time-low/; Jeffrey M. Jones, “Americans Increasingly See Russia as Threat, Top US Enemy,” Gallup, 
February 16, 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/181568/americans-increasingly-russia-threat-top-
enemy.aspx?utm_source=Politics&utm_medium=newsfeed&utm_campaign=tiles.  
14
 Richard Sakwa, “‘New Cold War’ or Twenty Years’ Crisis? Russia and International Politics,” 
International Affairs 84, no. 2 (2008): 241–67, doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00702.x.; Richard Sakwa, 
“The Cold Peace: Russo-Western Relations as a Mimetic Cold War,” Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs 26, no. 1 (March 2013): 203–24, doi:10.1080/09557571.2012.710584. 
15
 Edward Lucas, The New Cold War: Putin’s Russia and the Threat to the West, Third Edition, Revised 
edition (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan Trade, 2014). 
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The project starts with the case of the war in South Ossetia. As some analysts 
noted, this war marked a turning point in Russia-US post-Cold War relations specifically 
and in the “East-West relations” in general16 as “the rhetoric, used by both sides, [bore] 
all similarities with the Cold War period.”17 Most importantly, this case allows for 
examining how the struggles associated with the non-Russian nations of the former 
Soviet Union wrestling with the questions of post-Cold War sovereignty and 
independence are presented in the Russian and US news media. The central aim of this 
case study is to uncover and analyze the range of interpretive possibilities that different 
Russian and US news media present to their readers in order to make sense of the conflict 
that has a complex history and dynamic but that also takes place in the world where 
foreign policy is still to a large extent guided by the realist approach that views post-
Soviet space as a “buffer zone” between Russia and NATO forces.  
The second case study examines the diplomatic debate in the United Nations 
Security Council over the peace resolution aimed to end violence in Syria in 2011-2012. 
The resolution was vetoed by Russia and China three times over the course of ten 
months, turning the process into a major international controversy and prodding 
observers to label the situation a “global diplomatic divide” with the dividing lines drawn 
between the “anti-democracy and pro-dictatorship” and “pro-democracy and anti-
dictatorship” camps. This case study allows examining how different Russian and US 
                                                 
16
 See, for example Arie Bloed, “Georgian-Russian War, the Turning Point in East-West Relations?,” 
Security & Human Rights 19, no. 4 (October 2008): 322–25; Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War That Shook 
the World : Georgia, Russia, and the Future of the West, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); 
Fyodor Lukyanov, “The Russian-Georgian War as a Turning Point,” Russia in Global Affairs, November 
24, 2011, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/The-Russian-Georgian-war-as-a-turning-point-15381. 
17
 Bloed, 322. 
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news media make sense of the post-Cold War diplomatic debate over resolving a 
complex international crisis that occurs in the region with turbulent Cold War and post-
Cold War history. 
The third case study addresses the question of how the ideas associated with the 
socialist model of socio-economic development – the model that has “lost” the Cold War, 
according to the dominant interpretation of the end of the Cold War – are being discussed 
and presented to the audiences by various Russian and US news media in the post-Cold 
War time. The case study does so by examining how these media covered the death of 
Hugo Chávez – the former President of Venezuela who built and sustained “socialism of 
the 21st century” in “the US backyard” during fourteen years of his presidency. The case 
study aims to discover how the Russian and the US news media articulate the meaning of 
Chávez’s socialist legacy and how these articulations speak to the evolution of Russia’s 
and US’s own post-Cold War political identities.  
Mainstream and alternative media 
As Russian and US mainstream and alternative news media interpret and explain 
to their audiences these international events and controversies, they function as sites of 
meaning-making, constructing the reality of international affairs for the audiences by 
defining the key actors and their roles, the key settings and their significance, the causes 
of crises and conflicts, and the approaches to their resolution. As news media do so, they 
inevitably privilege some storylines over others (even when striving to achieve the ideals 
of “objectivity” and “balance” in news reporting), some sources over others, some ideas 
and interpretations over others, thus determining a specific range of interpretive 
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possibilities available for the audiences within these media texts. A comparative analysis 
across four very different types of media – Russian, US, mainstream and alternative – 
allows for identifying the key points of tension, contradiction, overlap or modulation 
central to our understanding of where and how the discursive boundaries that guide and 
possibly delimit the process of making sense of global politics and the identities of actors 
involved in it are being drawn.     
The mainstream news media are defined in this project as legacy media outlets 
with a long-standing record of producing international news for domestic audiences in the 
United States and Russia, and generally following – though at different degrees at 
different historic times and circumstances – the official foreign policy line of the 
respective governments. The mainstream news media are important to analyze for at least 
two crucial reasons. From a sociological perspective of international journalism studies, 
mainstream news media function as the principal, and often the only, source of foreign 
news for domestic audiences, thus possessing significant power over “giving meanings to 
the world”18 and shaping public’s understanding of “what the world beyond our borders 
looks like.”19 From a critical media studies perspective, mainstream news media 
comprise an important part of a “power structure of elite groups and institutions,”20 thus 
functioning as “engines of ideological production,”21 defining and legitimizing dominant 
understandings of social and political reality, and reproducing the consensus on which 
                                                 
18
 Giovanna Dell’Orto, Giving Meanings to the World: The First US Foreign Correspondents, 1838-1859, 
First Edition edition (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2002). 
19
 Dell’Orto, American Journalism, 1. 
20
 Teun van Dijk, “Power and the News Media,” in Political Communication in Action: States, Institutions, 
Movements, Audiences, ed. David L. Paletz (Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press, 1996). 
21
 Catherine Squires, “Black Talk Radio,” Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics 5, no. 2 (2000): 
73-96.  
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these understandings rest. Two US newspapers of record – the New York Times and The 
Washington Post – are chosen as such mainstream news media for this study’s analysis. 
On the Russian side, newspapers Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty serve similar functions.  
Alternative media are defined in this study as media outlets with a long standing 
record of producing narratives of international (and domestic) affairs that both challenge 
the dominant narratives and present perspectives and interpretations that are absent from 
or marginalized in the mainstream narratives. To follow Josh Greenberg’s and Heather 
Gilberds’ functional definition, “alternative media typically engage in efforts to create 
social, political, or economic change, and often promote a radical agenda.”22 It is 
important to examine the narratives produced by the alternative media because this study 
is concerned with discursive change as much as it is concerned with discursive 
continuity. As discourse analysis theory contends, discourses – even the most powerful 
ones – are not fixed and are being constantly rearticulated in the process of political 
struggle and contestation. Alternative media play a crucial role in discursive contestation 
since they “confront the biases embedded in established ways of viewing the world and 
offer possibilities for envisioning different ways of thinking.”23 The US alternative media 
chosen for the analysis include such publications as The Nation and Z Magazine. The 
Russian alternative media selected for this project are the newspaper Novaya Gazeta and 
the magazine The New Times.  
 
 
                                                 
22
 Josh Greenberg and Heather Gilberds, “Alternative Media,” in Intersections of Media and 
Communications: Concepts, Contexts, and Critical Frameworks, ed. Will Straw, Ira Wagman and Sandra 
Gabriele (Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 2011), 199. 
23
 Greenberg and Gilberts, 206 – 207. 
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Theoretical framework 
This study brings together discourse analysis theory, Stuart Hall’s theory of 
articulation and a set of concepts defining the debate on the forces of nationalism and 
globalization that shape the post-Cold War environment.  
The discourse analysis theory allows approaching news media texts as sites of 
meaning-making,24 and therefore also as sites of power struggle and political 
contestation.25 Thus, while this project focuses on analyzing texts, its aim is not merely 
descriptive. Rather, this project’s aim is to produce – through critical juxtaposition of 
different texts to each other – a thick comparative description that would uncover the 
meanings within the texts, and therefore help gain a deeper understanding of the social 
effects that these texts might have on both the public understanding of international 
affairs in the post-Cold War world and also on concrete policies that shape the material 
realities of international affairs. The power of discourse is especially important to 
consider and examine in the post-Cold War political context, which is characterized by 
increasing political, economic and cultural interconnectedness, rapid changes in 
communication technologies, proliferation of media and communication channels and, in 
part as a result of these processes, the growing popularity of the idea of “soft power,” 
which defines political success not only in terms of whose army wins but also in terms of 
whose story wins, to paraphrase Joseph Nye.26 I would also add that it matters what kind 
                                                 
24
 David Reah, The Language of Newspapers (London: Routledge, 2002); Norman Fairclough, Media 
Discourse (London: Arnold, 1995a); Anne O’Keefe, Investigating Media Discourse (London: Routledge, 
2006). 
25
 van Dijk, Power and the News Media. 
26
 Joseph Nye, The Future of Power, Reprint edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 2011); Joseph S. Nye, The 
Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone, 1 edition (Oxford; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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of story wins, as this is what determines the discursive environment that enables or limits 
specific actions. 
This project’s goal is not only to identify the ways in which the discourse of the 
Cold War structures news media narratives in the post-Cold War time, but also to identify 
how other discourses of global politics participate in the meaning-making process. Thus, 
a theoretical approach that would allow for a meaningful interpretation of diverse and 
possibly contradictory discourses interacting within the same discursive terrain was 
needed. Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation – a “theory of contexts”27 that allows 
“characterizing a social formation without falling into the twin traps of reductionism and 
essentialism” – contributes to this projects by helping to accomplish this task. In addition 
to working at the epistemological level of making sense of a wide variety of discourses 
defining the news media narratives analyzed in this project, the theory of articulation 
helps position the findings of this project at the political and strategic levels. At the 
political level, articulation allows determining how the interplay among the discourses 
and narratives identified in this project reflects the play of power and the relations of 
symbolic domination and subordination, which is precisely what makes this project 
important. At the strategic level, articulation “provides a mechanism for shaping 
intervention within a particular social formation, conjuncture or context,”28 which for this 
project means identifying where and how alternative discourses of the post-Cold War 
                                                 
27
 Lawrence Grossberg, “Cultural Studies and/in New Worlds,” Critical Studies in Mass Communication 10 
(1993): 1-22. doi: 10.1080/15295039309366846.  
28
 Jennifer Daryl Slack, “The Theory and Method of Articulation in Cultural Studies,” in Stuart Hall: 
Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, ed. Kuan-Hsing Chen and David Morley (New York: Routledge, 
2006). 
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global politics are being discussed in news media texts and whether these discussions can 
play a role in social and political change. 
Contextualizing this project within the theoretical framework of the debate on 
nationalism and globalization further allows for addressing the question of power – and 
power struggles – specifically in the context of global communication, engaging in a 
conversation with the scholars working in this subfield. In a nutshell (I provide a more 
detailed discussion in Chapter 2), the debate centers on the question of whether the 
nation-state remains to be the locus of power in the post-Cold War world or, due to the 
process of globalization, the power is dispersed among multiple actors, including 
particularly non-state actors. The debate so far has mainly focused on actors – including 
media actors – and their actions. I propose expanding the debate to include the analysis of 
media discourses as examples of “ways of thinking” that characterize these two 
paradigms.  
Thus, the goal of this project is twofold. First, the project aims to empirically 
assess to what extent the narratives created by the Russian and US mainstream and 
alternative news media rely on or depart from the discourse of the Cold War and what 
other discourses of global politics shape these narratives. Second, drawing on discourse 
analysis theory and Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation, this project seeks to uncover the 
political, strategic and ideological forces shaping the news media narratives of 
international debates and controversies that cause disagreements between Russia and the 
Unites States in the post-Cold War time. By doing so, this project aims to gain a deeper 
understanding of the role various discourses play in structuring the post-Cold War 
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environment that is characterized by power struggles between the forces of nationalism 
and globalization.  
This project is guided by the following overarching questions: 
RQ1: To what extent (if at all) does the discourse of the Cold War inform and 
structure the narratives created by the Russian and US mainstream and alternative 
media as they cover the events and controversies examined in this project? 
RQ2: What other discourses of international affairs and global politics can be 
identified? 
RQ3: How do the ways in which various discourses are articulated within the news 
media texts analyzed in this project expose the relations of symbolic domination and 
subordination that constitute the post-Cold War political and media environment, and 
how do these relations work to construct the identities of the actors involved in the 
events analyzed in this study? 
RQ4: What possibilities and limitations for discursive transformation can be discerned 
from the analysis of overlaps and contradictions among the narratives, and how do 
these possibilities and limitations expand the theoretical debate on power struggles 
between the forces of nationalism and globalization in the post-Cold War era?
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Chapter 1: Theory and Method 
Discourses, narratives, power and the news media 
This project is grounded in traditions of discourse analysis theory, which 
postulates that discourses – “particular way[s] of representing some part of the (physical, 
social, psychological) world”1 – structure reality by making certain ways of imagining it 
possible, true, legitimate and normal, and others impossible, faulty, unacceptable and 
deviant. By working in such ways, discourses help individuals, communities and nations 
make sense of themselves and of the world around them, while also influencing specific 
actions – decisions or policies – that shape everyday material realities. Discourses are 
thus both enabling and constraining, as they define the range of imaginable possibilities 
but also limit it by functioning as “repositories for the benchmarks of good and bad 
behavior.”2 As Charlotte Epstein states, “a discourse is a cohesive ensemble of ideas, 
concepts, and categorizations about a specific object that frame that object in a certain 
way and, therefore, delimit the possibilities for action in relation to it.”3 She further notes 
that “discourses and material practices are tightly bound up and mutually constitutive”4 – 
and this is why discourses are important to consider and to examine: they have very real 
and concrete social effects.5 This understanding is rooted in the works of Michel 
Foucault, who had shown how various discourses - “the sets of meanings and practices 
that contain rules about what is say-able and know-able and that create roles which actors 
                                                 
1
 Norman Fairclough, Analysing Discourse : Textual Analysis for Social Research (London ; New York: 
Routledge, 2003), 17. 
2
 Charlotte Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse, 
1st edition (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 2008), 13. 
3
 Epstein, 2. 
4
 Ibid., 5.  
5
 Fairclough, Analyzing Discourse. 
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fill”6 – constitute various material practices.7 When it comes to international affairs and 
global politics, scholars working in the constructivist tradition of international relations 
also emphasize causal links in the constitution of discourses, stating that “how things are 
put together makes possible or even probable, certain kinds of political behaviors and 
effects.”8 
This study distinguishes between discourses and narratives, following the 
argument that discourses are more stable and persistent entities that structure narratives, 
whereas narratives are more dynamic and thus are also often used by actors engaged in 
meaning-making (e.g. media producers or policymakers) strategically. As Alister 
Miskimmon and colleagues argue, “narratives can orient audiences to a future as leaders 
craft them out of discourses and frames. Discourses are the raw material of 
communication – bodies of knowledge about science, law, history, theology – that actors 
plot into narratives. … Actors can only form and project a narrative based upon the 
discourses available to them in their historical situation, so discourses have a structuring 
effect upon narrative action. Actors reflectively work with discourse to construct 
narratives with the instrumental aim to influence the opinions and behavior of others. 
History, analogies, metaphors, symbols, and images can trigger and/or shape narratives.”9 
As discourses and narratives constitute the production of meaning, they inevitably 
participate in generation and distribution of social power. Teun van Dijk defines social 
                                                 
6
 Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, Strategic Narratives: Communication Power 
and the New World Order (Routledge, 2014), 7.  
7
 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (Vintage, 1982); Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: 
The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan, 2nd edition (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). 
8
 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 4 (2001): 391-416, 
394. 
9
 Miskimmon et al., 7. 
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power as “a social relation between groups or institutions, involving the control by a 
(more) powerful group or institution (and its members) of the actions and the minds of 
(the members) a less powerful group.”10 Discursive power is symbolic; that is, it works in 
ways that make domination and control feel natural and legitimate. Pierre Bourdieu 
analyzed this form of power as a “symbolic domination.”11  Power exercised through 
symbolic domination does not need to work through coercion. Since it operates at the 
level of meaning and social interaction, it produces consent from within because it 
constitutes meaning and the rules of social interactions in the first place.  
Since news media are among the key agents of meaning making, they constitute 
critical sites of production of symbolic power. As news media interpret various events 
and issues for their audiences, they draw on discourses available to them in their specific 
historical circumstances, and construct narratives that work to help their audiences make 
sense of the world around them. In doing so, news media inevitably privilege some 
discourses over others, often resorting to those that would resonate more with their 
specific audiences. 
Important for this project is the notion that, as Norman Fairclough puts it, “there 
are alternative and often competing discourses, associated with different groups of people 
in different social positions.”12 Indeed, every society and every culture always consists of 
a dominant culture and multiple counter-cultures, and any understanding of national 
and/or cultural identity is incomplete without accounting for the interplay (or a struggle) 
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between these elements and corresponding discourses. Edward Said described this 
dynamic as follows: 
“…cultures are not the same. There is an official culture, a culture of priests, 
academics, and the state. It provides definitions of patriotism, loyalty, boundaries 
and what I've called belonging. It is this official culture that speaks in the name of 
the whole. But it's also true… [that] in addition to the mainstream or official 
culture, there are dissenting or alternative, unorthodox, heterodox, strands that 
contain many antiauthoritarian themes in them that are in competition with the 
official culture. These can be called the counter-cultures, an ensemble of practices 
associated with various kinds of outsiders, the poor, immigrants, artistic 
Bohemians, workers, rebels, artists. From the counter-culture comes the critique 
of authority and attacks on what is official and orthodox. No culture is 
understandable without some sense of this ever-present source of creative 
provocation from the unofficial to the official. To disregard the sense of 
restlessness… within each culture and to assume that there's complete 
homogeneity between culture and identity, is to miss what is vital and fertile in 
culture.”13 
 
This interplay of competing discourses is reflected in the narratives produced by 
different news media as they make sense of events and issues and construct the identities 
of the actors involved in these events and issues for their audiences.  
Mainstream news media and the dominant discourse of the Cold War 
Mainstream news media played a leading role in constructing the hegemonic 
discourse of the Cold War. In fact, the term “Cold War” as a way of characterizing 
international relations in the 20th century was first introduced and popularized by 
journalists and public intellectuals.14 The Cold War as a rhetorical construction15 and the 
array of corresponding metaphors defined international affairs for a large part of the 20th 
century. From a geopolitical point of view, imagining international affairs within the 
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confines of the Cold War discursive framework was convenient: “the Cold War, for all its 
risks, was characterized by a remarkably stable and predictable set of relationships 
among the great powers. Virtually every foreign policy move and world event, from a 
coup in Central America to cultural legislation in France, was to a great extent judged by 
its relation to the Cold War.”16 The Cold War discourse presented a similar convenience 
for mass media. In the United States, “journalists quickly discovered that they could sell 
their editors – because their editors could sell the public – almost any story pegged to a 
Soviet or communist threat, from crises in Berlin to Vietnam to Angola.” 17 This way, the 
commercial model of the free American media conveniently matched the ideological and 
geopolitical agenda of the US government. This approach further legitimized the Cold 
War model of global politics. As James Aronson noted, “the press helped to lead the 
nation into accepting a quarter century of the Cold War, with the awfulness that 
ensued.”18 It is important to note the difference between the mainstream press as an 
institution and the roles of individual journalists that worked for and in the system of the 
mainstream media. Several studies demonstrate how even though “the Cold War shaped 
understanding of all foreign events from the 1950s through 1991 for both journalists and 
policymakers, and correspondents had the difficult task of seeing through the 
simplification inherent in that frame to get at local realities,”19 individual journalists 
nevertheless tried to offer different understandings and interpretations of the Cold War 
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events and politics – sometimes more and sometimes less successfully, depending on 
various factors and circumstances.20 Yet there are also studies that examine the US 
mainstream media during the Cold War as institutions situated within a larger political 
system and thus not entirely immune to its ideological effects.21 Together, these studies 
show that the mainstream media did function as sites of ideological and discursive 
struggle, where the agency of individual journalists sometimes clashed with dominant 
understandings and interpretations of the Cold War as first and foremost a struggle 
between the two superpowers, yet these dominant understandings did exist on a structural 
level – otherwise the journalists would not feel that their attempts to interpret the events 
differently represented a “fight.”       
In the Soviet Union, where the media was controlled by the Communist Party, the 
dynamic was still rather complex.  On the one hand, the media in the Soviet Union was 
“an integral part of the party apparatus.”22 Yet several studies also demonstrate how 
Soviet media – and journalism – changed during the decades of the Cold War. For 
example, Dina Fainberg demonstrates and discusses the differences in how global politics 
was reported by the Soviet journalists during Stalin’s leadership and after it, with 
journalists having (and taking advantage of) more freedom to report on issues in more 
complex ways in post-Stalin era.23 Thomas Wolfe also demonstrates how the Soviet 
media of the post-Stalin era were part of a complex project of negotiation and redefinition 
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of the Soviet system and Soviet ideology, thus not always and not necessarily functioning 
as simply the tools of Soviet state propaganda.24 Yet these studies also note that the 
changes in Soviet journalism followed the changes in the Soviet political and ideological 
system, taking advantage of the opportunities opened up by, for example, post-Stalin’s 
era of Khrushchev’s Thaw, yet having to cope with the conservative conditions of 
Brezhnev’s era that followed the Thaw.    
The other history (or histories?) and the alternative discourses of the Cold War 
While the mainstream media in the United States and the Soviet Union 
constructed the reality of global politics in ways that often (though not always, as the 
previous section argues) interpreted international events within the framework of the 
rivalry between the two superpowers, a careful look at history shows that in spite of the 
domination of such canonical interpretations, the Cold War era was marked by 
tremendous complexities, tensions and contradictions.  
Several studies illuminate these complexities by introducing alternative ways of 
thinking about the Cold War. Penny Von Eschen, in her book Satchmo Blows Up the 
World: Jazz Ambassadors Play the Cold War, tells a compelling story of the US State 
Department-sponsored global jazz tours – a “cultural exchange” that had a strategic goal 
of “promoting black artists as goodwill ambassadors [and] symbols of the triumph of 
American democracy.”25 Von Eschen’s analysis brings to the surface the fundamental 
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contradiction between the image of the Unites States that the State Department sought to 
project to the rest of the world – one of the “land of freedom and equality” – and the 
reality of the Unites States still being a “land of Jim Crow laws.” The contradiction Von 
Eschen’s analysis reveals speaks directly to the question of state identity, and the roles of 
different populations and institutions in defining it. Though Von Eschen does not focus 
on examining the role of various media in covering the tours, she often cites the articles 
of the US mainstream newspapers; in her analysis, these mainstream media narratives 
support the image of the US crafted by the State Department, while the interactions of 
jazz musicians with different people on the tours often challenge this image. 
Von Eschen’s other work, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and 
Anticolonialism, 1937-1957, also challenges the bipolar framework of the Cold War. 
Here, Von Eschen’s analysis emphasizes the critical role that black press – an important, 
though not the only, segment of the various alternative US media – played in “reshaping 
international political debates and crafting new political strategies”26 during the Cold War 
era.  
James Aronson, in his work The Press and the Cold War, also discussed the role 
of the alternative press in challenging official US foreign policy and presenting “a 
counterweight to the general press which accepted and propagated without question basic 
United States policy and the virtue of the capitalist system.”27 Drawing on his own 
experience of founding and publishing one of such alternative publications – the National 
Guardian – Aronson described the publication’s philosophy in the following way: 
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“The National Guardian regarded United States policy as the chief source 
of the world’s problems. It did not as policy advocate socialism as an alternative, 
but insisted that it be discussed as a possible alternative, and not as a horrid word. 
It offered a sympathetic presentation of news of the socialist world, while 
reserving the right to be critical. It held that the peace of the world depended upon 
an acceptance by the people of the West that socialism was here to stay. Whether 
the peoples of the Western world liked it or not was irrelevant.”28 
 
Historical research exploring the counter-hegemonic narratives of the Cold War 
produced in the Soviet Union exists as well. Much of this research became possible after 
the opening of the Soviet archives. As Vladislav Zubok writes in his book A Failed 
Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War From Stalin to Gorbachev, “with all these 
sources, it became possible to write about the Cold War not just as a clash of great 
powers and as an accumulation of deadly weaponry. Above all, every history is the story 
of people and their motives, hopes, crimes, illusions, and mistakes. The Soviet Cold War 
had many fronts and dimensions – from Checkpoint Charlie in Berlin to Moscow 
kitchens, where dissidents spoke about Communism “with a human face,” from Politburo 
in the Kremlin to students’ dorms.”29 Though Soviet Union did not have official 
alternative media, the intricate networks of Samizdat – Soviet underground press created 
and disseminated by the Soviet citizens – functioned as discursive spaces of political 
dissent. Samizdat and the counter-discourses it produced were a part of the USSR’s state 
identity, in spite of the fact that this aspect of state’s identity was inconvenient for the 
state and thus it was rendered invisible.  
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Nationalism, globalization and power in the post-Cold War world 
 The power dynamic that underlies the coexistence and the continuous struggle 
between the mainstream and alternative interpretations (and corresponding media 
discourses) of events during the Cold War and after it connects this project to the 
theoretical discussion of nationalism and globalization as key frameworks for imagining 
the “world order” after the Cold War.  
At heart of the discussion is an idea expressed well by Nicholas Negroponte: “As 
we connect ourselves many of the values of a nation-state will give way to those of both 
larger and smaller communities.”30 Much has been written about the “values of the 
nation-state,” along with a nation-state’s multiple definitions. However, some of the core 
characteristics of the nation-state are sovereignty, defined territory, and a sense of 
common identity that connects the people belonging to a nation-state.31 These 
characteristics assume and require maintenance of a certain degree of isolationism and a 
necessity to draw various borders (not only physical ones) to be able to distinguish one 
state from another, one nation from another: this is us - and we do things and think about 
them this way, and those are them – and they act and think differently. To guarantee the 
security of a state, a certain order must be maintained; that is, a nation-state assumes the 
presence of a hierarchy – even in democratic nation-states – between the 
State/Government and the people/governed.  
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The relative isolationism and an ongoing concern over security also assume the 
development and maintenance of unity and solidarity among the people constituting a 
nation – something that is best achieved (under the nation-state paradigm) through 
fostering of a sense of common identity among the members of a nation. Mainstream 
mass media historically played an important role in creating and disseminating discourses 
that supported and reinforced that sense of common identity – an idea well expressed by 
Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities.”32 Under the nation-state 
paradigm, the information about outsiders is only valuable if it concerns the interests or 
the security of the insiders, and the state. Some of the best-known conceptualizations of 
the process of news-making stress this point. For example, Michael Gurevich’s concept 
of “domestication” suggests that in order for foreign events to become news for the 
domestic audiences, it must be tied to national security or/and national interests.33 Robert 
Entman also argues in his theory of framing that journalists, in order to present foreign 
news, search for frames that are “culturally congruent” – that is, resonate with the values 
and interests of the national audience.34 At the same time, such discourses often overlap 
with discourses of security that draw sharp distinctions between insiders and outsiders, 
defining their identities as fixed and monolithic. Cold War discourse, with its heavy 
reliance on security themes35 and on articulation of identities as monolithic and fixed 
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rather than nuanced and fluid, corresponds to the nation-state paradigm, and perhaps even 
serves as one of its best, though extreme, illustrations.  
 The turn of the twentieth century brought about transformations that, according 
to a number of scholars, challenged the nation-state paradigm on multiple dimensions. 
Significant changes in world trade, communication technologies and migration patterns 
created conditions that allowed non-state actors to pursue leading roles in managing 
world affairs. As Elizabeth Hanson puts it, “the stage of world politics is becoming so 
crowded that it is sometimes difficult to see who the main characters are. The stars are 
supposed to be the ones who have the most lines and provide the most action. But 
occasionally minor characters lurking in the background, or even previously invisible 
ones, leap to the center of the stage or simply assume a more important role.”36 Similarly, 
J. P. Singh argues that “the locus of authority, order, and legitimacy are shifting away 
from the state toward pluralism and actor advocacy”37 The conditions accompanying this 
arguably ongoing “power shift”38 create multiple opportunities for re-articulation and re-
formulation of state identities: “Globalization means that the potential of the media to 
buttress the identity of the state and its inhabitants is altered. Globalization means that the 
cultural bonds and loyalties that seemed to be within the control of the state are now less 
so.”39  
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The idea of the “power shift” has been disputed by scholars as well. For example, 
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye argue that the changes, especially those in the structure 
of information and its distribution worldwide, still occur within the existing power 
structure.40 Those who have more resources dictate the “rules of globalization.” Another 
line of criticism argues that states have always been challenged from inside and outside 
and always found ways of not only responding and adapting to those challenges, but also 
turning the challenges into opportunities for surveillance and more efficient order 
maintenance.41 
 Other scholars acknowledge changes in power dynamics but suggest that instead 
of interpreting these changes as a “power shift” it might be more useful to view them as 
an ongoing power struggle. For example, Manuel Castells argues that “the twin process 
of globalization and the rise of communal identities have challenged the boundaries of 
the nation state as the relevant unit to define a public space. Not that the nation-state 
disappears (quite the opposite), but its legitimacy has dwindled as governance is global 
and governments remain national.”42 Similarly, Ronald Deibert suggests that the state as 
power holder certainly exists and does not show signs of disappearance, but the political 
authority does not belong to the state alone anymore; it is dispersed among multiple 
                                                 
40
 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, “Power and Independence in the Information Age,” Foreign 
Affairs 77, no. 5 (September/October 1998): 81-94.   
41
 See, for example, Stephen Krasner, “Sovereignty,” Foreign Policy (January/February 2001); Paul Heyer, 
Communications and History: Theories of Media, Knowledge, and Civilization (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1988); Joanna Neuman, Lights, Camera, War: Is Media Technology Driving 
International Politics? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The 
Dark Side of Internet Freedom (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).  
42
 Manuel Castells, “Communication, Power and Counter-power in the Network Society,” International 
Journal of Communication, 1 (2007), 258. 
   27 
 
actors.43 Thus, globalization does not necessarily exclude nationalism as a framework for 
defining state (and individual) identities. However, it introduces multiple additional 
possibilities for identity articulation that are not limited by characteristics set within the 
nation-state framework.  
What is remarkable about the scholarly debate on nationalism and globalization is 
that it revolves exclusively around examining political actors and their actions. This 
project aims to shift the conversation to narratives and the nature of discourses informing 
these narratives in the post-Cold War world. If globalization means that power doesn’t 
belong to the state alone anymore and is instead dispersed among multiple actors, do the 
narratives that accompany power flows in the post-Cold War era also reflect this 
dynamic? Do the ways in which we talk about international affairs and the identities of 
states involved in these affairs evolve under the conditions of globalization that 
characterize the post-Cold War era? 
An insightful discussion by Clifford Geertz is particularly useful here. In his essay 
The World in Pieces: Culture and Politics at the End of the Century,44 Geertz reflected on 
the complexity of the post-Cold War world, with all its newly formed entities, alliances, 
sets of relations and identities. As Geertz put it, “the world of compact powers and 
contending blocks” gave way to “a stream of obscure divisions and strange 
instabilities,”45 to a world of “pressed-together dissimilarities variously arranged.”46 
                                                 
43
 Ronald Deibert, Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).  
44
 Clifford Geertz, “The World in Pieces: Culture and Politics at the End of the Century,” in Available 
Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics, ed. Clifford Geertz (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
45
 Ibid., 219. 
46
 Ibid.  
   28 
 
These relationships are “irregular, scrappy, ominously indeterminate;”47 Geertz called 
them a “disassembly” and added that “in a splintered world, we must address the 
splinters.”48 He then argued that so far there have been two general approaches to dealing 
with the world’s complexity: postmodernism, with its “neurasthenic skepticism about 
efforts to pull things together into encompassing accounts”49 and one of “totalizing 
concepts” like Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.” Neither approach is 
particularly useful in navigating the “disassembled world,” in Geertz’s view, so he put 
the following call out: “What we need, it seems, are not enormous ideas, not the 
abandonment of synthesizing notions altogether. What we need are ways of thinking that 
are responsive to particularities, to individualities, oddities, discontinuities, contrasts, and 
singularities, responsive to what Charles Taylor has called “deep diversity,” a plurality of 
ways of belonging and being, and that yet can draw from them – from it – a sense of 
connectedness, a connectedness that is neither comprehensive nor uniform, primal nor 
changeless, but nonetheless real.”50 
In this call Geertz pointed out – one more time – that cultures and identities are 
not fixed but rather dynamic, always-evolving and shifting, and that the end of the Cold 
War – the moment of rupture – had just increased and intensified the processes associated 
with cultural diversity and its negotiation by pushing individuals and communities to 
radically rethink and redefine who they are, where they belong, what they believe in and 
what is the best way to coexist. The post-Cold War conditions of globalization allow for 
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multiple discourses to exist and function simultaneously, sometimes in complementary 
and sometimes in contradictory ways, making the role of context particularly important. 
This project engages with multiple contexts by examining the discourses that a) are 
constitutive of these contexts and b) inform the narratives produced by the media with 
very different historical, political, linguistic and ideological backgrounds, as well as with 
different political and strategic goals.  
Articulation 
A critical aspect of the globalizing post-Cold War world is that multiple 
discourses coexist, overlap and compete for dominance, with news media comprising one 
of the key sites of this discursive struggle. Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation helps link 
various discourses that inform the media narratives about the events analyzed in this 
study and explain how they shape and reflect the power struggles and the relations of 
domination and subordination that structure the Russian and US mainstream and 
alternative media texts. Stuart Hall defines articulation as follows: “the form of the 
connection that can make a unity of two different elements under certain conditions. It is 
a linkage which is not necessarily, determined, absolute and essential for all time. You 
have to ask, under what circumstances can a connection be forged or made? The so-
called ‘unity’ of a discourse is really the articulation of different, distinct elements which 
can be rearticulated in different ways because they have no necessary ‘belongingness’. 
The ‘unity’ which matters is a linkage between the articulated discourse and the social 
forces with which it can, under certain historical 
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connected.”51 Lawrence Grossberg uses the metaphor of an English 16-wheel semi-truck 
to explain how articulation works.52 He says that such a truck is described in England as 
an articulated lorry, where the cab and the trailer are linked together: 
“The cab and the trailer can be separated, although neither piece would be very 
useful alone. The two pieces can be linked to other cabs or trailers to form a different 
truck, but neither half is a “truck” itself. The production of signs, texts, and meanings can 
be seen in similar terms. Signifiers are linked to produce signs; signs are linked to 
produce texts; texts are linked to produce interpretations. When someone uses language, 
he or she articulates signifiers together and codes together; this is how language makes 
signs, texts, and meanings. Meanings involve the articulation of relations between 
signifiers, relations that are themselves described in terms of codes. This process, at a 
broader level, implies that texts themselves have meaning only in relationship to the 
codes with which they are articulated or located, and hence in relationship to the broader 
set of other texts that carry those codes with them. The meaning of the message depends 
on the ways these codes are linked or articulated to other codes in and through texts.”53  
 
Articulation is a process, and thus articulation as a theory is rooted in the tradition 
of cultural studies that views theory as a “‘detour’ to help ground our engagement with 
what newly confronts us and to let that engagement provide the ground for 
retheorizing.”54 As Stuart Hall remarked, “the only theory worth having is that which you 
have to fight off, not that which you speak with profound fluency.”55 Thus, articulation is 
not just a link or a connection but a process of creating these links and connections.  
As Daryl Slack reminds us, articulation works at multiple levels. At the 
epistemological level, articulation is “a way of thinking the structures of what we know 
as a play of correspondences, non-correspondences and contradictions, as fragments in 
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the constitution of what we take to be unities.”56 Thus, articulation enables us to think of 
the ways in which the contradictions that are constitutive of specific practices can be 
thought together, even though these contradictions may not all arise at the same time and 
in the same way. As Hall states, “the structuralist paradigm… enable[s] us to begin really 
to conceptualize the specificity of different practices (analytically distinguished, 
abstracted out), without losing its grip on the ensemble which they constitute.”57 At the 
political level, articulation is “a way of foregrounding the structure and play of power 
that entail in relations of dominance and subordination.”58 Here Hall draws on the work 
of Antonio Gramsci on hegemony, interrogating the notions of power and privilege and 
arguing that certain articulations are more persistent and effective than others. Hall 
suggests that such articulations comprise “lines of tendential force,”59 making re-
articulation more difficult. At the strategic level, articulation “provides a mechanism for 
shaping intervention within a particular social formation, conjuncture or context.”60 Here 
articulation as a theory intersects with articulation as a method, allowing a theorist to 
examine how various social, political, economic, institutional forces are organized into 
units that are effective and are relatively empowering or disempowering.”61 As Daryl 
Slack notes, also quoting Hall,62 “the specificity of the domain of communication… 
requires that we examine the way in which these forces, at a certain moment, yield 
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intelligible meanings, enter the circuits of culture – the field of cultural practices – that 
shape the understandings and conceptions of the world of men and women in their 
ordinary everyday social calculations, construct them as potential social subjects, and 
have the effect of organizing the ways in which they come to or form consciousness of 
the world.”63 Thus, the aim of a cultural theorist’s practice (a “theoretically-informed 
political practice,”64 as Daryl Slack calls it) is to determine “when, where and how these 
circuits might be rearticulated.”65 
Method 
This project is based on a combination of a qualitative textual analysis and a 
discourse analysis of the news media texts. Qualitative textual analysis was used to 
identify key themes and dimensions within the themes for each case study. The analysis 
for each case study was conducted in three steps. During the first step of open coding - “a 
process of unrestricted coding… during which an analyst goes through the texts line by 
line and marks those chunks of text that suggest a category”66 – initial categories were 
identified for each case study. Next, these initial categories were integrated during axial 
coding – a stage in which “the codes are used to make connections between categories… 
thus [resulting] in the creation of either new categories or a theme that spans many 
categories.”67 As a result, the categories were “collapsed” into “notional categories”68 or 
themes, which comprise the final themes discussed in this project for each case study. 
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Additionally, some categories/themes were “dimensionalized.” According to Spiggle, 
“dimensionalization involves identifying properties of categories and constructs… Once 
a category has been defined, the analyst may explore its attributes or characteristics along 
the continua or dimensions.”69  
Discourse analysis was used to determine how various elements of the Cold War 
discourse informed the narratives comprising the themes and how other discourses 
structured the narratives. The discourse analysis was guided by the following questions: 
Which voices and texts were included and which were excluded? What significant 
absences could be identified? Which roles did different actors fill in the scenarios 
presented by different news media? What was discussed as a problem and what was 
discussed as an opportunity? Which solutions to the identified problems were legitimized 
and which ones were marginalized? Thus, discourse analysis allowed determining how 
the correspondences, non-correspondences and contradictions among the narratives and 
the discourses reflected the relations of symbolic domination and subordination 
structuring the texts, as well as how and where the opportunities for discursive 
transformation could be identified.  
The texts for the analysis were collected via different means. All texts for the US 
mainstream newspapers (the New York Times and The Washington Post) were obtained 
through the LexisNexis database accessed through the University of Minnesota library. 
The texts for the two Russian mainstream newspapers (Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty) 
were obtained by searching the archives of these publications; the texts of the news 
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articles were available free of charge. The same principle was used for the two Russian 
alternative publications (Novaya Gazeta and the New Times) and for the US alternative 
publications (The Nation and Z Magazine). All quotes from the Russian news media used 
to illustrate the points in the analysis section were translated to English by the author.   
The New York Times and the Washington Post were chosen for the analysis of the 
US mainstream news media discourses. Both newspapers fit well the definition of the 
“major national newspaper” with high circulation rates,70 robust readership base71 and 
editorial and news-gathering standards and practices that are considered professional and 
therefore authoritative and credible. In addition, both newspapers have foreign news 
bureaus - a resource that significantly widens these news outlets’ possibilities for 
covering foreign events and issues. Moreover, having foreign news bureaus increases the 
credibility of the news reports on foreign affairs in the eyes of the readers, serving as a 
powerful tool of legitimizing the narratives produced by both newspapers.  
The newspapers of the Russian media environment that fit the definition of the 
“major national newspaper” are Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) and Izvestia 
(The News). Izvestia is a daily with the audience of over 300,000 readers.72 Argumenty i 
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Fakty is a weekly newspaper with a large audience of over seven million readers.73 Both 
newspapers had correspondents reporting directly from the regions where the events 
analyzed in two of the three case studies in this project took place.  
Novaya Gazeta and The New Times are well-known in Russia for reporting that 
challenges existing political order without advocating for specific political parties that 
comprise the Russian “official” political opposition. Both employ a number of journalists 
famous for their investigative and literary work; several of them, including Anna 
Politkovskaya, were murdered or physically attacked as a result of their reporting on 
sensitive political issues.74 Novaya Gazeta has the audience of over 100,000 readers,75 is 
published twice a week and has a well-developed and constantly updated website. The 
New Times defines its mission as “being a magazine for and of the civil society, which 
means writing honestly and objectively about the events in Russia and in the world”76 and 
“about problems that others choose to ignore or silence.”77 
The Nation and Z Magazine have a long standing history of producing narratives 
that challenge dominant US discourses on domestic and international politics. The 
Nation, established in 1865, still follows the principles outlined in its founding 
prospectus: “The Nation will not be the organ of any party, sect, or body. It will, on the 
contrary, make an earnest effort to bring to the discussion of political and social 
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questions a really critical spirit, and to wage war upon the vices of violence, 
exaggeration, and misrepresentation by which so much of the political writing of the day 
is marred.”78 The Nation describes itself as “the flagship of the left,” and is published 
weekly. Z Magazine’s editor defines the publication’s mission as “one of keeping the 
politics alive, focusing more on reimagining society, and hoping for some event or 
catalyst to break through the reactionary politics that seems to dominate the 
mainstream.”79 Z Magazine is published once a month.  
It is important to note that the alternative publications both in Russia and in the 
US have significantly less resources than the mainstream news media, often existing 
solely off the readers’ contributions, and thus sometimes experiencing lapses or delays in 
coverage of certain issues. In addition, alternative media tend to focus on producing 
analytic essays or longer investigative reports rather than up to date reporting more 
typical for the mainstream media outlets. Because of this specificity, I had to make the 
time frames during which I conducted searches for the materials pertaining to the case 
studies more flexible for the alternative media. 
US and Russia during and after the Cold War: political context 
This project focuses on Russian and US media coverage of selected events in the 
post-Cold War era. While the project does not directly compare media texts with policy 
texts or documents that pertain to these events, it is important to provide a basic historical 
context crucial for understanding the significance of these events in the post-Cold War 
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era. Moreover, this project’s engagement with the “Cold War discourse” necessitates a 
discussion of the politics and policies of the Cold War era that made up what is defined in 
this project as the discourse of the Cold War.  
Thus, this section will first discuss the key directions of the US and 
Russian/Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War. Second, it will discuss how these 
directions changed and developed in the post-Cold War time.  
US foreign policy during the Cold War: key directions 
While there is a vast body of scholarship investigating and discussing the US 
foreign policy during the Cold War – with many disagreements, debates, controversies 
and unresolved questions – scholars tend to agree on some of the general foreign policy 
directions pursued by the United States between approximately 1947 (considerable 
debates exist regarding the official start of the Cold War as well) and 1991.  
The first – and perhaps defining – direction was informed by the policy of 
containment, which assumed employing any means possible to prevent further spread of 
communism. George Kennan first formulated the principles of the policy of containment 
in 1947 in his famous article in Foreign Affairs titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” 
and published under the pseudonym of Mr. “X.” In the article, Kennan insisted that a 
“policy of firm containment” must be “designed to confront the Russians with unalterable 
counterforce, at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a 
peaceful and stable world.”80   
The policy of containment drew on some of the already existing elements of the 
Truman Doctrine – a perspective on the US foreign policy articulated by President Harry 
                                                 
80
 “X,” “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs XXV (July 1947): 566-582, 570.  
   38 
 
S. Truman in 1947 that framed conflicts between non-communist regimes around the 
world and communist insurgents as ones between free peoples (non-communist) and 
totalitarian regimes (communist). The Truman Doctrine is often represented by the 
following phrase from the speech President Harry Truman delivered to Congress in 1947: 
“It must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.”81 The Truman 
Doctrine and the policy of containment became important components of the US foreign 
policy during the Cold War and influenced – though in different ways and to different 
degrees – subsequent policies and actions. American support of the client states 
worldwide – nations ruled by non-communist dictatorships backed by the United States – 
was informed by the doctrine of containment; these states, sometimes also called the 
“proxy states” often became the sites of “proxy wars,” as different sides in local civil 
wars were backed by the US and the USSR. The doctrine of containment was evoked by 
various American presidents at different times during the decades of the Cold War. For 
example, President Lyndon Johnson cited containment to justify his policies in Vietnam 
in 1960s. Later, in late 1970s, President Jimmy Carter returned to containment when 
reacting to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Finally, Ronal Reagan built on 
containment in developing his “new Reagan Doctrine” in 1980s, which denounced the 
USSR as an “evil empire,” thus justifying the right for the US to subvert existing 
communist governments worldwide.82  
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The doctrine of containment also informed the creation of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, designed to expand American influence in Europe. 
Paterson et al. quote a popular saying that NATO was designed “to keep the Soviets out, 
the Americans in, and the Germans down.”83 The creation of NATO was part of a larger 
political strategy of expanding American influence in Europe and containing the spread 
of communism in Europe. This strategy involved the European Recovery Program (ERP), 
more widely known as the Marshall Plan – a comprehensive, coordinated program 
intended to restore post-World War II Europe. In addition to the Marshall Plan, one of the 
pillars of the US foreign policy rooted in economic development was the support of free 
trade and international economic institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs and the World Bank.84 This way, containment 
of communism went hand in hand with active promotion of capitalism.  
Another critical component of the US foreign policy during the Cold War was 
nuclear deterrence – a strategy based on the development of nuclear weapons as a 
credible threat of retaliation in case of enemy attack. The primary focus of the US 
deterrent during the Cold War was the Soviet Union, which also had built nuclear force 
targeting the United States. The situation was called “mutual deterrence,” or as it was 
more often called, “mutual assured destruction” (MAD). While some have argued that 
MAD kept the two superpowers from an all-out war, others also noted that the existence 
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of nuclear weapons brought the world to the brink of nuclear war several times, most 
notably in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.85  
While containment and deterrence guided the US foreign policy for most of the 
Cold War, there were also periods of thaw in US-USSR relations. The most notable 
period occurred in the 1960s and 1970s and became known as détente. By then, the 
pattern of international relations became more complex, with Western Europe and Japan 
having recovered from the World War II destruction, and with the Third World nations 
forming alliances like the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
the Non-Aligned Movement, allowing these nations to assert their independence and 
resist the pressures from the US or the USSR. Particularly during the presidency of 
Richard Nixon, a strategy of “peaceful coexistence” was embraced by both superpowers, 
leading to the signing of the two arms control treaties – SALT I (the first limitation treaty 
signed by the US and the USSR) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.86 Both treaties 
limited the development of anti-ballistic and nuclear missiles. The second period of the 
Cold War when the American foreign policy was guided by efforts to improve relations 
with the USSR occurred in mid-to-late 1980s. It was during this period when President 
Ronald Reagan agreed to renew talks on economic issues and nuclear arsenal reductions. 
A series of talks between President Reagan and USSR’s General Secretary Mikhail 
Gorbachev resulted in several breakthroughs, such as, for example, the signing of the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. This course of foreign policy continued with 
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President George H. W. Bush and ended with the end of the Cold War when the 
beginning of the new era called for a renewed foreign policy.  
Russian/Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War: key directions 
The Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War was driven, like domestic policies, 
by ideology of Marxism-Leninism, though at different times (especially in the later stages 
of the Cold War) changes in the Soviet leadership introduced changes in the extent to 
which the ideology affected Soviet foreign policy.  
Immediately after the World War II, the USSR started to establish policies that 
would counter British and American power in Europe. This was reflected in 
“Sovietization” of Eastern Europe under the control and supervision of Soviet military 
forces, as well as in creation of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) tasked 
with establishment and coordination of Soviet-led policy in Europe.87 Similar efforts 
extended beyond Eastern Europe later, with the creation of the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON) – an organization that served as a framework for 
cooperation between the USSR, its Eastern European allies and the Soviet allies in the 
Third World.88 These initiatives were part of the Soviet reaction to the American doctrine 
of containment. Similarly, in 1955, the Warsaw Pact – a Soviet-led military alliance 
based in Eastern Europe – was created to counter NATO. The principles of spreading 
communism worldwide while countering Western capitalism and imperialism informed 
the Soviet foreign policies aimed at suppressing liberalization and democratization 
movements in Eastern Europe (with the Soviet violent suppression of such movement in 
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Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 serving as particularly dramatic 
examples), as well as at supporting “national liberation movements” in countries of the 
Third World (for example, in Ethiopia, Angola, Nicaragua and El Salvador in 1970s).89 
This line of foreign policy was particularly strong under Stalin’s leadership, and then 
again, in the 1970s, under the leadership of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. The 
Brezhnev Doctrine postulated that a threat to socialism in one country meant a threat to 
socialism everywhere; such threats, according to the Brezhnev Doctrine, had to be 
countered with military force.90 The doctrine persisted even throughout the détente period 
of US-USSR relations, culminating in the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 
(informed by the doctrine) and ending the détente. 
At the same time, other trends shaped Soviet foreign policy during the Cold War. 
For example, two years after Stalin’s death in 1953, the First Secretary Nikita 
Khrushchev took embraced the policy of “De-Stalinization.” He denounced Stalin’s 
politics and policies as careless and ruthless, as well as challenged Leninist notion about 
the inevitable warfare between Socialism and Capitalism.91 Khrushchev emphasized the 
policy aimed at achieving peaceful co-existence, especially in the face of the danger of 
nuclear war. Ironically, it was under Khrushchev leadership when the USSR and the US 
were on the brink of the nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis. It was also under 
Khrushchev leadership when the Berlin Wall was constructed in order to prevent massive 
emigration and defection from East Germany to West Germany.  
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The sharpest turn in the Soviet foreign policy occurred in the mid-to-late 1980s 
with the reforms introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev, widely known as perestroika. The 
reforms aimed at improving Soviet economy, while turning away from the arms race with 
the US. This meant the recognition of the irrelevance of the buffer zone in Eastern 
Europe, and therefore the end of USSR’s interference in the politics of the Eastern 
European states. This also meant consent to German reunification, which resulted in the 
demolition of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The Soviet troops were withdrawn from 
Afghanistan under Gorbachev’s leadership, and several mutual arms control agreements 
were reached with the United States in a series of arms control summits.            
US foreign policy after the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War introduced the need for the United States to reset its 
foreign policy goals and priorities. The chief enemy disappeared and while on the one 
hand this was a source of celebration and a “proof” of American superiority, it also, on 
the other hand, resulted in a sense of “loss of direction” in American foreign policy. One 
of the key questions that became central to the US foreign policy after the Cold War 
concerned interventions in conflicts abroad. If before the interventions were justified by 
the doctrine of containment, in the new political landscape marked by “the changing 
structure of the world power, the rising tide of nationalism and ethnic identity, the 
challenge of Islamic jihadism, the increased importance of world economics, and the 
prominence of relatively new foreign policy issues like the environment and drugs”92 
making decisions regarding foreign interventions became much more complex. In light of 
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this complexity, George H. W. Bush introduced a standard for intervention termed 
“prudent realism,” which meant that the US should intervene only when its national 
interests were at stake, when no other effective option were available, and when the use 
of force was likely to be effective. One of the first examples of an intervention based on 
“prudent realism” was the Persian Gulf War in 1991, where the US, several Middle 
Eastern countries and Gorbachev’s Soviet Union expelled Saddam Hussein’s Iraqis from 
Kuwait. In other instances – notably in Yugoslavia and Bosnia that both sunk into civil 
wars in the 1990s – the US did not intervene as Bush argued that no American national 
interests were at stake there. At the same time, several humanitarian interventions, 
notably in Panama and Somalia, occurred under the pressure by the American public, 
despite the fact that no vital US interests were involved.  
Bill Clinton’s intervention policy shifted the focus from unilateralism to the 
involvement of multiple actors, notably the United Nations. It also put heavier emphasis 
on the idea that interventions are legitimate if they aim to “defend democratic principles 
and human rights against atrocious regimes.”93 Interventions, however, were not the main 
priority of Bill Clinton’s foreign policy, despite three difficult intervention dilemmas – in 
Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans – Clinton faced early in his presidency. Instead, he 
focused more on expanding free markets, democracy and on “preparing the US for the 
challenges of globalization.”94 One of the most notable trade agreements reached during 
Clinton’s presidency was NAFTA, which reduced tariffs and promoted investment 
between the US, Canada and Mexico. Clinton also expanded NATO in Europe, “reduced 
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the North Korean threat through a mixture of deterrence and diplomacy, and helped bring 
China into the global mainstream.”95 Clinton also supported Russia’s transition to market 
economy and its membership in the G8. It was also under Clinton’s leadership when 
nuclear weapons were removed from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Critics argued 
that Clinton’s foreign policy lacked strategic focus and was for the most part reactive. 
Cameron cited one critic who insisted that Clinton “stumbled from crisis to crisis, trying 
to figure out what was popular, what would be effective, and what choices would pose 
the lower risk to his presidency, and, especially, his reputation.”96 
George W. Bush’s foreign policy in many ways opposed Clinton’s and set the US 
on a different course. Bush announced the end of US’s engagement in the Middle East 
peace process, the suspension of the talks with North Korea, termination of sending 
troops to the Balkans and a push toward strengthening national missile defense. This 
agenda led to critics proclaiming Bush’s “retreat from US role as a peace broker.”97 As 
Cameron noted, “the world has become accustomed to US participation in and general 
support for multilateral institutions during the Bush senior and Clinton administrations. 
Many world leaders, therefore, found it difficult to accept the new Republican view that 
international organizations often reflect ‘a consensus that opposes American interests or 
does not reflect American principles and ideas’.”98 The biggest foreign policy challenge 
Bush faced also became the biggest turning point not only in the US post-Cold War 
foreign policy but in the entire US (and global) post-Cold War history. The terrorist 
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attacks of September 11, 2001 led to a new agenda in Bush’s foreign policy. He 
articulated this agenda in a famous “you are either with us or with the terrorists” phrase. 
The global was on terror was proclaimed, leading to US’s unilateral decision to first 
attack and defeat the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and later, in 2002, to start the war in 
Iraq. The war in Iraq became one of the most controversial wars in US’s history, as it was 
grounded on allegations that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction, 
which later turned out to be false. Additionally, the United National Security Council did 
not authorize the invasion of Iraq, yet President Bush chose to do so unilaterally. The war 
drew heavy international criticism, and gradually the domestic criticism as well (even 
though initially the American public supported the invasion). The post-9/11 “war on 
terror” foreign policy course changed the priorities for the US, shifting the focus to the 
Middle East, Persian Gulf and South Asia, and away from Europe, Latin America and 
Africa.  
Barack Obama, as Combs put it, “promised a foreign policy profoundly different 
from the Bush Doctrine of unilateralism, preemption, and the massive use of armed force 
to spread American ideals.”99 Deeply critical of the war in Iraq, he made putting an end to 
the war one of his top foreign policy priorities. At the same time, Obama’s foreign policy 
was “far from pacifist,”100 and even though he explicitly rejected the Bush Doctrine, he 
stuck to some of its principles. While embracing internationalism and diplomacy, Obama 
did not completely reject unilateralism. “I – like any other head of state – reserve the 
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right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend my nation,”101 proclaimed Obama in his 
Nobel speech. Obama continued the war on terror, though he narrowed down the focus, 
identifying al-Qaeda network as the enemy and authorizing drone strikes and special 
operations raids (one of them resulting in killing of Osama bin Laden) as one of the key 
methods of fighting al-Qaeda. Obama also negotiated the new START nuclear reduction 
treaty with Russia as part of the larger strategy of the US-Russia relations “reset,” though 
the effectiveness of the “reset” has been doubted as disagreements between the US and 
Russia grew during Obama’s presidency. Obama’s successes, at least according to Indyk 
et al., also include effective management of relations with China, rebuilding the Unites 
States’ international reputation and completing free-trade accords.102 Among the 
setbacks, Indyk et al. include “no progress on resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
very little to show on combating climate change, the United States' continued low 
standing in the Muslim world, deepening frictions in U.S.-Pakistani relations, a Mexico 
awash in drugs and violence, an Iran still bent on acquiring the means to produce and 
deliver nuclear weapons, and a North Korea still developing its nuclear arsenal.”103 
Indyk et al. characterize Obama’s style of foreign policy in the following way: 
“The Obama approach has been relatively nonideological in practice but informed by a 
realistic overarching sense of the United States' role in the world in the twenty-first 
century. The tone has been neither that of American triumphalism and exceptionalism nor 
one of American decline. On balance, this approach has been effective, conveying a 
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degree of openness to the views of other leaders and the interests of other nations while 
still projecting confidence and leadership. Judged by the standard of protecting American 
interests, Obama's foreign policy so far has worked out quite well; judged by the standard 
of fulfilling his vision of a new global order, it remains very much a work in progress.”104  
Russian foreign policy after the Cold War 
 
When talking about Russia of the early 1990s, many historians and political 
scientists refer to this period as one of the post-Cold War euphoria. This was the time 
when Russian leaders developed a pro-Western vision of Russian national identity and 
foreign policy. Fascinated by the economic and political rise of the West, leaders 
embraced such Western ideals as freedom, prosperity and justice. As Tsygankov wrote, 
“it was this fundamental belief in the superiority of the Western system that also shaped 
the minds of the emerged liberal coalition in Russia. Boris Yeltsin and his liberal foreign 
minister Andrey Kozyrev believed that history in a sense had ended and presented no 
alternatives to the pro-Western development.”105 Kozyrev and other liberal Westernizers 
asserted that “the country’s very system of values was to be changed, as Russia was to 
accept the priority of the individual and the free market over society and the state. As a 
result, a “natural partnership” with Western countries was to develop, and Russia was to 
be brought to the front-rank status of such countries as France, Germany, and the United 
States within ten to twelve years.”106 This new vision of national interest emphasized the 
importance of developing in three key directions: radical economic reforms, rapid 
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membership in the Western international institutions, and isolationism from the former 
Soviet states.  
The concept of national interest based on liberal Westernization was quite 
revolutionary and in many ways unprecedented. As Tsygankov put it, “never before had 
Russia’s officials been as supportive of dismantling their imperial institutions, as critical 
of their own history, and as trusting of Western intentions.”107   
The liberal Westernization course, however, began to lose its momentum towards 
the end of 1992, as it was challenged by other visions of Russia’s identity, foreign policy 
and national interest that were expressed by various political groups and existed in the 
society at large. There were competing visions among the Westernizers themselves; they 
split up into liberal Westernizers, social democrats and statists. Social democrats viewed 
Russia as an independent part of international society. Russia, in their view, had its own 
specific interests but also shared some common interests with others. The main threats to 
Russia were seen as coming from the violation of basic human rights and disrespect for 
cultural pluralism. Statists viewed Russia as a sovereign state and a great power with its 
own specific interests in maintaining the stability of the international system. Statists saw 
the main threats to Russia coming from state-revisionists seeking to change the existing 
balance of power. There were also views expressed by the so-called civilizationists, who 
also were represented by two “camps”: national communists and hard-line eurasianists. 
National communists perceived Russia as an independent social civilization and a great 
power/superpower whose interests were incompatible with those of the West. Russia’s 
interests, according to the national communists’ vision, included restoration of a balance 
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of power between socialism and capitalism and the spread of the influence of Russian 
civilization. National communists saw the main threats to Russia coming from the West 
and its imperial intentions. Hard-line eurasianists viewed Russia as a land-based 
geopolitical empire. Russia’s interests were seen as mutually exclusive from those of sea-
based powers and included the preservation and expansion of Russia’s geopolitical 
sphere of influence. Hard-line eurasianists saw the main threats to Russia coming from 
the sea-based powers. 
While each vision was quite strongly supported by different clusters of Russian 
population, the statist vision of Russia’s development started replacing the liberal 
Westernization one by mid 1990s. This shift marked a new period in Russia’s post-Cold 
War history termed by some scholars the Great Power Balancing.108 
The new course viewed geopolitics as a defining factor of Russia’s development. 
The idea of the revival of Russia as great power became dominant. Although this position 
leaned towards viewing the world in terms of competition among great powers, it was not 
anti-Western and did not see Russia as hostile to the West. As Tsygankov summarized it, 
“the Statist worldview then was a familiar realist picture of power competition between 
sovereign states reminiscent of nineteenth-century European politics; that is, the world is 
not inherently hostile, but it does consist of selfish power-seeking state actors whose 
interests must be balanced in order to maximize peace and stability.”109 
Statist view of Russia’s national interest in mid to late 1990s was based on the 
idea of a multipolar world. In a nutshell, this meant that in order to restore and preserve 
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its significant geopolitical role of the great power, Russia had to become an independent 
power pole; otherwise it would not have an independent voice in international politics. 
Instead of succumbing to the rhetoric of the strongest (mainly the U.S.), Russia should 
use a combination of cooperation and balancing policies to undermine the unipolarity.110 
Flexible alliances (not confrontation with other great powers), reintegration of the former 
Soviet region and economic reforms became the main means for achieving the desired 
ends. 
While the course determined by the statist view continued throughout the 
beginning of 2000s, it took a new turn with Vladimir Putin coming to power in 2000. The 
new course, often labeled in political and historical literature as the Great Power 
Pragmatism embodied both a continuation of and a departure from the Great Power 
Balancing one.  
Pragmatism, self-concentration and emphasis on modernization and economic 
growth were put forward, replacing the previous course’s emphasis on the power 
balancing. Putin’s vision of the early 2000s in a sense combined Westernist and Statist 
influences. As Tsygankov put it, “unlike Gorbachev…, Putin was not eager to replicate 
Western social democratic or liberal values on Russian soil, and he made it clear that 
Russia would never become the ‘second edition’ of… the U.S. or Britain.”111 Rather, he 
saw his country as a modern great power capable of adapting to a changing world under 
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state leadership. In the tradition of Statism, the priority is given to governability and the 
state’s ability to exercise its power, whereas democracy comes second.”112  
When it came to defining Russia’s national interest, Putin’s vision valued 
geoeconomics over geopolitics, thus emphasizing the idea of defending national interest 
by economic means rather than by balancing American influences in the world. The 
guiding principles of the Great Power Pragmatism were defined as follows: 
counterterrorist cooperation with Europe and the U.S. (after the terrorist attacks in 
September 2001), limited integration in the world economy and market-based principles 
in the former Soviet region.113 
During the first term of Putin’s presidency, the Great Power Pragmatism course 
stayed true to its proposed principles, for the most part. Russia’s economic and social 
conditions improved significantly since the 1990s; as Edward Lucas noted, “… 
investments [were] pouring in and living standards [were] rising. Most Russians have 
never had it so good.”114 Russia’s relationships with the states of the former Soviet region 
were stable and even cooperative, including the relationships with the countries that went 
through the first wave of the so-called “colored revolutions.”115 The new foreign policy 
course that focused on improving relations with the West on the bases of 
counterterrorism and energy issues also seemed to work more or less flawlessly, although 
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this course still “did not mean that Russia’s power to defend its own perceived interests at 
home and in the region was to be seriously curtailed.”116 
Putin’s second term of presidency was marked by a new dimension of his Great 
Power Pragmatism of the early 2000s. This new dimension is commonly referred to as 
Great Power Assertiveness. The turn to assertiveness is often attributed to the external 
geopolitical factors that Russia confronted in the 2000s.  
Particularly, Russian officials became increasingly critical of what they saw as 
American “unilateral” approaches to foreign policy. Putin expressed this view explicitly 
in his speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in February of 2007: 
“One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has 
overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, 
political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who 
likes this? Who is happy about this? … Russia is a country with a history that 
spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to 
carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition 
today.”117 
 
The theme of Russia’s right to “decide for itself the pace, terms and conditions of 
moving towards democracy”118 became the most prevalent one in the speeches of Russian 
political leaders both on national and international levels. 
The area where Russia’s national interests became highly contested during the 
Great Power Assertiveness period of Russia’s post-Cold War foreign policy was the CIS 
(Commonwealth of Independent States) space. Some consequences of the colored 
revolutions – former Soviet states’ aspirations to join NATO, presence of NATO troops 
on the territories that Russia has historically considered the “buffer” zone between itself 
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and the West, strong anti-Russian sentiments in those countries and their strengthening 
ties with the West – were perceived as threats to Russia’s national security. Russia’s 
rather harsh response to Georgia’s invasion of South Ossetia in August of 2008 was 
widely interpreted as a “high point” of the Great Power Assertiveness vision, and a 
“signal to the rest of the world that Russia continued to regard the CIS as its own sphere 
of influence, where it would not tolerate having its interests ignored.”119 Some 
researchers noted that “the Russia-Georgia crisis… became an indicator of a bigger 
Russia-West crisis.”120 
It is precisely during this period when the conversations about the “new Cold 
War” had started. Russia’s assertive approaches made observers talk about “Russia 
reverting to Soviet behavior”121 or “Russia’s return to the bad habits of its Soviet past.”122 
Researchers started discussing “the rise of a new authoritarianism on the world stage,”123 
the “potential for the diffusion of autocracy,”124 the “democratic recession”125 and the 
“geopolitical balance between democracy and autocracy.”126 
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Chapter 2: The War in South Ossetia 
The five-day war in South Ossetia in August of 2008 can indeed be called “a little 
war that shook the world,” as the title of a recent book on it does.1 It escalated and ended 
very quickly, resulting in enormous damages and a high toll of victims for a five-day war. 
Most importantly for this project, it was accompanied by a landslide of confusing, 
contradictory and often polarizing information about who started the war (Georgia, South 
Ossetia or Russia?) and whose interests (Georgian, American, South Ossetian or 
Russian?) were at stake, thus raising a number of critical questions about the political 
power struggles defining the post-Soviet space in the post-Cold War era. These questions 
pertain to the view that the post –Soviet space remains a territory of geopolitical 
contestation in the post-Cold War time, functioning as a “buffer zone” between NATO 
forces and Russia. As states and nations comprising this “buffer zone” negotiate their 
national identities, wrestling with questions of sovereignty and independence, they are 
also caught up in a bigger power play that traces its roots to the struggle over the “spheres 
of influence” that defined the Cold War.  
As some analysts have noted, the conflict marked a turning point in Russia-US 
post-Cold War relations specifically and in the “East-West relations” in general2 as “the 
rhetoric, used by both sides, [bore] all similarities with the Cold War period.”3 Indeed, as 
I noted in the introduction, this conflict drew my attention to the topic of the Cold War 
discourse in the post-Cold War media narratives on the first place, as I couldn’t help 
noticing how the differences in the ways US and Russian mainstream news media 
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presented the conflict revealed critical and unresolved tensions that the end of the Cold 
War claimed to resolve.  
This chapter examines the narratives constructed by the US and Russian 
mainstream and alternative news media about the five-day war in order to determine to 
what extent (if at all) these narratives rely on or depart from the discourse of the Cold 
War and what other discourses informed these narratives as Russian and US news media 
explained and interpreted the conflict to their audiences. This chapter seeks to identify 
how – through articulation of multiple elements of various discourses – the US and 
Russian mainstream and alternative media communicated to their readers why they 
should care about the conflict and what about the conflict do they really have to know. 
The analysis is thus based on the following questions: how were the relations between 
smaller and bigger players imagined and re-imagined in media texts analyzed? How were 
the claims of smaller players for sovereignty and independence articulated and in what 
ways were they legitimized or marginalized? How were the roles and the arguments of 
the bigger players (and which players were defined as “big”?) articulated? Were the 
heroes, villains and victims clearly identified? What causes and consequences of the 
conflict were discussed and which solutions were offered in various media texts? These 
questions are important to examine as I would argue that the ways in which the key 
narratives and the images of the key actors involved in the war in South Ossetia in 2008 
were articulated contributed to the creation and perpetuation of a particular discursive 
environment that privileges certain ways of talking about the conflicts in the post-Soviet 
space while marginalizing others.  
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To better understand the significance of the key points of discursive contestation 
revealed through the comparative analysis in this chapter, it is necessary to briefly discuss 
the historical and political background of the war in South Ossetia. 
Historical background of the conflict 
The initial start of the tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia can be traced 
back to the late 80s - early 90s. In 1989 South Ossetia declared political autonomy, and 
started operating as an autonomous region within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(SSR). In 1990, the USSR passed legislation that gave the autonomous regions the right 
to either gain independence along with the Republic they belonged to or remain in the 
Soviet Union. When Georgia left the USSR in 1991, South Ossetia chose to remain a part 
of the USSR. Political tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia soon grew into an 
armed conflict, which lasted until 1992. Russia took part in mediating the conflict, and in 
1992, after a series of negotiations a ceasefire defined both a zone of conflict around the 
South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali and a security corridor along the border of South 
Ossetian territories. Tskhinvali was isolated from the Georgian territory around it and 
Russian, Georgian and South Ossetian peacekeepers were stationed in South Ossetia 
under the Joint Control Commission's (JCC) mandate of demilitarization.4 During the 
1990s, Russia granted citizenship to the majority of South Ossetians,5 which the Georgian 
government called the “annexation of Georgian territory.”6 A number of other events 
during the 1990s contributed to strengthening relations between South Ossetia and Russia 
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on one side and to raising tensions between Georgia and South Ossetia and Georgia and 
Russia on the other side.  
The tensions remained latent until 2003, when Mikheil Saakashvili came to power 
in Georgia's Rose Revolution. He started a program geared towards the territorial 
unification of Georgia, strengthening security and military state institutions and 
implementing what many viewed as a pro-US foreign policy.7 One of Saakashvili’s main 
goals was Georgian NATO membership, which became a stumbling block in Georgian-
Russian relations, as Russia opposed Georgia’s NATO membership.  
Georgia maintained a close relationship with the George W. Bush administration. 
In 2002, the United States started the Georgia Train and Equip Program to arm and train 
the Georgian military, and in 2005 the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations 
Program aimed to broaden the capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. These programs 
involved training by the United States Army Special Forces, United States Marine Corps, 
and military advisors personnel.8 
South Ossetia, on the other hand, maintained a close relationship with Russia. In 
addition to granting Russian citizenship to South Ossetians, in 2006 Russia promised to 
help South Ossetia in case of a military offensive from Georgia.  
Tensions between Russia and Georgia grew by 2008. Throughout the summer of 
2008, clashes and shelling between Georgian and South Ossetian forces occurred. In spite 
of the fact that on the evening of August 7, 2008, President Saakashvili ordered a 
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unilateral ceasefire, later that night Georgian forces began a major artillery assault on 
Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia. The headquarters of the Russian peacekeeping 
forces also came under fire, and several Russian peacekeeping force soldiers were killed. 
Next day, Russia entered the war, and after five days of battles the war had officially 
ended. Russian President Medvedev ordered an end to military operations in Georgia. 
Later on the same day, he met the President-in-Office of the European Union, French 
President Nicolas Sarkozy, and approved a six-point peace plan. Late that night Georgian 
President Saakashvili agreed to the text. By August 16 all parties signed the ceasefire 
agreement. On August 26, 2008, Russia officially recognized South Ossetia’s 
independence.9 In response, Georgia cut diplomatic ties with Russia, and declared South 
Ossetia Russian-occupied Georgian territory.10 
The war in South Ossetia lasted only a week but it received extensive news media 
coverage, which continued even after the war officially ended. Thus, the time frame for 
the analysis was extended from the August 7 – 16, 2008 period to August 7 – 31, 2008 in 
order to include more materials that played a critical role in the construction of meanings 
about the conflict. During this period, the New York Times published 98 articles related to 
the war, with 50 articles falling in the period of the actual war (before August 16th). 
Eighty three articles came out in The Washington Post, with 40 being published before 
August 16th. 164 articles were published in Izvestia, with 92 covering the events before 
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August 16th. Argumenty i Fakty contained 18 articles11, with 8 materials published in the 
August 13th (3) and August 20th (5) issues. The Nation published eight articles, and Z 
Magazine featured one long analytical piece in its October issue. Novaya Gazeta 
published 38 materials, and The New Times featured six.  
US mainstream media coverage 
A Russia-Georgia war 
 Both US newspapers presented the conflict as one between Georgia and Russia, 
where the Georgian attacks on South Ossetia only “sharply escalated the fighting,”12 and 
where the military power of the “emboldened Kremlin”13 was juxtaposed to the 
innocence of “the small, mountainous country … taken by surprise by the intensity of the 
Russian response.”14 Interestingly, both the New York Times and The Washington Post 
published short news reports on August 8 presenting the conflict as one between Georgia 
and South Ossetia, and quoting “experts” who stated that “the appearance [was] that the 
violence is linked to strategic moves by one or both sides to improve their positions.''15 
Yet, next day both newspapers sharply reframed the conflict as one between Russia and 
Georgia. The analysts quoted in the August 9 articles said that “either Georgia or Russia 
could be trying to seize an opportune moment – with world leaders focused on the start of 
the 2008 Olympics this week – to reclaim the territory, and to settle the dispute,”16 with 
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Russian goals being to “do a creeping annexation of South Ossetia… and … to overthrow 
Saakashvili, who is a tremendous thorn in their side.''17 Additionally, both US mainstream 
news media suggested that the reason Russia invaded Georgia was to “administer a quick 
military “punishment” to Mr. Saakashvili, and then restore some version of the unstable 
status quo ante.” 18 Both newspapers made explicit references to the Cold War when 
commenting on a larger geopolitical context of the conflict. For example, the New York 
Times remarked that “global politics have breathed new life into the conflict, making it a 
flash point for resurgent tensions between former cold war rivals,”19 with another author 
suggesting that “for much of the diplomatic and policy-making world, the border where 
Georgia faces Russia, with South Ossetia … between them, has become a new cold war 
frontier.”20 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili and Georgia 
Both the New York Times and The Washington Post depicted Georgian President 
Mikheil Saakashvili as an impulsive leader. However, “impulsive” was presented as 
romantic and passionate about democracy. “Some diplomats considered Mr. Saakashvili 
a politician of unusual promise, someone who could reorder Georgia along the lines of a 
Western democracy and become a symbol of change in the politically moribund post-
Soviet states. Mr. Saakashvili encouraged this view, framing himself as a visionary who 
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was leading a column of regional democracy movements,” stated the New York Times.21 
Saakashvili was depicted as a leader, “who led his country from near bankruptcy into a 
golden age of economic growth and the world's highest rate of foreign direct investment 
as a percentage of GDP.”22 While some articles acknowledged that Saakashvili was 
emotional and even “the most theatrical of presidents”23 who “must think strategically 
about the future… and manage the situation [like conflict in South Ossetia] with greater 
care,”24 the overall image of the Georgian President was presented as one of a hero who 
had the courage to play a game of “baiting the Russian bear.”25  
Georgia as a country was presented by both newspapers in a similar way: 
“melodramatic”26 and “theatrical”27, yet a “courageous democracy,”28 a “beacon of 
democracy in the post-Soviet space”29 and a “poster child for Westernization”30 who 
historically “suffered from the Soviet rule.”31 Both newspapers argued that Georgia was 
now suffering from Russian “neo-imperialism” as Russia was “determined to turn 
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Georgia into the kind of vassal state that existed during Soviet times,”32 and therefore 
Georgia was fully “trusting the West to save it from a ravenous neighbor.”33  
While both newspapers made no explicit references to the Cold War within this 
theme, the image of Georgia was constructed almost exclusively by placing it in the 
context of the geopolitical struggle for power between evil “neo-imperialist Russia” and 
good democratic West. 
Russia and Russian political leaders 
Russia was depicted in the conflict’s coverage as the main aggressor, who “seeks to 
regain lost power”34 and “wants to flex the muscles”35 by “picking at those smaller than 
itself.”36 The most often used characteristics of Russia pointed to its imperialistic desire 
to “demoralize and dominate Eastern Europe”37 by “ruthlessly pressing at its borders [and 
being] implacably hostile to democratic neighbors like Georgia and Ukraine.”38 “Russia 
doesn’t have limited aims”39 and its real goal is to “get rid of Mikheil Saakashvili, 
Georgia's pro-democracy, pro-American president,”40 as well as to “dismantle Georgia, a 
democratic state that is worth saving for itself but also because it is the first domino of 
the Near Abroad,”41  asserted both US newspapers. Additionally, just like the “conspiracy 
theory” about the United States orchestrating the conflict in South Ossetia gained 
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popularity in Russian news media, the same, but reversed in terms of the “main actor,” 
theory unfolded on the pages of the two US newspapers42.  
The image of Russian political leaders, and the image of the Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin, was presented similarly. It is important to note that while 
Dmitry Medvedev was the President of Russia at time of the conflict, the US news media 
focused mainly – and overwhelmingly – on Putin’s persona. The newspapers questioned 
the authority of President Medvedev by calling him “Mr. Putin’s hand-picked 
successor,”43 whose power is limited and “whose real job is to act as Putin's lawyer.”44 
By stating that “the events of the past five days wiped away any pretense that President 
Dmitry Medvedev runs the country,”45 both newspapers justified associating Russia’s 
politics during the conflict with the political image of Vladimir Putin.  
In turn, Vladimir Putin’s political image allowed making the “natural” fit between 
his persona and the image of Russia as it was presented by both newspapers. Prime 
Minister Putin was depicted by both newspapers as the “former KGB officer whose 
views were shaped in the Cold War era,”46 and who “systematically centralized power in 
his own hands.”47 Putin’s goal, according to both newspapers, was to “destabilize the 
Saakashvili regime.”48 The journalists went further and directly compared Putin to Stalin: 
“History offers no neat repetitions, but Russia's power gambit in the Caucasus and 
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challenge to the post-1991 order would be entirely familiar to Stalin. After World War II, 
Stalin seemed at the height of his prestige after years of revolution, terror and war – just 
as today Mr. Putin's Russia seems muscular and resurgent after the humiliations of the 
1990s.”49 When connecting Putin’s persona to the politics of Russia in the conflict in 
South Ossetia, the New York Times made direct references to the Cold War: “If we are 
returning to cold war, the Berlin Crisis is the most useful precedent. Stalin tested the 
West in Berlin in 1948 much as Mr. Putin is doing in Georgia today.”50 Referring to “Mr. 
Putin’s cold war mentality” 51 and developing the narrative of comparing Putin to Stalin, 
the New York Times moved to a larger question of domination and spheres of influence: 
“It isn't just a question of spheres of influence; it's about domination. Stalin remarked that 
his armies would impose his political system on Eastern Europe. Likewise, Moscow's 
Georgian invasion aims to remove American-style democracy, replacing it with Russia's 
strain of managed authoritarian politics. The Kremlin, then and now, is basically against 
anything that we are for.”52 This last quote shows how the image of Russia and Russian 
politicians was presented through explicit juxtaposition to the image of the United States, 
placing the comparison squarely within the “us versus them” and “evil versus good” 
categories. 
Russian mainstream media coverage 
A Georgia-South Ossetia war 
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Both Russian newspapers presented the conflict as one between Georgia and 
South Ossetia, where Russia had to intervene to prevent Georgia from demolishing the 
much smaller republic of South Ossetia.  Most news reports focused on the dramatic 
events taking place in Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, depicting the brutality of 
the Georgian military, and juxtaposing the power of the “best-trained and best-equipped 
in all post-Soviet space”53 Georgian army with the disempowered and demoralized South 
Ossetian civilians who were being killed, and who begged Russia for help.54 
Russian newspapers described the Georgian “invasion to South Ossetia” as “a 
well-planned by Saakashvili small, quick operation that would allow demolishing South 
Ossetia in a few hours and then, right before the opening of the Olympic games, would 
allow Saakashvili to state that South Ossetia does not exist anymore.”55 Such 
interpretation of the conflict mirrored in a curious and twisted way the assertion in the US 
mainstream newspapers discussed earlier that Russia’s invasion of Georgia was planned 
as a “quick military punishment.”  
The Russian mainstream newspapers were less explicit than the US ones about 
making references to the Cold War – at least the reporters did not use the term “cold war” 
– yet, for example, Izvestia, while emphasizing Georgian military power, noted that “such 
power has been gained largely due to the help of Georgia’s western friends.”56 By 
stressing this connection, Russian media, although not directly, reminded the readers of 
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the East-West Cold War time opposition and the “great powers” supplying their clients 
with weapons. The theme of collaboration between Georgian and American militaries 
prior to the conflict, as well as the financial support the US provided for Georgia to 
enhance its military potential was one of the most prominent in the Russian news media 
coverage of the conflict. It also overlapped with the next theme.  
Georgia and the Georgian President 
Russian news media portrayed Georgia as an aggressive state that wanted to 
control South Ossetia in spite of the fact that South Ossetia opposed Georgian influence 
and strove for independence. Both newspapers depicted Georgia as a state where 
“emotions take over the common sense”57 and as one whose leaders’ words and promises 
are “extremely difficult to trust.”58 Georgia was also depicted as a pro-Western state 
seeking membership in NATO, and “hoping that the West will support, ideologically and 
militarily the Georgian aggression toward South Ossetia and help to fight Russia if it 
enters the war.”59  
Georgian president Saakashvili was depicted in Russian news media as an 
impulsive, “unpredictable leader who cannot control the territory of his own state”60 and 
who “deceitfully invaded South Ossetia first and is now pretending to be the main victim 
suffering from the Russian aggression.”61 Russian newspapers also called Saakashvili a 
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“puppet of the West,”62 which inspired the conspiracy theory about the United States 
planning the conflict for a while and using Saakashvili as a pawn.63 The aim of the 
conflict, according to this theory, was to provoke Russia to take military action and then 
label it evil, non-democratic, aggressive and violent, discrediting its reputation in the 
world community.  
One interesting example illustrates the core differences in how Georgia and its 
relationship with the United States was portrayed by the Russian mainstream news media 
in comparison to the US mainstream news media. Two articles – one in the New York 
Times, another in Argumenty i Fakty – talked about one of the streets in Tbilisi, the 
capital of Georgia, being named after George W. Bush. The difference in the ways this 
fact was framed in the articles is evident from the following direct quotes. The New York 
Times: “Tbilisi is a charming city, its ancient Orthodox churches restored to life, the lanes 
of the old city lined with cafes and art galleries. Mr. Saakashvili has also made Georgia 
one of the world's most – or few – pro-American countries. President Bush received a 
rapturous welcome when he visited in 2005, and the road to the airport has now been 
named after him, complete with a large poster of the president.”64 Argumenty i Fakty: 
“There is already the George W. Bush interstate in Tbilisi. But, of course, this isn’t 
enough to satisfy the Georgian politicians. In order to make the friendship with the US 
firm and stable, all streets of the Georgian capital must be renamed. There should be a 
boulevard of John McCain, a square of Dick Cheney, the street of Brzezinski [former 
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President Jimmy Carter's national security adviser, who compared the actions taken by 
Russian prime minister Putin to the actions taken by Stalin and Hitler in the 1930s], the 
avenues of FBI and CIA and a few children playgrounds named after Kachinskii and 
Yushenko [the presidents of Poland and Ukraine who supported Georgia during the 
conflict]. It would also be useful to commemorate the contribution that Latvia, Lithuania 
and Estonia made defending Saakashvili from the cannibalistic Moscow. And here it 
would be appropriate to install, of course next to the noble Georgian Capitol building, a 
group sculpture of collectively peeing boys. Obviously, they should be peeing in the 
direction of Moscow.”65 Sarcasm and parody, in fact, were used in many opinion pieces 
in the Russian coverage of the conflict.  
The United States and its politics  
Additional themes are important to note regarding the image of the United States 
in the Russian coverage of the conflict. First, the articles in Izvestia and Argumenty i 
Fakty frequently referenced the US aggression and military operations in Yugoslavia, 
Afghanistan and Iraq, arguing that by carrying out these operations the United States 
“demonstrated the irrelevance of ethical norms, … and set the standard for use of force as 
a primary conflict resolution approach.”66 “Georgia, being pro-American, eagerly learned 
from its patron and implemented the “use of force” approach to resolve the tensions with 
South Ossetia.”67 The Unites States is described as a cynical manipulator who interprets 
the facts as it pleases and in accordance with its own interests: “Saddam Hussein, who 
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destroyed several Shiite villages, of course, deserved a death sentence. But the actions of 
the current Georgian political leaders, who demolished ten South Ossetian villages, ran 
over children and elders with tanks and burned Ossetians alive in the locked houses, the 
actions of these leaders must be defended.”68 “[America] takes for granted that it has the 
right to do anything it pleases, and that everybody else has no such right,”69 stated 
Izvestia.  
Frustration with the US media coverage of the conflict 
Lastly, the theme of disappointment and frustration with the way US mainstream 
media covered the conflict were prominent in the Russian coverage. The American news 
media system was described as “well-trained and well-maintained mechanism that 
presents only the scenarios that fit well with the dominant way of thinking.”70 “The lack 
of objectivity in Western [including American] news media shocked Russia. Freedom 
and independence of the Western press, the idealized image of the Western democracy 
that we have been praising for so long, turned out to be an illusion,”71 stated Argumenty i 
Fakty. Russian newspapers referenced the campaign the US media executed before the 
2001 war in Iraq and argued that “a very similar campaign is being held now against 
Russia.”72 
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US alternative media coverage 
US response and US hypocrisy 
The Nation and Z Magazine critiqued the official US position in the conflict 
insisting that supporting Georgia and condemning Russia in this conflict reflected the 
politics of double standards. As one of The Nation’s contributors put it, “At the root of 
this conflict is a clash of two twentieth-century guiding principles in international 
relations. Georgia, backed by the West, is claiming its right as a sovereign nation to 
control the territory within its borders, a guiding principle since World War II. The 
Ossetians are claiming their right to self-determination, a guiding principle since World 
War I.”73 The author further added that in dealing with crises that are based on the 
conflict between these principles, “sometimes, the West takes the side of national 
sovereignty, as it is in the current war; other times, it sides with self-determination and 
redrawing of national borders.”74 Similarly, Z Magazine’s contributor stated that “the UN 
Charter and international law come and go in the US depending on whether the United 
States is ignoring and violating them or trying to use them for its own political ends.”75 
 Contributors of The Nation and Z Magazine also highlighted the hypocrisy in 
magnifying Russia’s aggression while downplaying many US military operations around 
the world and throughout the history. For example, Z Magazine’s Edward Herman 
pointed out that “it is amazing to watch the US imperialist establishment, including the 
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media, wax indignant about "Russian aggression," Russian "brutality," and a renewal of 
Russian "expansionism." This establishment can never admit its own regular, serial, and 
massive aggressions—the word was never used by mainstream reporters or editors to 
describe the attack on Vietnam, 1954-75, or Iraq in 2003 and onward.”76  
Both magazines also urged US policymakers to respect Russia’s concerns for its own 
national security, pointing out that the United States valued its own security very highly. 
Edward Herman suggested an interesting hypothetical analogy: 
“If the Russians (or Chinese) had entered into a military alliance with Mexico, 
supplied it with arms and military advisors, used a Russian or Chinese version of 
the "National Endowment for Democracy" and other agents to bring about 
political change in Mexico (recall that Mexico has had a series of elections won 
by fraud), and perhaps put some ABMs in place to protect Mexico against a 
possible threat from Colombia, can you imagine the frenzy of US politicos and 
the "free press?"77 
The Nation’s Katrina vanden Heuvel articulated this idea in a more positive way 
through a narrative of using the conflict as an opportunity to “create the space for a 
different US-Russian relationship.”78 She proposed that “a new approach must begin with 
recognition of Georgia's sovereignty but also recognize that Russia has legitimate 
interests along its borders and in areas that have been its traditional zones of security, 
from Central Asia to the Caucasus to Ukraine.”79 The key step to such recognition would 
be putting an end to NATO’s eastward expansion, from vanden Heuvel’s perspective. 
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Three more materials in The Nation supported this idea, with one of the contributors 
concluding: 
“In fact, one of the most effective ways America could respond to this crisis is by 
rethinking its entire geopolitical approach of the past two decades, which has been 
hegemonic, arrogant, hypocritical and reckless. If we set a better example, then 
we could at least reclaim the moral authority, or "soft power," that we once 
had.”80  
 
US electoral politics 
In August 2008, the US Presidential election campaign pitted John McCain 
against Barack Obama, and the authors of the four articles in The Nation argued that the 
war in South Ossetia was in best interests of “John McCain and the same neocons who 
led us into earlier disasters.”81 In order to demonstrate that McCain’s response to the 
conflict “offers a disturbing and somewhat surreal taste of what to expect from John 
McCain should he become our nation's Commander in Chief,”82 The Nation’s 
contributors developed two main narratives. The first one was based on detailed and 
revealing discussions of the political and financial connections between the Georgian 
President and the US neoconservative elites. All four articles emphasized that John 
McCain’s foreign policy adviser, Randy Scheunemann , was a paid lobbyist for the 
Georgian government in the United States until May 2008; he supported the initiative of 
Georgia joining NATO, the Georgian President’s program of “unification of Georgia” 
(which assumed making South Ossetia a part of Georgia) and “supported [Saakashvili’s] 
                                                 
80
 Ames, August 13, 2008. 
81
 Mark Ames, “Getting Georgia’s War On,” The Nation, August 8, 2008, 
http://www.thenation.com/article/getting-georgias-war.  
82
 Ibid. 
   74 
 
bellicose views toward Russia's Vladimir Putin.” 83 The second narrative portrayed John 
McCain as a “raving Russophob”84 and as one of the leaders of “the army of neocons and 
old cold warriors who naturally gravitate to a fight with Russia.85 Together, these two 
narratives worked to support the idea advanced by another contributor that “these folks 
[neoconservatives] are always looking for a foreign enemy on which to base a new cold 
war, and with the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime, it was Putin's Russia that came 
increasingly to fit the bill.”86 The author underscored that under this scenario, “McCain 
gets to look tough with a new cold war to fight while Democratic presidential candidate 
Senator Barack Obama, scrambling to make sense of a more measured foreign policy 
posture, will seem weak in comparison.”87  
Critique of the US mainstream media coverage 
The Nation and Z Magazine argued that the conflict in South Ossetia “has been 
flagrantly misreported in this country”88 and that “the way in which US officials and the 
media handled the Russian response to the Georgian assault has been a lesson in bias, 
misrepresentation, decontextualization, and the applied double standard.”89 The Nation’s 
Katrina vanden Heuvel argued that the US media “have failed to provide the full 
backdrop,90 supplying instead a “relentlessly one-sided commentary91 on the conflict. 
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Similarly, Mark Ames wrote in The Nation that “up until now, this war was framed as a 
simple tale of Good Helpless Democratic Guy Georgia versus Bad Savage Fascist Guy 
Russia [while] in fact, it is far more complex than this, morally and historically.”92 In the 
same article, the author underscored that in the mainstream Western media “you hear 
little if anything about the Ossetians, who seem to hardly exist in the West's eyes, even 
though their grievance is the root cause of this war.93 Katrina vanden Heuvel’s essay 
echoed this point: 
 “…commentary in the US media, almost without exception, has turned a 
longstanding, complex separatist conflict into a casus belli for a new cold war 
with Russia, ignoring not only the historical and political reasons for South 
Ossetia's drive for independence from Georgia but also the responsibility of 
Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili for the current crisis. So eager have 
commentators been to indict Vladimir Putin's Russia that they have overlooked 
Washington's contribution to the rising tensions.”94  
 
Z Magazine’s Edward Herman derided the mainstream media’s attempts to depict 
Georgia as a victim of aggression on the one hand and as a supporter of the American 
war in Iraq (in order to show that Georgia has always been a friend of the US) on the 
other: “the editors of an ideological institution like the Washington Post are, of course, 
completely oblivious to the irony in their pat on the back for aggression-victim Georgia’s 
support of the more massive aggression.”95 
Lastly, The Nation’s Mark Ames shared insightful details about the close political and 
business ties between the Georgian government and US political and financial elites. He 
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argued that these elites transmitted the Georgian version of the conflict to the leading US 
news media as part of Georgian “PR offensive”96 that accompanied the conflict: 
“The invasion was backed up by a PR offensive so layered and sophisticated that I 
even got a hysterical call today from a hedge fund manager in New York, 
screaming about an "investor call" that Georgian Prime Minister Lado Gurgenidze 
made this morning with some fifty leading Western investment bank managers 
and analysts. I've since seen a J.P. Morgan summary of the conference call, which 
pretty much reflects the talking points later picked up by the US media.  
These kinds of conference calls are generally conducted by the heads of 
companies in order to give banking analysts guidance. But as the hedge fund 
manager told me today, "The reason Lado did this is because he knew the 
enormous PR value that Georgia would gain by going to the money people and 
analysts, particularly since Georgia is clearly the aggressor this time." As a former 
investment banker who worked in London and who used to head the Bank of 
Georgia, Gurgenidze knew what he was doing. "Lado is a former banker himself, 
so he knew that by framing the conflict for the most influential bankers and 
analysts in New York, that these power bankers would then write up reports and 
go on CNBC and argue Lado Gurgenidze's talking points. It was brilliant, and 
now you're starting to see the American media shift its coverage from calling it 
Georgia invading Ossetian territory, to the new spin, that it's Russian imperial 
aggression against tiny little Georgia."97  
  
Human tragedy 
The Nation featured two detailed reports by a special correspondent who traveled 
to Georgia and South Ossetia to “report the conflict from both sides.”98 The reports 
described in detail the chaos, panic and destruction caused by the war, while also 
emphasizing how difficult it was for the populations of Georgia and South Ossetia to 
make sense of the rapidly developing events in an atmosphere of fear: “Ossetians now 
blame Georgians for ethnic genocide; Georgians say Russia has broken an international 
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law and call for international help against the Russia's aggression. As for ordinary people 
on all sides of this conflict, anger and fear are the dominant emotions.99  
In the context of other articles, these two reports served as a powerful illustration 
of how the average people – Georgians, South Ossetians, Russians, soldiers and civilians 
– were caught up in what The Nation’s Katrina vanden Heuvel called a “dangerous 
geopolitical gamesmanship.”100 The lines quoting average Georgians begging the West 
for help (“Are they [the West] sending their forces to help us? "We need their guns, not 
words. We need them to help us to fight occupying Russian forces"101) stood in stark and 
bitter contrast with revelatory details other authors in The Nation provided about the 
strategic calculations and “national interests” of both the Georgian and the American 
political elites that led to the conflict but that also contributed it its framing as a “Russian 
aggression.” As the author of both reports summarized, reflecting on the sentiment 
widespread among the Georgian people, “it seems to people here that the West has a lot 
of issues with Russia that it considers more important than the fighting that now rages 
between Moscow and Tbilisi.”102  
The image of Georgia and Georgian President 
The Nation and Z Magazine argued that the role of Georgian President Mikheil 
Saakashvili in the conflict was “whitewashed”103 in the United States. Both magazines 
asserted that Saakashvili has not really been the kind of democratic leader the United 
States (and the US mainstream media) portrayed him to be. As Mark Ames wrote in The 
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Nation, “while Bush and McCain speak of Saakashvili as if he's a combination of 
Thomas Jefferson and Nelson Mandela, he's seen by his own people as increasingly 
authoritarian and unbalanced.”104 Z Magazine’s Edward Herman underscored the same 
point: “A number of observers have pointed out that Saakashvili has displayed marked 
authoritarian tendencies. … Election observers from the OSCE raised questions about 
election integrity based on claims of Saakashvili’s use of state money, blackmail, and 
vote-buying.105 Bringing in the question of South Ossetia’s struggles for independence 
and Saakashvili’s political course for “reunification of Georgia,” Mark Ames questioned 
US’ reasons for supporting “a petty dictator like Saakashvili”106 in his plan to “get control 
of a region that doesn't want any part of him.107 In another article, Ames developed this 
point, characterizing Saakashvili in the following way: 
“When he first rose to prominence, the American-educated Saakashvili was often 
referred to as "Georgia's Vladimir Zhirinovsky" – the Russian ultranationalist 
firebrand who once promised to retake Alaska. Although Saakashvili was 
subsequently rebranded as a Euro-democrat, he promised to reunite Georgia and 
bring his separatist regions to heel, by force if necessary, whether the aggrieved 
ethnic groups liked it or not.” 108 
  
Contributors also commented on Saakashvili’s domestic politics, pointing out that 
“Georgia's president has often seemed more intent on currying favor with the Bush 
Administration … than on looking after the interests of his people.”109 Five articles in 
The Nation mentioned Saakashvili’s “violent crackdown on Georgian protesters,… his 
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rigged election, declaration of martial law, attacks on opposition media and jailing of 
opponents.”110 
Russian alternative media coverage 
More than two sides to the conflict – everybody guilty 
Novaya Gazeta and The New Times offered various angles in interpreting the 
conflict, insisting that all sides – and there were more than two, according to both media 
– were responsible for the war.  
First, authors argued that Georgian President Saakashvili “made a big mistake”111 
and “acted emotionally… breaking the rules of big politics where actors must approach 
issues rationally.”112 Saakashvili’s actions were condemned as irresponsible, “especially 
if he knew that Russia would respond to Georgian aggression [in South Ossetia] the way 
it did, and if he knew that no one from his “big friends” would rush to help.”113 By acting 
this way, “Saakashvili discredited himself because he had been warned multiple times 
that Russia would inevitably respond the way it did.”114  
Second, Russia was also condemned for “going too far”115 in its response to 
Georgian aggression. Here it is important to note that while Russia’s response in general 
was defended and justified – as one of the authors put it, “if one doesn’t supply weapons 
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to its client, one can’t just not protect this client, especially after making such promise”116 
– Russia was criticized both for the magnitude of its attacks on Georgia and for 
expanding its military action beyond South Ossetia. One contributor to Novaya Gazeta 
even suggested that Russia had been in fact preparing for the war with Georgia for a 
while, and that South Ossetia – a devoted client – played its role by provoking Georgia to 
launch a massive offensive, which legitimized Russia’s intervention.”117  
Third, some authors also blamed the West – the United States and Europe – for 
ignoring the complex dynamic of an ongoing conflict that preceded the war on the one 
hand,118 and, on the other hand, for pushing NATO expansion in the post-Soviet space 
despite clear objections by Russia.119 Novaya Gazeta published a piece by Mikhail 
Gorbachev who critiqued the Unites States for “talking down to Russia and ignoring 
Russia’s interests and position.”120 He also pointed out major deficiencies in coverage of 
the conflict by the US mainstream media who “launched a large-scale propagandistic 
offensive against Russia… lacking objectivity… and depriving the American society of 
complete and balanced information [about the conflict].”121 
Lastly, two authors offered an insightful perspective on the political dynamics 
within South Ossetia, stressing the divide between the people of South Ossetia and the 
corrupt government of South Ossetia. This divide, according to the authors, mirrored a 
similar divide within Russia. Not unexpectedly, the corrupt political elites of South 
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Ossetia have similar interests with corrupt elites of Russia. The authors argued that 
despite the claims that the protection of South Ossetia served Russia’s national and 
strategic interests, it in fact only served the interests of the corrupt elites in Russia and in 
South Ossetia. The following quote summarizes this perspective: 
“This war involves not two and not three but four sides: Russia, Georgia, the 
government of South Ossetia who, together with Russia’s national security elites 
became the shareholders of the enterprise that pumps money [out of the budget] 
for a fight with Georgia, and the people of South Ossetia who – as little as there is 
left of them – have to choose between Saakashvili who is destroying Tskhinvali, 
and Kokoity (President of South Ossetia) who turned into a South Ossetian 
Arafat.”122  
This perspective emphasized that the dynamics of the conflict are much more 
complex than presented in the mainstream accounts that of course omitted any references 
to corrupt Russian national security elites.  
Human tragedy 
Both the New Times and Novaya Gazeta emphasized in their coverage that the 
conflict was first and foremost a great human tragedy and an example of how civilians 
become the victims of political intrigues, calculations and, what is even more frustrating 
and depressing, miscalculations. In addition to publishing several reports by special war 
correspondents discussing the realities on the ground - in the hospitals,123 in large cities124 
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and small villages125 both in Georgia and in South Ossetia – some columnists approached 
the question of emphasizing the personal within the geopolitical creatively by, for 
example, concluding their opinion pieces and/or news analyses with heart-breaking 
testimonies from civilians who described how they survived the shelling in South 
Ossetia.126 Novaya Gazeta also discussed the problem of assessing the casualties in the 
war, especially when it comes to estimating how many civilians died in South Ossetia.127 
The narrative of friendship between Georgian and Russian soldiers was also prominent 
within this theme. While one article pointed out that “only a few years ago Georgian and 
Russian officers studied together in the Military Academy in Moscow,” another featured 
a bitter remark by a Russian officer: “There are also personal relationships with the 
Georgian officers; we studied together in military academies and colleges, we fought 
together in Afghanistan and Chechnya, we were friends. Georgian President knew it and 
yet he ordered a massacre in Tskhinvali.”128 
The reports by special correspondents demonstrated – through detailed 
descriptions of the dire conditions in which people on both sides of the conflict found 
themselves as well as through numerous quotes by soldiers and civilians – how the 
people of different nationalities and ethnicities either cooperated in the face of common 
tragedy or, on the contrary, hated each other even more. All reports without exception 
quoted various people expressing their frustration with the actions of various 
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policymakers in this conflict. Thus, numerous stories and vignettes featured by the 
correspondents of Novaya Gazeta and The New Times demonstrated the complexity of 
human relations that constituted the conflict, constantly challenging various assumptions 
about the nature of the conflict being either purely ethnic or purely political. 
Failure of Russian diplomacy and Russia’s damaged reputation 
Novaya Gazeta and The New Times argued that as a result of this war Russia lost 
its status as the “great moderator”129 and “Caucasian peacekeeper”130 and that “it is hard 
to even imagine the colossal consequences for Russia on the international stage.”131 
Russia’s response, according to both newspapers, had been clumsy both in terms of its 
military actions132 and especially in terms of strategic communication during the war. As 
one of the authors in Novaya Gazeta remarked, “everything seemed as if the Russian 
political leaders didn’t feel like they needed to explain their position to the world beyond 
making the official statements. …In the meantime, Saakashvili basically worked as his 
own press-secretary.”133 Another author stated that “your image rather than who you 
really are makes a difference in the 21st century. The old God said, “Do not steal;” the 
new God says: “Stole something? Prepare to pay for an article about your generosity. … 
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Russia won the battle for Tskhinvali but it should have won the battle on television 
too.”134  
Conclusion 
Mainstream news media both in the US and Russia placed the conflict squarely 
within the interpretive framework characterized by the “pro-US Georgia” versus “pro-
Russian South Ossetia” dichotomy. The US mainstream media glorified “brave little 
Georgia” while vilifying “big brutal Russia”, and, in a very similar fashion, Russian 
mainstream media victimized “poor little South Ossetia” while vilifying “aggressive 
Georgia” and the grand mastermind and root of all evil: the United States of America. 
South Ossetia played a marginal role in the US mainstream media narratives, 
communicating the idea that the conflict only mattered for the United States (and for the 
American readers) because of the “resurgent Russia.” Such presentation of the conflict is 
indeed reminiscent of the Cold War era when regional conflicts were only considered 
worthy of attention if they brought the main antagonists together; consequently, such 
conflicts were presented in ways that followed the “great powers and their regional 
clients” scheme.   
In the post-Cold War era, and in case of the conflict in South Ossetia specifically, 
relying on the time-tested simplified dichotomy of Cold War politics presents certain 
convenience for the mainstream media but also serves a strategic purpose. For example, 
bringing the South Ossetian story into the mainstream US narratives would make it 
significantly harder to justify that the story mattered to the American readers – after all, 
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who in America would really care for a tiny breakaway region on the border of Russia 
and Georgia? When one crafts a storyline that needs to have villains and victims and 
needs to choose between South Ossetia, Georgia and Russia, Russia clearly becomes the 
best fit for the role of the villain, because American readers are already familiar with the 
“Russian bear,” and much of this familiarity traces its roots to the Cold War animosity. 
Georgia and South Ossetia would require additional and time-consuming 
contextualization.  
Most importantly though – and this becomes evident only after analyzing The 
Nation’s accounts – casting Georgia in a negative, or even in a more multidimensional 
light could interfere with larger political interests at play. The Nation’s revelations of the 
ties between the American conservative political establishment and the Georgian 
government, and especially the role these ties might have played both in the conflict and 
in American electoral politics, introduce a completely different picture, widen the range 
of interpretive possibilities for the readers and re-articulate the dominant understanding 
of the conflict advanced by the mainstream media. One would think that this is precisely 
the kind of news American public would need and would want to know. However, it is 
also evident that the powerful elites are not in favor of revealing anything beyond the 
“mutual love of democracy” that comprises the US-Georgia partnership. This manifests 
itself in the mainstream media accounts where the image of democratic Georgia is 
conveniently – and strategically – juxtaposed to the image of authoritarian Russia. The 
Nation’s and Z Magazine’s interpretations also paint a different portrait of the Georgian 
President; this portrait challenges the mainstream narratives, complements the one 
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presented by the Russian mainstream media and certainly introduces an additional – and 
important – angle for understanding the conflict. However, again, this image of the 
Georgian President is absent from the US mainstream accounts, constituting an important 
“significant absence” that reveals crucial insights about the US mainstream media being 
not simply the sites of meaning making but most importantly the sites of ideological 
production.  
The interplay between convenience and strategic discursive choices manifests 
itself in texts of the Russian mainstream media as well. Here the evil mastermind USA 
becomes the convenient cause of all of Russia’s misfortunes, especially in foreign affairs 
because it keeps meddling in the affairs of post-Soviet states, “dragging them into 
NATO,”135 and antagonizing Russia. Of course, the Russian mainstream media 
completely neglect to discuss Russia’s own deficiencies in dealing with the post-Soviet 
states, as well as the failures of Russia’s own domestic politics that are, perhaps, the chief 
cause of alienation post-Soviet states feel toward Russia. The mainstream media 
presented the conflict as one between Georgia and South Ossetia, vilifying Georgia and 
victimizing South Ossetia, yet omitted the important information about the close political 
ties between the government of South Ossetia and the Russian national security elites that 
Novaya Gazeta brought to light. This finding mirrors in a curious way a similar insight 
discussed by The Nation regarding the ties between the American conservative elites and 
the Georgian government. These insights demonstrate that while the mainstream media 
both in Russia and in the US interpreted the conflict from the perspective of the “big 
players and their client states,” they omitted the important information about these 
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“donor-client” relationships, focusing instead on the essentialist “good us versus bad 
them” juxtaposition. I would argue that in this case, the mainstream media in both states 
operated within the paradigm of nationalism, plugging in certain elements of the Cold 
War discourse to highlight the differences between the nations involved in the conflict. 
The alternative media, however, focused on if not smaller but certainly less visible yet 
more powerful players and issues, revealing insights that advanced the understanding of 
the conflict as being less about the similarities and differences of national interests but 
more about the similarities and differences of the interests of the political elites in 
different states.  
The theme of “human tragedy” prominent in accounts by both US and Russian 
alternative media merits additional discussion. Clearly, this theme was downplayed in the 
US mainstream accounts, while in Russian mainstream accounts only the suffering of the 
South Ossetians was depicted, indicating that the narrative was used exclusively for 
strategic purposes in order to highlight Georgia’s brutality. The narratives comprising this 
theme both in Russian and US alternative media reflected the tremendous complexity of 
reality and human relations constituting the conflict. This was clearly a more complex 
picture of the world and also the one that focused on humans and human costs of the 
conflict rather than on great power politics. Combined with the insights that highlighted 
the roles of various political elites in the conflict, these accounts offered a drastically 
different understanding of who really were the villains and the victims in the conflict. 
The story here was not about Georgia, South Ossetia, Russia or the Unites States. It was 
about the people struggling to survive the war and make sense of it, and the political 
   88 
 
elites competing for political and economic dominance and crafting the narratives of the 
war. 
This is not to say, however, that geopolitics was not discussed in the alternative 
media. However, in contrast to the mainstream media who spoke with authority and 
confidence, quickly defining the heroes, the villains, the victims, the causes of the 
conflict and approaches to its resolution, alternative media struggled to make sense of the 
events, producing a wider range of narratives, perspectives and angles, and inviting the 
readers to think along and not jump to conclusions.  
Thus, while the mainstream media presented a picture of the world where the 
conflict in South Ossetia only mattered because South Ossetia and Georgia happened to 
be part of the “buffer zone” between Russia and NATO (with the US being one of its key 
members), alternative media emphasized other, and perhaps more important, aspects of 
the conflict. The mainstream media tied the conflict to the Cold War animosity using the 
idea of the political struggle of the two great powers for spheres of influence as 
justification for importance of the conflict. In this case, this element of the Cold War 
discourse and its strategic use by the mainstream media both in Russia and in the US 
constituted what Stuart Hall termed “the lines of tendential force,” serving as a barrier for 
re-articulation. In contrast, alternative media insisted that the conflict was more complex 
than the Cold War-inspired binary constructs suggested. Most importantly, the conflict 
mattered because it showed, once again, as one of Novaya Gazeta’s war correspondents 
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remarked after describing his helicopter ride from South Ossetia alongside the burned 
corpses of young soldiers that “the lives of these boys are the currency of big politics.”136 
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Chapter 3: The Syrian Debate 
In January of 2012, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held a meeting 
aimed at passing a resolution that would put sanctions on the regime of Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad who was accused of launching a violent crackdown on the anti-
government protestors in Syria. The resolution was drafted by the United States, France 
and members of the Arab League and was based on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) 
norm of the United Nations. According to the R2P norm, “the international community 
has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to 
protect populations [of sovereign states]”1 from crimes and atrocities committed by the 
state governments against their populations. Russia and China – two of the five 
permanent members of the UNSC – used their veto right to block the resolution first in 
October of 2011, then again in early February of 2012 and then again in July of 2012, 
arguing that the proponents of the resolution were trying to use it to justify military 
intervention and regime change in Syria. It is a common practice in the UNSC that the 
first drafts of resolutions do not pass, but the second and the third vetoes created immense 
tension in the international community, pitting the resolution’s supporters and opponents 
against each other and prodding some officials to call the situation a “global diplomatic 
divide.”2 Some of the leading media outlets remarked that “the unusually bitter 
atmosphere [at the Security Council] has been compared to the cold war.”3  The 
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Guardian quoted France's UN ambassador, Gérard Araud, as saying that the Security 
Council "has never been as paralyzed as it is today since the end of the cold war,"4 
Reuters asked whether “the Security Council [was] returning to the days of the Cold War 
when US-Soviet rivalry left the Council virtually unable to act?”5 and CNN’s 
commentator G Lopez lamented that the situation “look[ed] like, fe[lt] like, sound[ed] 
like Cold War redux.”6   
Implicit in these comparisons was a concern of the policymakers and observers 
over the ability of the international community – in this case officially represented by the 
United Nations Security Council – to find a solution to an immensely complex 
international crisis. This chapter shares this concern but also asks whether the ways in 
which the diplomatic debate was covered by the US and Russian news media created and 
sustained the environment within which the discussions of certain arguments, diplomatic 
positions, actors and policy propositions reinforced the very same “Cold War 
atmosphere” that these media appeared to be concerned about.   
It is important to note that when the United Nations was created in 1945, its 
founders intended for the organization as a whole and for its Security Council in 
particular to serve as guarantors of peace, international cooperation and security in the 
post-World War II world. However, as the Cold War ensued after World War II, the 
fundamental disagreements between the USSR and the USA often paralyzed the work of 
the Security Council. Its role was reduced to dealing with conflicts where the interests of 
                                                 
4
 Borger. 
5
 Louis Charbonneau, “Russia U.N. Veto on Syria Aimed at Crushing West’s Crusade,” Reuters, February 
8, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/08/us-un-russia-idUSTRE8170BK20120208. 
6
 Lopez, George, “Russia and China: Sabotaging U.N. With Vetoes,” CNN, February 8, 2012, 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/08/opinion/lopez-russia-sanctions-cold-war/index.html.  
   92 
 
the “great powers” were not directly at stake, while some of the major conflicts and crises 
that indeed presented a threat to global peace and security brought the Cold War 
antagonists into direct confrontation.7 The end of the Cold War revived hopes for a new 
world order with the renewed role of the United Nations as a key organization where 
multilateral negotiations and recognition of the need for complex solutions to diplomatic 
problems are supposed to reign.  
This chapter examines the narratives constructed by US and Russian mainstream 
and alternative news media as they covered the diplomatic debate at the UNSC, offering 
various interpretations of the roles different actors played in the debate. The chapter asks 
to what extent (if at all) did these narratives rely on or depart from the discourse of the 
Cold War and what other discourses informed the narratives as Russian and US news 
media explained and interpreted the diplomatic debate to their audiences? This chapter 
seeks to identify how – through articulation of multiple elements of various discourses – 
the US and Russian mainstream and alternative media communicated to their readers why 
they should care about the diplomatic debate at the UNSC and what about it was really 
important to know. The analysis is thus based on the following questions: which actors 
were identified as key players in the debate? How were the images of these actors 
constructed? Were the heroes, villains and victims clearly identified? Which arguments 
comprising the debate were legitimized and which ones were marginalized and how were 
various discourses used to do so? Which obstacles to overcoming the “diplomatic divide” 
were discussed and which solutions to the situation were offered in various media texts? 
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These questions are important to examine because the ways in which the key narratives 
and the images of the key actors involved in the debate are articulated contribute to the 
creation and perpetuation of a particular discursive environment that enables (and 
privileges) certain actions and policies as ways of responding to complex international 
crises, while limiting (and marginalizing) other actions and policies. While Russia-US 
relations do not comprise the centerpiece of global politics in the post-Cold War era, both 
hold seats in the UNSC and thus – as long as the UNSC remains the key organization for 
regulating international security and peace – the two will have to work together to find 
solutions to international crises. This case is also important for this project as the UNSC – 
and the discourses surrounding its activities – is perhaps one of the best illustrations of 
the interplay between the paradigms of nationalism and globalization.  
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the six month period between the second 
(February 4, 2012) and the third (July 19, 2012) vetoes, analyzing the articles published 
between February 1 – August 1, 2012 as it was during this time when most media 
coverage was generated. The New York Times published 67 articles, The Washington Post 
– 36, Izvestia – 59 and Argumenty i Fakty – 23. Nine materials came out in The Nation, 
five in Z Magazine, ten in Novaya Gazeta and three in The New Times.  
 US mainstream media coverage   
Supplying weapons 
The US mainstream newspapers paid close attention to Russia’s arms 
sales/supplies to the Syrian government, and, though to a lesser extent, to the strategic 
importance of the Russian naval base at the Syrian port city of Tartus. The presentation of 
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both topics reinforced the “great power and its client” narrative – a classic element of the 
Cold War discourse.  
Forty articles out of one hundred and four highlighted the fact that Russia was 
“Syria’s main weapons supplier.”8 Similarly, the articles described Assad’s regime as a 
“longtime Russian client and arms purchaser”9 and reiterated that “arms exports have 
long anchored the relationship between Moscow and Damascus.”10 Fifteen out of these 
forty articles also mentioned and discussed Russia’s naval base in Tartus, highlighting the 
fact that the base was the “only military installation outside the former Soviet 
territories”11 – a clarification intended to underscore the strategic importance of the base. 
References to the Russian arms sales always accompanied remarks about Russia’s 
political and diplomatic support of the Syrian government, as exemplified by the 
following quote: “Throughout the nearly yearlong popular uprising in Syria and a lethal 
government crackdown, Moscow has thrown President Bashar al-Assad a lifeline, 
providing weapons and diplomatic support to help keep his government afloat.”12 
Highlighting the complementary nature of Russia’s “veto diplomacy” at the UNSC and 
its military support of the Syrian government reinforced the “great power and its client” 
narrative, thus resembling the discourse of the Cold War.  
At the same time, several articles also interpreted Russia’s arms sales to Syria 
from a pragmatic perspective stating that “Syria places orders worth about $700 million a 
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year, making it a ‘major, very important, high-priced client by Russian standards’”13 and 
pointing out that business rather than politics was at stake: “Moscow is keen to preserve 
Syria’s lucrative market for Russian arms, especially now that its weapons contracts in 
other Middle Eastern countries, particularly Libya, are in question.”14 One could argue 
that this pragmatic take on the issue of the arms sales undermined the ideological 
component of the Cold War discourse (Russia cares about its commercial contracts, not 
about promoting a specific political/ideological agenda). However, Russian pragmatism 
was also presented and interpreted in a way that portrayed Russia as cynical and immoral, 
demonizing Russia in a way similar to the demonization of the USSR by the US 
mainstream media during the Cold War:  
At the United Nations, the American ambassador, Susan E. Rice, also criticized 
Russia for continuing to provide arms to Syria's government, most recently 
aboard a ship that docked Saturday at the Mediterranean port of Tartus. ''It is not 
technically, obviously, a violation of international law since there's not an arms 
embargo,'' she said, ''but it's reprehensible that arms would continue to flow to a 
regime that is using such horrific and disproportionate force against its own 
people.''15  
 
One editorial suggested that “Moscow valued arms deals with Damascus over the 
Syrian people,”16 while another argued that “Russia unconscionably refuses to halt its 
arms sales to the Assad government”17 and proclaimed that “the United States and its 
allies should publicly expose every shipment.”18 Similarly, a news report in The 
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Washington Post quoted Hillary Clinton: “We will work to expose those who are still 
funding the regime and sending it weapons to be used against defenseless Syrians, 
including women and children.”19  
The narrative of condemning Russia for its arms sales to Syria persisted 
throughout the coverage. When controversial news about the Russian attack helicopters 
being sent to Syria appeared in the media in mid-June, the New York Times featured a 
harsh critique in one of its editorials titled “Russia, Soviet Style:” 
“On Tuesday, Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton accused Russia of 
supplying attack helicopters to the Syrian government. Apparently, blocking the 
United Nations Security Council from punishing Syria isn't enough for the 
Russian president. He needs to be actively helping the Syrian dictator, Bashar al-
Assad, kill his own people more efficiently and in even larger quantities.”20  
  
The use of the “Soviet Union” historical analogy in the headline of this editorial 
also functions as an element of the Cold War discourse, further reinforcing the idea that 
Russia, just like the USSR during the Cold War, continues to supply arms to its “client 
state.” Another example of this discursive approach is from the news report referencing 
“amateur videos [showing] the forces of President Bashar al-Assad rolling through the 
besieged city of Homs in vintage Soviet battle tanks”21 and “satellite images released by 
the State Department, show[ing] deployments of Soviet-designed truck-mounted rocket 
launchers.”22  
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Lack of trust 
One of the key themes that defined the discourse in the US mainstream print 
media coverage of the debate was an enduring sense of mistrust between Russia and the 
United States and its allies. The sense of apprehension toward Russia was particularly 
pronounced, and was articulated in a number of ways.  
First, the articles discussing Russia’s plan to send envoys to Syria to try 
negotiating with Assad were skeptical of Russia’s genuine desire to improve the situation 
and doubted the success of this plan. This was expressed through such statements as: 
“Few believe that Russia has enough clout with either Mr. Assad or the Syrian opposition 
to broker a deal that could halt the violence.”23 Both newspapers stated that “[it was not 
clear] whether Russian diplomatic efforts could push Mr. Assad to a compromise”24 and 
that “there was little chance that such a plan could succeed.”25 Both papers also referred 
to the British and French officials – also supporters of the resolution – “hav[ing] very 
little confidence” and “express[ing] skepticism”26 about Russia’s diplomatic success in 
Syria. The skepticism in the coverage grew as the crisis progressed in spite of the fact 
that earlier coverage expressed some hope for Russia’s role in the conflict as well as 
Russia’s commitment to resolving it: “At the same time, Russia has been eager to show 
that it is sincere about pursuing a diplomatic solution, and said Monday that it had 
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persuaded the Assad government to participate in mediation talks in Moscow.”27 While 
this line gives an impression of challenging the theme of mistrust, it is important to note 
that it was followed by the statement that “the Syrian National Council immediately 
rejected the proposal.”28 The article then laid out how the Syrian opposition members do 
not trust Russia and while they recognize that “Russia holds many keys,”29 they consider 
“getting there without the Russians”30 even if this implies a “more difficult and more 
costly process.”31 Every article in the coverage that discussed Russia’s diplomatic 
initiatives also mentioned the resistance of the Syrian opposition, attributing it to the fact 
that “Russians have been unable to gain the trust of the Syrian opposition.”32 When 
interpreted within the larger context of the debate where the United States openly 
supported the opposition, such discussion of Russia’s diplomatic efforts implied that the 
United States and other proponents of the resolution who support the Syrian opposition 
should not trust Russia, even if at times Russia seems “sincere about pursuing a 
diplomatic solution.”33 This narrative was also supported and intensified by constant 
references to Russia as Syria’s “staunch ally,”34 “most powerful supporter,”35 “principal 
                                                 
27
 Neil MacFarquhar and Hwaida Saad, “Syria Fighting Escalates as a Mediation Offer Fails,” New York 
Times, January 31, 2012, A9.  
28
 MacFarquhar and Saad, January 31, 2012.  
29
 Ibid.  
30
 Ibid.  
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Schwirtz and Gladstone, February 8, 2012.  
33
 MacFarquhar and Saad, January 31, 2012. 
34
 Barry, January 28, 2012; Thomas Erdbrink, “Russia and Iran Criticize the Unit-ed States on Syria,” New 
York Times, June 14, 2012; Liz Sly and Colum Lynch, “U.N. Council Condemns Syria in Massacre of 
116,” Washington Post, May 28, 2012, A01.  
35
 Ellen Barry, “Russia Seems To Soften Its Support For Syria,” New York Times, March 21, 2012, A6; 
Colum Lynch and Will Englund, “Russia Stands Firm Against U.N. Resolution On Syria,” Washington 
Post, February 1, 2012, A10.   
   99 
 
foreign defender,”36 “primary ally,”37 and “firm backer.”38 “Moscow has thrown 
President Bashar al-Assad a lifeline,” stated the New York Times,39 explaining that 
“Russia’s ties to Syria are old and deep.”40 Similarly, The Washington Post proposed that 
“Russia’s stance underscores the strength and depth of its relationship with Assad’s 
regime.41 Fifty one articles out of 104 contained similar references, further undermining 
Russia’s trustworthiness, as well as reinforcing the “great power and its client” narrative.  
While references to Russia’s close ties with the Syrian government and Russia’s 
lack of credibility with the Syrian opposition served to challenge the idea that Russia 
could be trusted as a partner in a diplomatic process aimed to stabilize the Syrian crisis, 
Russia’s intentions and the transparency of Russian diplomacy were brought under 
scrutiny as well.  The discussions of Russia’s diplomatic efforts were constructed in ways 
that conveyed skepticism about Russia’s intentions to stabilize the situation, thus 
questioning Russia’s trustworthiness. The Washington Post wrote in a news report: “A 
meeting scheduled for Tuesday between top Russian officials and Syrian leader Bashar 
al-Assad is being portrayed by the Russian government as an attempt to bring about “the 
swiftest stabilization of the situation in Syria” in response to the growing conflict.”42 The 
phrase “is being portrayed” suggests to the readers that the Russian government has 
different goals and tries to use the meeting as a cover up for something else that is going 
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on “behind the scene.” Additionally, putting the quote about “the swiftest stabilization of 
the situation” in quotation marks serves a dual purpose. On the one hand, the phrase, 
indeed, is a direct quote by one of Russian diplomats, as evidenced later in the article. On 
the other hand, putting it in quotation marks without attribution to the author also serves 
to convey skepticism and perhaps even mockery.  
The editorial that followed the news report advanced this narrative. The author 
ridiculed the Russian foreign ministry’s phrase about “the swiftest stabilization of the 
situation in Syria on the basis of the swiftest implementation of democratic reforms” by 
first noting that “the brutality increased during the hours that Lavrov spent in 
Damascus”43 and second, stating that it is “hard to listen to the Russian foreign minister’s 
comments [about democratic reforms] with a straight face.”44 The editorial argued that 
Russia’s statements about the “democratic reforms” are profoundly hypocritical because 
Russia does not support democracy in its own domestic politics in the first place. In 
addition to undermining the credibility of Russia’s diplomatic efforts in Syria (and 
Russia’s trustworthiness), this narrative resembled one of the key features of the Cold 
War discourse, which involved the US and the USSR pointing out flaws and hypocrisy in 
each other’s domestic politics in order to advance larger geopolitical goals. Curiously, the 
editorial used a Cold War inspired historical analogy to strengthen the argument about 
what it termed Russia’s “pretend democracy:” “Once upon a time, a Soviet envoy visiting 
the beleaguered head of a client state in a similar situation would have used words like 
‘comradely solidarity’ instead of ‘democracy,’ and he would have brought along some 
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very visible military advisers for good measure.”45 This quote also evokes the narrative of 
“great powers and their client states,” as well as overlaps with the theme of “arms sales” 
by hinting at the indispensable military connection between the “power” and the “client.”  
The suspicion that Russia was “playing games”46 and “providing cover for 
[Assad’s] regime to push forward with their approach”47 only grew as the coverage (and 
the crisis) progressed. In the second half of the coverage, both US newspapers used 
quotes by US top officials to illustrate the idea that “Russians have done nothing to move 
the Syrian dictator toward the exit”48 and that Russia’s efforts to negotiate with Assad 
were in fact double talk and in reality Russia was “propping up the regime:”49 “The 
Russians keep telling us they want to do everything they can to avoid a civil war… and 
they are just vociferous in their claim that they are providing a stabilizing influence. I 
reject that”50 (quoting Hillary Clinton). An editorial in The Washington Post supported 
Clinton’s position and called Russia’s actions “foot-dragging.”51 Interestingly, this 
editorial in fact advocated for striving to reach a compromise with Russia. However, the 
editorial argued for the need to engage in “realpolitik” and cooperate with Russia while 
still insisting that “the country did not deserve good press.”52 Thus, the only possible and 
acceptable scenario of cooperation with Russia was presented within the confines of the 
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“realpolitik” doctrine, where pragmatism and short-term goals rather than long-term 
goals and trust determined relations and decisions.   
Both US newspapers also frequently acknowledged that the Syrian crisis caused 
“damage to bilateral ties”53 between Russia and the United States and that “relations 
between Moscow and Washington have worsened over the past year, as the cordial tone 
of the ‘reset’ between President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev has been 
replaced by a drumbeat of criticism.”54 While the New York Times characterized Russia-
US relations as being in a “downward spiral,”55 The Washington Post suggested that 
“US-Russia relations may have truly hit bottom.”56 The idea of the “failed ‘reset’”57 was 
very prominent in the discussions of Russia-US deteriorating relations, with The 
Washington Post explicitly asking “What happened to the US – Russia ‘reset’ button?”58 
and the New York Times answering that “the back-and-forth … over Russian support for 
Syria's government … underscored the limits of Mr. Obama's ability to ''reset'' ties with 
Moscow.”59 The articles implicitly blamed Russia for a failed “reset,” putting forth such 
“evidence” as “traditional Russian suspicions of the West”60 and Russia’s growing anti-
Americanism: “… after a year of popular uprisings in the Arab world, which Russia has 
taken a dim view of, Moscow has become especially sensitive to American support for 
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civil society, an unfettered Internet and what Putin calls ‘exporting democracy.’”61 Citing 
an expert from Human Rights Watch, the New York Times stated: “There is a deep strain 
of anti-Americanism at the heart of Putin’s Kremlin. … When a proposal is perceived as 
something the Americans want, it can automatically become less desirable to the 
Russians.”62 As evident from this quote, Russia’s mistrust of the United States was also 
connected to the figure of Vladimir Putin and, as the next few examples will demonstrate, 
to Putin’s K.G.B. past. The New York Times described Putin as “the grim former K.G.B. 
colonel,”63 “deeply distrustful of the West’s intentions both in Russia and in the Middle 
East.”64 The Washington Post also argued that Putin “sees Western influence behind 
nearly any mass protest”65 and explained that “Mr. Putin’s intransigence was entirely 
predictable”66 because “the KGB-trained strongman seethes at the notion of Western 
intervention to support a popular revolution against a dictator.”67 The New York Times 
gave a similar explanation to the question of why Russia was supporting Assad: 
Decisions are flowing from President Vladimir V. Putin, whose career has left 
him overwhelmingly wary both of revolutions and of Western intervention. This 
is a man who, during the death throes of the Communist system, personally 
defended the K.G.B.'s headquarters in Dresden against an angry crowd of 
Germans. And Mr. Putin's already suspicious view of street politics only 
deepened with the ''colored revolutions'' of the mid-2000s, in which pro-Western 
protests, some supported by the United States, ousted a series of Moscow-friendly 
leaders. Since the recent Arab uprisings began, Russian leaders have viewed them 
through this lens -- as a product not of social change but of interference by the 
West, intended in part to damage Russia.68   
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The New York Times cited an analyst at the Carnegie Moscow Center saying that 
“the reset failed to change the underlying suspicion and distrust of America shared by a 
majority of Russians as well as Putin himself. America is seen as a threat, an agent 
seeking to undermine Russia, to weaken it, to do harm to it. Russia always has to be on 
the alert, on the defensive.”69 Similarly, The Washington Post cited an “expert on 
Russia’s Middle East policy” as saying that “deep down, Putin believes the West is an 
opponent. Not an enemy; he doesn’t believe there will be American aggression against 
Russia, no. But he believes the West is always trying to find a weak spot in our armor, to 
enrich itself at our expense – and we must respond in kind.”70 This quote reflects one of 
the key tensions marking the dynamics of the US – Russia relations in the post-Cold War 
time: the mutual fear is gone but other remnants of the Cold War like suspicion, mistrust 
and defensiveness still prevail, making it difficult to reach mutual understanding and gain 
mutual trust – conditions necessary for the success of the international cooperation on 
complex issues like the crisis in Syria.   
One last episode in the coverage that merits a brief discussion is a report from a 
press conference where Vladimir Putin answered questions, including questions about 
Russia’s position on Syria, from the Western journalists. The report ended with a short 
summary of an exchange between a journalist and Vladimir Putin: “One reporter asked 
Mr. Putin, a former K.G.B. colonel, with whom he would most like to take on a spy 
mission. “With nobody,” Mr. Putin said. “I’m not a spy anymore.”71 The episode,  though 
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certainly a minor one, illustrates well the tension that marks media’s and policy makers’ 
engagement with elements of the Cold War discourse in the post-Cold War time. The 
journalist asked a question that clearly attempted to cast Putin’s identity in Cold War 
terms, tying his present role to his K.G.B. past and to the classic Cold War theme of 
espionage. Putin, however, did not play along and gave the answer that suggested a 
discursive break from the narrative of the Cold War. However, the New York Times still 
published the exchange, which, when interpreted in a larger context of the political 
identity of Vladimir Putin being constructed exclusively in Cold War terms, reinforced 
the Cold War discourse.  
Isolating Russia 
Another key theme in the US mainstream newspapers’ coverage centered on the 
narratives that worked to isolate Russia as the player who opposes the ending of violence 
in Syria, and creates obstacles to the UNSC peace efforts. 
First, both the New York Times and The Washington Post explicitly pointed to 
Russia’s “growing isolation”72 and “the widespread international condemnation”73 of 
Russia’s actions. The New York Times emphasized that “Russia and China had set 
themselves against Arab opinion and world opinion,”74 though in later coverage a similar 
statement was applied exclusively to Russia, as demonstrated by the following quote 
from an editorial: 
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The overuse of veto rights -- such as blocking three United Nations Security 
Council resolutions on Syria -- has reduced Russia's international standing and 
contributed to its growing isolation. Unless the Kremlin becomes more pragmatic 
and softens its dealings with other nations and institutions, the country will see its 
influence further erode. … now Russia is at the margins of international planning 
for a post-Assad future and assistance for Syria.75 
 
Interestingly, even though Russia and China vetoed the resolution, both 
newspapers seemed to be very careful about making statements that would isolate or 
condemn China and relatively early in the coverage (mid February) a New York Times 
editorial tried to cast China in a more favorable light: 
On Tuesday, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao of China, speaking at a European-China 
summit meeting in Beijing, said, ''What is most urgent and pressing now is to 
prevent war and chaos'' in Syria. There is no evidence Russia has had similar 
second thoughts, but China is showing renewed interest in working with the Arab 
League. Beijing's shift could shame Moscow into reconsidering its support for 
Mr. Assad, and approving United Nations action, including sanctions.76   
 
In spite of the fact that all three vetoes were issued by Russia and China, the New 
York Times and The Washington Post emphasized “intensifying diplomatic pressure on 
the Kremlin,”77 and Russia (not China) “facing mounting international pressure.”78 
Second, both newspapers blamed Russia (and in some cases China as well) for 
provoking further violence with their vetoes at the UNSC. This narrative singled out 
Russia and China as villains and pitted them against the proponents of the resolution who 
were portrayed as heroes committed to ending violence in Syria. The connection between 
the vetoes and the implied compliance with escalating violence was articulated in two 
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major ways: direct accusations and more implicit linking of the two ideas through 
specific sentence construction and paragraph ordering.  
Direct accusations were more frequent in editorials, for example with authors 
arguing that “Moscow and Beijing now have the blood of Syria’s valiant people on their 
hands as well,”79 and in direct quotes by the officials and/or experts presented in the news 
reports:  
"The United States is disgusted" by the Russian and Chinese vetoes, Susan E. 
Rice, the US ambassador to the United Nations, said after the vote. "A couple of 
members of this council remain steadfast in their willingness to sell out the Syrian 
people and shield a craven tyrant."80 
''To block this resolution is to bear responsibility for the horrors that are occurring 
on the ground in Syria.”81  
“The failure of the Security Council resolution after a double Russian and Chinese 
veto ''appears to have fueled the Syrian government's readiness to massacre its 
own people in an effort to crush dissent,'' Ms. Pillay said.”82 
 
Some editorials and news reports also constructed sentences in ways that implied 
causation between the vetoes and the escalating violence: 
“Two days after Russia and China vetoed a United Nations Security Council 
resolution calling for a peaceful transfer of power in Syria, President Bashar al-
Assad continued his killing spree” (editorial).83  
“The violence has gotten worse in the 11 days since Russia and China vetoed a 
United Nations Security Council resolution” (editorial).84  
“The violence in Syria has escalated since Saturday, when Russia, seconded by 
China, vetoed an Arab League-backed resolution at the United Nations Security 
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Council that called on Mr. Assad to give up some powers as part of a plan to 
defuse the crisis, which increasingly resembles a civil war” (news).85 
 
Interestingly, the idea of Russia’s complicity with the violence in Syria was 
expressed as an opinion (through the direct quote) in the early coverage: "We all have a 
choice: Stand with the people of Syria and the region, or become complicit in the 
continuing violence there" (quoting Hillary Clinton).86 However, later in the coverage the 
idea was presented as common knowledge: “Moscow faces frustration in Western 
capitals, where it is seen as complicit in the killings of civilians by forces loyal to Mr. 
Assad.”87   
News reports also suggested the connection between the vetoes and the potential 
for greater violence, stating that “the veto is almost sure to embolden the government of 
President Bashar al-Assad:”88   
“…the double veto at the U.N. Security Council that outraged the United States, 
its European allies and Arab leaders … intensified fears that Assad would unleash 
even greater violence to crush protesters.”89  
“It’s quite clear – this is a license to do more of the same and worse. The regime 
will take it for granted that it can escalate further. We’re entering a new phase that 
will be far more violent still than what we’ve seen now.”90  
“The veto of the Security Council resolution appears to have emboldened the 
Syrian government to crack down even more harshly against protesters, and the 
conflict has increasingly taken on the cast of an armed insurgency as frustrated 
protesters gather weapons and fight back.”91   
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Putting the blame on Russia’s diplomacy for the escalating violence in Syria also 
created an impression that Russia’s veto was the only obstacle to achieving peace in 
Syria: 
“Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton signaled the Obama administration's 
mounting frustration with Russia over the unending violence in Syria on 
Thursday, saying that Russia's refusal to take decisive action against President 
Bashar al-Assad threatened to precipitate the very civil war that Russian 
diplomats have said they wanted to avoid.”92 
 
“The outlook for a peaceful outcome to the conflict darkened further on Thursday, 
when Russia and China vetoed a Britain-sponsored resolution at the United 
Nations Security Council that would have penalized Mr. Assad's government with 
sanctions for the first time for failing to implement the six-point peace plan 
negotiated by Kofi Annan, the special Syria envoy.”93 
   
Presenting Russia’s intransigence in the debate as a principal cause of the 
“deadlock”94 and the “diplomatic stalemate”95 in the Security Council constituted the last 
key dimension of the larger theme of isolating Russia. The New York Times referred to 
the UNSC as being “paralyzed”96 due to “Russia blocking constructive action.”97 
Similarly, The Washington Post asserted that the passed resolution would end “months of 
inaction on Syria”98 but cautioned that “the entire proposal could unravel”99 if Russia did 
not support it. The New York Times cited the US top diplomats contending that the UNSC 
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has been unable to act because of the vetoes and, more specifically, because of Russia’s 
(and in some, but not all, accounts China’s) intransigence.100 
After the second veto in February, The Washington Post stated that such response 
“doomed any hope of a quick resolution at the United Nations”101 and that “White House 
officials acknowledged that the vote was a blow to diplomatic efforts to end the Syrian 
crisis.”102 Similarly, the New York Times proclaimed that “a United Nations Security 
Council effort to end the violence in Syria collapsed in acrimony with a double veto by 
Russia and China,”103 and that Russia “defied broad international consensus”104 by 
rejecting the proposal. Later in the coverage, The Washington Post stated that “diplomatic 
efforts to resolve the crisis have been stalled since the Feb. 4 veto of the Security Council 
resolution,”105 implying Russia’s responsibility for the stalemate (and ignoring Russia’s 
diplomatic efforts that already took place at that time). The discourse did not change as 
negotiations progressed and after the third veto in July, The Washington Post concluded: 
“With the veto by Russia and China of a U.N. Security Council resolution aimed 
at Syria effectively heralding an end to diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis, the 
spiraling violence seemed to leave little doubt that both sides are gearing up for a 
fight to a finish.”106 
  
Articles were frequently composed in such a way that the potential benefits of the 
proposed resolution were listed and presented in a positive light first, raising readers’ 
hopes for a possible solution to the crisis. The introductory paragraphs sometimes also 
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listed the actors who welcomed the resolution, creating an impression of a wide 
consensus. Then a sharp turn would follow – for example, “and a day later, Russia had its 
say: Not a chance”107 – creating the dynamic that not only pitted Russia against the 
proponents of the resolution but also portrayed Russia as a “spoiler,” as an evil character 
solely responsible for the inability of the UNSC to solve the Syrian crisis. The articles 
would then give updates on the escalating violence in Syria (often adding brief remarks 
about Russia’s arms deals with the Syrian government), creating a sense of urgency and 
emphasizing that the issue was extremely time sensitive and that immediate action from 
the international community was needed. Such structure of the articles worked to support 
the idea that the resolution put forth by the United States and the Arab League was the 
panacea, and if passed, would put an end to the crisis and the violence. Yet Russia’s veto 
(and Russia’s overall position regarding the crisis) created a “stalemate” at the UNSC and 
therefore contributed to escalation of violence and unraveling of the crisis in Syria.  
Divided global community/spheres of influence 
The US mainstream newspapers presented the debate over the resolution as being 
inherently about the competition for “spheres of influence” – a classic theme of the Cold 
War discourse. Additionally, this competition was presented as occurring in the “divided 
global community,” with lines of division closely resembling those that defined 
geopolitical struggles and the cartography of the Cold War.  Forty one out of the total of 
one hundred and four articles evoked the narratives of “spheres of influence” and 
“divided global community” in various combinations.  
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When discussing Russia’s position in the diplomatic debate, both newspapers 
emphasized that the underlying reasons for Russia’s intransigence had to do with its 
unwillingness, and even fear to lose its influence in the Middle East and its larger 
ambition of assuming “a proper role in shaping world affairs.”108 The New York Times 
referred to Syria as Russia’s “last bastion of influence”109 in the Middle East, suggesting 
that Russia always “used Assad to project its influence in the region,”110 and now Russia 
supports Assad because it fears losing that influence with Assad’s fall.111 In July, the New 
York Times published an op-ed piece written by Ruslan Pukhov, the director of the Center 
for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies – a Russian research organization. In that 
piece, Pukhov argued that Russia’s support of Assad’s government was a matter of 
prestige and even national pride for “many Russians:” 
“Many Russians believe that the collapse of the Assad government would be 
tantamount to the loss of Russia's last client and ally in the Middle East and the 
final elimination of traces of former Soviet prowess there -- illusory as those 
traces may be. They believe that Western intervention in Syria (which Russia 
cannot counter militarily) would be an intentional profanation of one of the few 
remaining symbols of Russia's status as a great world power.”112  
 
This quote suggests that Cold War past might have a strong symbolic significance 
for many Russians who feel nostalgic for the time when their country was “strong and 
powerful;” thus, any elimination of the link to this “glorious past” strips Russia of its 
desired status of a “great world power.” This quote illustrates the tension between the 
reality of the post-Cold War time when Russia “cannot counter [the West] militarily,” 
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and Russia’s desire to reassert its superpower status through diplomacy and rhetoric that 
resemble the diplomacy and rhetoric of the Cold War.  Implicit in this quote is also the 
idea that Russia can only “expand its role as a global powerbroker”113 if it engages in 
Cold War-style confrontation with “the West” – another dominant dimension of the 
“spheres of influence” theme. The Washington Post expressed the idea bluntly in one of 
its early news reports on the issue: “Prime Minister Vladimir Putin [stated] that Russia 
has to assume its proper role in shaping world affairs. That almost inevitably means 
sparring with the United States.”114 The idea was echoed in the New York Times that 
argued that “Kremlin is eager to send a stern message to the West”115 and that “for Mr. 
Putin [brokering a peace deal in Syria] may not be as important as standing up to the 
West.”116 Similarly, The Washington Post noted Russia’s “growing willingness to 
challenge the United States and its European allies on a number of issues”117 and offered 
an interpretation of Russia’s position being “an effort to seize the initiative on Syria from 
the Western powers - and from the United States, in particular.”118 The argument 
resonated with the view offered by the New York Times through the expert’s quote: 
“Russia’s support for Mr. Assad gives it a ‘huge role’ and leverage over the West.”119  
Russia’s opposition to the West as a grand strategy of what The Washington Post 
termed (referring to “one senior council diplomat”) the “Putinization of Russian foreign 
                                                 
113
 Herszenhorn, February 19, 2012.  
114
 Englund, January 19, 2012. 
115
 Herszenhorn, February 19, 2012. 
116
 Schwirtz, February 9, 2012. 
117
 Englund, February 7, 2012.  
118
 Ibid.  
119
 Barry, March 21, 2012 
   114 
 
policy”120 was complemented in the coverage by frequent references to Russia’s siding 
with states like China, Iran and North Korea. For example, when writing about the vote in 
the UN General Assembly, the New York Times noted that “Russia was one of just a 
dozen countries, among them China, Iran and North Korea, to vote against a General 
Assembly resolution urging Mr. Assad to step down.”121 Even though there were a dozen 
countries, the New York Times chose to single out China, Iran and North Korea – states 
that have already been worked up in the lager mainstream US news discourse as rather 
“unfriendly” (though to different degrees and for different reasons) toward the United 
States. Similarly, The Washington Post commented on the resolution’s veto:  
“The Russian and Chinese veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution has left 
the international community divided between those who support the Syrian 
uprising's call for the ouster of President Bashar al-Assad, including the United 
States, Europe and most of the Arab states, and Syria's allies who do not, 
including Russia, Iran and China.”122 
 
Thus, linking Russia to these states and juxtaposing this “group” to the United 
States, Europe and what The Washington Post termed “some Arab states” strengthened 
the idea of a very particular “divide” (along very particular geopolitical and perhaps even 
ideological lines) and implicitly articulated the connection to the Cold War discourse.  
One news report in the New York Times was particularly powerful in articulating 
this dimension of the “spheres of influence” theme. The report discussed Vladimir 
Putin’s visit to China in June. The New York Times opened the report with the following 
statement: “The Russian president, Vladimir V. Putin, arrived in China on Tuesday for 
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meetings aimed at strengthening a partnership between the two countries and offsetting 
the influence of the United States.”123 The article juxtaposed this visit to Putin’s decision 
not to attend a summit meeting hosted by President Obama in the US just one month 
before and stated that “the talks between Mr. Putin and Mr. Hu, along with the two-day 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit meeting, are fraught with the symbolism of 
two major powers interested in further developing a multilateral organization that does 
not include the United States, and where Iran plays a role, if only as observer.”124 This 
interpretation of the meeting expressed the interplay of the narratives of the “global 
divide” and “spheres of influence” and was echoed in The Washington Post’s 
interpretation of the resolution’s veto by Russia and China: 
“Russia and China on Thursday vetoed a Western-backed U.N. Security Council 
resolution threatening the government of Syria with sanctions, leaving the United 
States and its allies grappling for a new strategy to end the violence at a time of 
spreading chaos within the country. … It also placed new strains on relations 
between the United States and its European allies on one side and Russia and 
China on the other.”125  
 
In addition, the overall coverage often recreated an atmosphere of political battle 
between the two sides that “skirmished”126 over the text of the resolution, “traded 
barbs”127 with each other, sent “stern messages,”128 prepared for “launching a major 
diplomatic offensive”129 and “threatened” each other – linguistic choices highlighting 
military undertones of the discourse about the negotiations, conceptually overlapping 
with the “arms sales” theme and evoking memories of the Cold War confrontation.  
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Russia’s fear of radical Islam 
As previous discussion demonstrated, both US newspapers were highly critical of 
Russia’s position in the debate. However, they also made a few attempts to explain 
Russia’s position without demonizing Russia. In doing so, both US newspapers 
predominantly relied on the narrative of the “radical Islam threat” pointing out that 
“radical Islam is a huge concern for Russian leadership”130 and that “some Russian 
analysts” fear that the fall of Assad will lead to “ethnic violence against Christian 
minorities and the spread of terrorism.”131 The New York Times also brought up the 
concerns of the Russian Orthodox Church for the safety of Christian minorities in Syria 
(including a significant population of ethnic Russians residing in Syria), stating that “the 
Russian Orthodox Church… defended Mr. Assad’s secular government, arguing that it 
protects religious minorities and acts as a bulwark against radical Islamism.”132 Another 
article reiterated this point by stating that “the Russian Orthodox Church… fears that 
Christian minorities, many of them Orthodox, will be swept away by a wave of Islamic 
fundamentalism unleashed by the Arab Spring.”133 The article also quoted a Syrian living 
in Russia lamenting the fate of the Christian minorities after Assad’s fall: 
“Usama Matar, an optometrist who has lived in Russia since 1983, said he did not 
harbor any illusions about Russia's motives for defending Syrian Christians like 
himself, whom he called ‘small coins in a big game.’ But he said there were few 
international players taking notice of Eastern Christians at all. ‘The West is 
pursuing its own interests; they are indifferent to our fate,’ he said. ‘I am not 
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justifying the Assad regime -- it is dictatorial, we know this, it is despotic, I 
understand. But these guys, they don't even hide their intention to build an Islamic 
state and their methods of battle, where they just execute people on the streets. 
That's the opposition, not just the authorities. And we are between two fires.’”134 
  
Interestingly, the quote reveals the interplay between the two security discourses. 
On the one hand, Usama Matar is explicit in articulating his fear of the “spread of radical 
Islam” and the violence that he associates with it. On the other hand, he simultaneously 
points out that Syrian Christians are “small coins in a big game,”135 thus accepting the 
“great powers” logic of geopolitics that resembles the Cold War discourse. The phrase 
“we are between two fires” points to the tension between the two security discourses (and 
also corresponding approaches to policy) – one of the “clash of great powers” and 
another of the “clash of civilizations.”  It also points to a conceptual similarity between 
the two discourses, since neither of them addresses the complexities represented by the 
“small coins.”   
A similar interplay between the two security discourses is presented in the Op-Ed 
piece by Ruslan Pukhov, director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and 
Technologies (a Russian research organization) published in the New York Times in July 
of 2012. The main goal of the piece titled “Why Russia is backing Syria” is to explain to 
the American readers “the real reason”136 behind Russia’s position. The opening 
paragraph states: 
“Many in the West believe that Russia's support for Syria stems from Moscow's 
desire to profit from selling arms to Bashar al-Assad's government and maintain 
its naval facility at the Syrian port of Tartus. But these speculations are superficial 
and misguided. The real reason that Russia is resisting strong international action 
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against the Assad regime is that it fears the spread of Islamic radicalism and the 
erosion of its superpower status in a world where Western nations are increasingly 
undertaking unilateral military interventions.”137 
 
The author proceeds to debunk the “superficial and misguided speculations,” 
while also capitalizing on two key narratives: Russia’s role as a “superpower” and 
Russia’s fear of radical Islam. The former narrative supports the discourse of the Cold 
War and complements the themes discussed at length in the previous section. The latter 
narrative merits further discussion. The author of the article contends that “Russian 
observers believe that Arab revolutions have completely destabilized the region and 
cleared the road to power for the Islamists. In Moscow, secular authoritarian governments 
are seen as the sole realistic alternative to Islamic domination:”138 
“The continuing struggles in Arab countries are seen as a battle by those who 
wear neckties against those who do not wear them. Russians have long suffered 
from terrorism and extremism at the hands of Islamists in the northern Caucasus, 
and they are therefore firmly on the side of those who wear neckties. To people in 
Moscow, Mr. Assad appears not so much as ''a bad dictator'' but as a secular 
leader struggling with an uprising of Islamist barbarians.”139 
 
The narrative of the “Islamic threat” is evident in the quote above, as is the 
explicit essentialist juxtaposition of “those who wear neckties against those who do not.” 
Most importantly, while the US newspapers extensively critiqued Russia’s position in the 
Syrian debate (as exemplified by the discussion in the previous section), the critique 
never extended to Russia’s position regarding the “threat of radical Islam.” In addition, 
The Washington Post also talked about “growing concerns that al-Qaeda influenced 
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groups may be trying to muscle in to the increasingly chaotic situation in Syria,”140 
though carefully noting that “US officials… added that there is no indication that the 
Syrian opposition is falling under the influence of extremist groups.”141 The clarification 
was followed by a claim in an article published just a few days later that “top US 
intelligence officials said… that they think members of al-Quaeda have infiltrated Syrian 
opposition groups… though in many cases the opposition groups may not be aware that 
[the extremists] are there.”142 Thus, The Washington Post brought in the narrative of the 
“Islamic threat,” yet tried to separate it from the Syrian opposition since the US official 
policy supported the opposition. In doing so, The Washington Post also used the narrative 
of the “Islamic threat” to further advance the US official position, arguing in one of its 
editorials that “a managed transition… could end the bloodshed relatively quickly and 
give the upper hand to secular and pro-democracy forces,” whereas prolonged fighting 
increased the chance that “Syria will be overtaken by a merciless sectarian war… [which] 
would empower Islamic extremists.”143 A news report later in the coverage reiterated this 
point by quoting one of the State Department’s senior diplomats: “The longer this goes 
on, the deeper the sectarian divisions, the higher the risks of long-term sectarian conflict, 
the higher the risk of extremist involvement.”144  
Lastly, the theme of the “Islamic threat” also came up in two Op-Ed pieces 
published in The Washington Post that advocated military intervention145 and arming of 
                                                 
140
 Sly, February 13, 2012.  
141
 Ibid. 
142
 Lynch, February 17, 2012. 
143
 “Saving Syria,” January 31, 2012.  
144
 Karen DeYoung, “US, partners weigh military moves to curb Syrian carnage,” Washington Post, March 
11, 2012, A01. 
145
 Max Boot, “Get Off the Sidelines with Syria,” Washington Post, March 16, 2012, A13.  
   120 
 
the Syrian opposition.146 The author of the former article argued that “if we (the US) 
stand on the sidelines, worst-case scenarios – such as Syrian chemical weapons falling 
into the wrong hands or groups such as al-Qaeda developing havens – are more likely to 
result because of the Assad regime’s inability to control its own territory.”147 This quote, 
in addition to playing on the theme of the “radical Islam threat,” also reflects paternalistic 
attitude and assumption that the US and its allies will be able to control the territory in 
Syria, unlike Assad’s regime that is being portrayed as not just brutal and autocratic (in a 
larger context of the coverage) but as incompetent and unable to stand up to the “terrorist 
forces.” The second article advocated for arming the Syrian opposition, putting forth two 
arguments that, once again, brought together the discourse of the Cold War and the 
discourse of the “threat of radical Islam.” The first argument was based on the idea that if 
Russia arms Assad’s forces, then the US has a right to arm the opposition. The author 
even brought up a historical parallel of how “arming the Afghan opposition in the 1980s 
succeeded in its aim of driving out the Soviet Union,”148 though promptly adding that 
“US responsibility for the subsequent chaos lay in its abandoning the country after 
1989.”149 The discourse of the Cold War clearly surfaces in the narrative constructed by 
the author, yet it also takes an interesting twist in the concluding paragraph: 
“…the United States has reason to provide material support for the Syrian 
opposition: precisely so it can be a player in Syria if and when Assad does fall. 
Western influence could be vital in shaping the post-Assad regime. Or would it be 
better to stand back while Saudi and Qatari fundamentalists ship weapons to their 
counterparts in Syria - and call the political shots afterward?”150 
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 The concluding paragraph blends the discourse of the “threat of Islamic 
fundamentalism” into the larger geopolitical discourse of “spheres of influence,” which 
closely resembles the discourse of the Cold War, especially when interpreted within the 
larger context of the editorial and the coverage in general.  
Russian mainstream media coverage 
Russia’s respect of state sovereignty versus Western plan of intervention and regime 
change 
One of the central themes in the coverage by Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty was 
the juxtaposition of Russia’s respect for Syria’s sovereignty, and therefore Russia’s 
commitment to diplomatic solutions to the crisis, to Western (and often time exclusively 
American) desire for intervention and regime change in Syria. Both newspapers 
supported the official Russian position that the resolution proposed at the UNSC “did not 
rule out military intervention,”151 and if such intervention was to occur, it would “shake 
the foundations of international order.”152 Both newspapers constantly emphasized 
Russia’s position that “it should be up to the Syrian people to decide the future of their 
country”153 and therefore members of the UNSC should act as mediators instead of 
“taking part in the civil war by supporting one of the sides in the conflict.”154 The United 
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States and its allies, according to both newspapers, were “trying to get UNSC’s approval 
for military intervention in Syria”155 in order to topple Assad’s regime. 
The situation with intervention and regime change in Libya was mentioned often. 
“Russia will do all it can to prevent the declaration of a “no-fly” zone in Syria, like it 
happened in Libya,”156 wrote Izvestia. “No one should be allowed to implement the 
‘Libyan scenario’ in Syria,”157 stated Argumenty i Fakty, quoting President Putin and 
explaining the reason for such position: 
“A string of military conflicts justified by humanitarian goals compromises the 
integrity of the centuries-old principle of state sovereignty. As a result, many 
nations become victims of “humanitarian” operations and of the export of the 
“rocket-and-bomb democracy.” Last time the aviation was used to topple the 
regime in Libya – an operation that culminated in a disgusting scene of Gaddafi’s 
murder (quoting Putin).”158 
   
This quote determined one of the key arguments advanced by Argumenty i Fakty 
throughout the coverage: “the proclaimed goal of any operation proposed by the United 
States and its allies is to defend civilians but in reality, like in Libya, the allies will take 
the side of Assad’s opposition.”159 In advancing this argument, Argunety i Fakty referred 
to some of the top Russian officials and diplomats stating, for example, that “Russia will 
not allow a military campaign in Syria resembling the one in Libya where Western allies 
attacked Libya under the pretense of protecting civilians, which led to the toppling of 
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Gaddafi’s regime.”160 It also quoted “average Syrians” worrying about NATO 
intervention. For example, one story (by a correspondent reporting directly from Syria) 
quoted a student shouting on the street during a heated debate: “First, the American 
planes will arrive. Then NATO people will pay the officers and sponsor a coup! All 
according to a well-known scheme just like in Libya!”161  
When in February of 2012 (after Russia and China vetoed the resolution for the 
second time) proponents of the resolution initiated the creation of the “friends of Syria” 
group in order to develop measures for resolving the crisis independently of the UNSC, 
both Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty drew a parallel with the “friends of the Libyan 
people” group organized a year earlier: 
“In early March of last year Paris initiated a similar political operation by 
organizing a “contact group on Libya.” On September 1st it was renamed into a 
“group of friends of the Libyan people.” In the next six months, as everyone 
knows, “the friends” bombed all military bases of the Libyan army and armed the 
opposition for a fight against Gaddafi. The present “group” – which the French 
diplomats are putting together according to a tested scenario – consists of pretty 
much the same members.”162 
 
The main goal of the “friends of Syria” group was, according to both newspapers 
“the legitimization of military intervention and regime change”163 rather than their 
declared goal of starting a dialogue in order to resolve internal crisis in Syria. One of the 
indicators, according to Izvestia, was that the “friends of Syria” only invited leaders of 
some opposition groups to the initial meeting of the group in Tunis and did not invite the 
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representative of the Syrian government.164 This, according to Izvestia, was not 
considerate of the interests of the large portion of the Syrian population that was 
supporting the government165 and therefore such initiative would not help to start a 
dialogue. Instead, Izvestia argued, the group looked more like an “international coalition” 
aiming to “kick Assad out of Syria.”166 Both newspapers argued that the West was 
“misleading the opposition [by insisting that Assad lost his legitimacy and must leave], 
signaling that starting a dialogue is pointless and that the opposition should count on 
Western and NATO help, like it happened in Libya a year ago.”167 An op-ed piece in 
Izvestia reiterated this point: 
“Interestingly, the United States and their allies, not Russia, provoke the growth 
of violence and chaos in the region with their actions. By taking a firm position 
that Assad must leave, they raise the expectations and the demands of the armed 
opposition. The opposition, aware of the Libyan experience, radicalizes its own 
demands. The opposition loses motivation for trying to negotiate with the existing 
regime in order to find a compromise. It demands external intervention and 
violent toppling of the Assad’s regime from its Western donors and their allies in 
the region. Thus, the West, by not suggesting any political and diplomatic 
solution to the problem, by not suggesting any alternative to the plan of Kofi 
Annan supported by Russia, enables further escalation of the conflict.”168  
 
Thus, from the perspective of the Russian mainstream media, the West acted as a 
“spoiler” in the process of the peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis because the goal of 
the West was “military intervention and regime change.”  
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Conversely, Russia was always portrayed in Izvestia and Argumenty I Fakty as 
striving to “find a compromise,”169 “bring stability to Syria through diplomatic 
negotiations and democratic reforms”170 and as being “open to partnership with those 
who were seeking this partnership.”171  Russia’s key position in the debate, according to 
both newspapers, was that the main goal of the members of the UNSC should be to get 
both the Syrian government and the opposition to stop mutual violence and to get to the 
negotiating table. Thus, both newspapers devoted significant amount of coverage to 
discussing Russian diplomatic efforts in Syria, including multiple trips of the top Russian 
officials to Damascus and their initiatives on hosting negotiations between the Syrian 
government and the opposition in Moscow. Both newspapers were optimistic about the 
potential of these efforts, calling them “timely and useful”172 and reporting that “Assad 
agreed to ceasefire and reforms”173 and “is ready for a dialogue with all political 
groups.”174 However, when these efforts did not produce any positive results, Izvestia and 
Argumenty i Fakty argued that the reason for the lack of progress was the intransigence of 
both the Syrian opposition and of its foreign supporters.  
Russian rational diplomacy versus Western emotional messianism 
Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty argued that Russia and Russian officials were 
embracing, and actively working toward, a diplomatic solution to the Syrian crisis while 
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the West, and the US specifically, were plotting intervention with the goal of the regime 
change. In constructing these narratives both newspapers emphasized that Russian 
diplomacy was rational and thoughtful, while the United States and its allies, blinded by 
the “regime change” idea, overlooked the important complexity of the situation in the 
region and therefore were more emotional rather than rational in their arguments and 
proposed actions. The juxtaposition of the two narratives was particularly pronounced in 
several instances. 
First, in discussing the reaction of the proponents of the resolution to Russian and 
Chinese vetoes, both newspapers highlighted the comments by Sergey Lavrov, the 
Russian Foreign Minister, who noted that “some of the comments coming from the West 
in regards to the UNSC voting results sound inappropriate and are close to hysteria”175 
and “urged [his Western colleagues] to assess the situation more thoughtfully:”176 “I 
recall a proverb that one who is angry is rarely right,”177 quoted Izvestia. In another 
report, Izvestia quoted a Twitter post by Gennadiy Gatilov (Russian Deputy Minister of 
Foreign Affairs) stating that “undiplomatic reaction of Westerners to Russia’s position on 
Syria at the UNSC only confirms the correctness of our arguments. It is better to seek 
compromises.”178 Articles were often composed in such a way that the diplomatic efforts 
– whether by Russia or by the special UN envoy Kofi Annan – were directly juxtaposed 
to United States’ and its allies’ alleged “non-diplomatic plans.” For example, Argumenty i 
Fakty stated: “While the special UN and Arab League envoy Kofi Annan tried to start the 
                                                 
175
 “Lavrov Zametil Isteriku V Siriyskom Voprose,” Izvestia, February 6, 2012, 
http://izvestia.ru/news/514379#ixzz29N0PNJCY. 
176
 “Lavrov Zametil,” February 6, 2012. 
177
 Ibid. 
178
 “Lavrov i Fradkov,” February 7, 2012. 
   127 
 
negotiations between the Syrian government and the opposition, the United States and 
their allies started discussing intervention plans. Will the West dare to bomb yet another 
country?”179 Similarly, when in February of 2012 the United States and several Western 
European countries either closed their embassies in Syria or summoned their 
ambassadors, Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty contrasted this “flight of ambassadors” with 
the diplomatic efforts of the top Russian officials – including especially their trips to 
Damascus – happening at the same time.  The articles discussing these events were 
structured in a way that listed all the countries whose ambassadors left Syria, making it 
seem like an emotional and symbolic gesture indicating the end to those countries’ 
diplomatic relations with Syria, and therefore those countries’ unwillingness to seek a 
diplomatic solution to the crisis. After that, the articles would point out that “at the same 
time”180 Russian top officials and diplomats were meeting with Assad, working hard on 
trying to find compromises and foster a dialogue between multiple political groups in 
Syria. Izvestia also referenced Sergey Lavrov noting that “the situation [of the 
ambassadors leaving Syria] borders with hysteria and only leads to escalation of tensions 
in the country.”181   
Second, both newspapers accused the US officials of “relying on sensational 
media coverage rather than on thoughtful analysis of the situation”182 when making 
foreign policy decisions. Both newspapers asserted that the Western media and 
governments were working in unison to support and promote only the Western 
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perspective on the Syrian crisis and on ways of resolving it. When in early February of 
2012 the Syrian city of Homs was shelled by the government forces, Argumenty i Fakty 
noted: “The city of Homs is a direct proof that the wars of the twenty-first century are not 
won with weapons. What wins is a picture on television or a video on the Internet.”183 
Dissatisfied with the Western media’s coverage of the shelling in Homs, Argumenty i 
Fakty sent its own correspondent to Syria, who frequently cited Syrian journalists and 
local organizers in his reports from Homs: 
“Tell me – asks me Mohammed – we have walked through five districts – have 
you seen a single dead woman or a child? But if you watch CNN, all our army is 
doing is systematically murdering civilians. Actually, the army opened a corridor 
right before the shelling – all citizens left Homs. But has any single Western 
channel shown that?”184 
 
In the same report, the author acknowledged the atrocities committed by the 
government forces but also pointed readers’ attention to the violence coming from the 
opposition:  
“I accept that civilians indeed died in Baba-Amr (a district in Homs): after all, 
tanks shelled the city directly. But there is also another truth. CNN and BBC don’t 
show it. Rebels murdered hundreds of civilians in Homs who were supporting 
Assad: not military personnel but civilians. For example, rebels shot a local 
school’s principal (like Assad, he belonged to the sect of Muslim Alawites) and 
his whole family, including three children, and threw the bodies down from the 
balcony. This immediately reminds us of the situation with Gaddafi: the global 
community loudly protested the crack down on the protestors but completely 
ignored videos on the Internet showing the rebels murdering Libyan soldiers.”185 
 
In this report, the journalist drew a comparison with the conflict in Libya – a 
frequent theme in the overall Russian media coverage that was discussed earlier – to 
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show “the history of Western double-standards” repeating itself. Another report in 
Argumenty i Fakty made a similar point, while also bringing up the Western media 
campaign accompanying the US invasion of Iraq: 
Western mainstream media always support the official policy of their 
governments even if it involves telling lies and manufacturing truths. Recently, 
we had two cases when lies were used to start a war against a country. The first 
one was the US occupation of Iraq, when all mass media were insisting that 
Saddam Hussein possessed nuclear weapons. What happened next? After 
Baghdad’s fall, everyone found out that there were no such weapons. Most 
recently we had the case of Muammar Gaddafi. [The media] kept telling that he 
was burying protesters in mass graves, and bombing from the air. When this 
information was debunked, they buried Gaddafi himself. The West needs a reason 
to invade Syria – everything else doesn’t matter. This is a political theater where 
corpses serve as decorations.186  
 
Moreover, Argumenty i Fakty argued that in comparison to Libya and Iraq, Syria 
was in fact a progressive country with a progressive leader who was undeservingly 
demonized by the Western media: 
“Before the ‘Arab Spring’ Bashar al-Assad was considered one of the most 
progressive leaders in the Middle East. He developed the Internet in the country, 
opened Syria for tourists, and Syrian people could openly criticize the government 
in conversations with the foreigners. This was impossible in Libya under Gaddafi 
or in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Now, due to the Internet and television, Assad 
is portrayed as a monster who eats babies for breakfast. It is impossible to prove 
this wrong – you will be told, again, about murdered women and children.”187 
  
To reinforce the point about the West manufacturing media coverage to justify 
intervention, Argumenty i Fakty also argued that Western media determined the roles of 
“bad guys” (the Syrian government) and the “knights in shining armor”188 (the 
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opposition) according to the official foreign policy, without taking into consideration the 
dynamic of the unfolding crisis: 
 
“Any murder can be blamed on the regime in Damascus: no one will even listen 
to any other opinion. Why conduct an independent investigation? The West jumps 
to conclusions five minutes after listening to BBC. There is only one perspective: 
“freedom fighters” only tell the truth, the regime always lies.”189  
 
According to Argumenty i Fakty, such static view of “heroes and villains” in the 
crisis was impossible to change, even when facts contradicted this perspective: 
 
“I turn on CNN and hear: ‘Hula was shelled with heavy artillery,’ – comments 
Ibrahim Salad, a military expert. Atrocities of the Syrian army are extensively 
discussed for two days. Then suddenly they say: ‘Almost all victims were 
stabbed.’ UN monitors go to Hula, put together a report, which has nothing about 
heavy artillery. So the artillery turned out to be a hoax? Well, this doesn’t bother 
anyone. The US and the E.U. already accused Syria, and summoned their 
ambassadors. Soon a new scoop appears: soldiers murdered the people in their 
homes. There is no proof but the West doesn’t need it. It’s pointless for Syria to 
try to prove otherwise – if rumors are not confirmed, no one believes Syria 
anyway.”190  
 
Similarly, Argumenty i Fakty quoted a Syrian journalist frustrated by Western 
media’s coverage and their source selection bias:  
“It’s hard to be a bloody tyrant. You can tell the truth, and no one will still believe 
you. Note that during the first day of fighting in Homs foreign news agencies 
announced: 250 people were killed. The source? “According to the phone 
message from a representative of the Syrian opposition forces.” And that’s it, 
that’s enough! This means every person can make up some numbers and the West 
will accept it automatically! I will tell you honestly; I was in Homs that day and 
saw everything and the amount of killed people was not even close to that. But 
who will believe someone who is on the tyrant’s side? We can rip our throats 
shouting but no one in the West will hear us.”191  
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Bringing readers’ attention to the pro-opposition, anti-Assad bias in Western 
media coverage supported the larger point about the intransigence of the West, its 
unwillingness to consider alternative perspectives and even facts. Moreover, the claims 
about the Western policy makers relying on sensational media coverage undermined 
these policy-makers’ credibility, though Izvestia pointed out in one of its reports that “if 
the West decided something, it will not back down because there is no substantial 
counter-power to the power of the West in the world today.”192 Thus, Izvestia recognized 
the unmatched power of the West. At the same time, the refusal to accept the Western 
perspective (powerful but wrong, according to the Russian mainstream media) evident in 
other dominant themes discussed above also points to the resistance to the post-Cold War 
“unipolar world” and to the desire to restore the “balance of power.”  
Divided Syria, fractured opposition 
One of the key arguments advanced by Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty in order to 
support Russia’s official position in the debate was that a large portion of Syrian 
population was siding with Assad. When Syria held a referendum on the new 
Constitution in late February of 2012 – an event resulting in 90% of Syrians supporting 
the modernization of the Constitution (at least according to Izvestia) – Izvestia declared 
that “the results of the referendum demonstrate that the argument about Assad’s 
illegitimacy is false.”193 Moreover, Izvestia asserted that the results of the referendum 
also demonstrated “a change in the position of the people who previously supported [the 
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revolution]:”194 “once people saw that weakening of the government leads to terrorist 
attacks and violence, they took Assad’s side [because he is] able to prevent Syria from 
falling apart”195 – cited Izvestia a Russian expert on Middle Eastern affairs. Argumenty i 
Fakty supported this point by quoting Syrians in its report by a special correspondent in 
Syria: 
“‘I also supported the revolution at the beginning – says Professor [Jamal al-
Bahr]. ‘I was fed up with the corruption on all levels, with impossibility to resolve 
any issue without a bribe, with small salaries. But now my opinion drastically 
changed! The West portrays Bashar al-Assad as a bloody tyrant but compared to 
the real tyrants he is an angel. Bashar did not hang people on the streets, like 
Saddam, and his family did not steal milliards, like Gaddafi’s relatives. Have you 
seen a sculpture of Bashar anywhere in Damascus? And you won’t see it. Syria 
has free health care and free education, and crime was unheard of before. I 
expected positive changes from the “Arab Spring” and what did I get? Money 
perished, there is fighting in cities and towns, burglars break into cars, my 
children don’t have jobs. To hell this kind of revolution!’”196 
 
Every report in Argumenty i Fakty described in detail the dire conditions in which 
Syrians found themselves after the protests escalated into a violent conflict, implying that 
this situation was a “result of the revolution.” Several vignettes similar to the one above 
demonstrated that the “people of Syria” wanted peace and associated peace and stability 
with Assad, in contrast to the opposition that demanded Assad to step down and thus, 
according to the logic implicit in both newspapers’ narratives, was instrumental in 
exacerbating tensions and causing greater violence. Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty 
connected the idea of the opposition provoking violence to the argument that the 
opposition itself was fractured and that the opposition groups with most radical views 
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were supported from abroad,197 while some of the groups representing what Izvestia 
termed “internal opposition”198 were more moderate and willing to negotiate with the 
authorities.199 
Thus, Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty developed the narrative of divided Syria 
where the majority – “the people of Syria” supporting Assad – were terrorized by the 
powerful minority – the opposition demanding regime change and getting substantial 
support from the “foreign actors.” According to both newspapers, the West and other 
proponents of the UNSC resolution who supported the opposition did not support “the 
people of Syria.” “Moscow believes that the global community should support the entire 
Syrian nation, not just its fraction,” stated Izvestia in a report discussing the first meeting 
of the “friends of Syria” group. Quoting one of the Russian top officials, Izvestia argued 
that because “the leaders of certain opposition groups were invited to the meeting and the 
Syrian government officials were not, [this meant that] the interests of the majority of 
Syrians who support the current government, would not be represented [at the 
meeting].”200 Similarly, Argumenty i Fakty quoted a Russian diplomat arguing that “none 
of the opposition groups have a right to speak on behalf of the Syrian people, and 
especially to represent them.”201 This dichotomy – Russia supporting Assad and therefore 
the people of Syria, and the West (especially the United States) supporting the opposition 
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– was evident in several stories by Argumenty i Fakty correspondents who portrayed 
Syria as divided into pro-Russian and pro-American forces: 
“The entire way from Beirut to Damascus the driver Ahmed kept explaining: 
“Don’t mention anywhere that you are from Russia. The Islamists think that 
Bashar’s regime is holding only because of Moscow’s support. Here in Damascus 
you will be called a brother but in Homs the rebels swore to Allah that they will 
kill all Russians. If you go there, pretend that you are an American. You speak 
English with an accent? Well, then tell them you are from Finland; no one knows 
Finnish here.”202  
 
Argumenty i Fakty also quoted some anti-Assad Syrians saying they “would 
rather clean the boots of the Americans than the Russians.”203 In another story, the author 
was describing an episode at a small café in Hula (a town in Syria where some of the 
most intense fighting occurred in May of 2012).  As the author and the café owner drank 
tea in the darkness, they could see the flames and hear the shooting. The café owner said: 
“This is the sound of NATO guns – means the rebels are shooting. Once we hear 
Kalashnikovs – that’s our [Syrian] army.”204 These quotes and episodes reinforced the 
narrative of the divided Syria while also demonstrating Syrians’ recognition and 
acceptance of the “great powers and their clients” political order and discourse. 
Threat of radical Islam 
The main argument Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty presented when defending 
Russia’s support of Assad was that “if Assad falls, Syria will sink into sectarian war 
where Islamists, supported by the Persian Gulf monarchies, will gain strength”205 and 
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eventually seize power.206 Argumenty i Fakty quoted Syrians worrying about the 
prospects of a violent sectarian war: “If they kick Bashar out, everything here will choke 
in blood. Alawites and Sunni will fight, and then Shia and Christians will join too… You 
will see, there will be a big war.”207 Another person also noted that the “revolution” took 
an unintended, yet somewhat predictable turn: 
“You know what sucks about all this? The protests of the “Arab Spring” were 
different – against corruption, against rich bureaucrats, against dictatorship. But is 
what’s going on in Hula now a democracy? No, this is called bloodshed. Rebels 
are not aliens who came from Mars: they always lived among us. Turns out, if a 
country has strong power, everyone is afraid of that power. But as soon as you 
loosen the grip, people who like to murder their neighbors immediately turn up. 
Syria is sinking in blood…”208  
 
Izvestia emphasized in its reports that “there were many radical Sunni Muslims 
[in the opposition]”209 and that’s why Moscow was “insisting that the opposition 
members distance themselves from extremist organizations.”210 Argumenty i Fakty 
quoted a Syrian fearing the “Islamic turn” of the revolution: 
“I’m not happy with Bashar,” tells me Karim, a businessman and the owner of a 
local restaurant chain. “But I see who is about to replace him. Protests in Syria 
were started by students with stones in their hands, and then the initiative was 
hijacked by the Islamists with grenade-guns. If they win, they will kill everyone 
who supported Assad. Christians will have to flee, people who drink a glass of 
beer will be beaten with sticks on the streets of Damascus – just like in Iran. 
Thanks but I don’t need this kind of democracy!”211  
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Izvestia noted in one of its reports that Israel has been surprisingly quiet about the 
Syrian crisis and explained to the readers that Israel’s cautious position could be easily 
understood because “Israel realizes that if Arab nationalists fail, their place in Damascus 
would be taken by Islamic fundamentalists who have ties to al-Qaeda.”212   
The “al-Qaeda connection” was discussed thoroughly throughout the coverage by 
both newspapers. In early February, Izvestia announced: “al-Qaeda officially supported 
the Syrian opposition and called on all Muslims to join the protests against President 
Bashar Assad.”213 Izvestia noted that while it was still unknown how likely al-Qaeda’s 
direct participation in the Syrian crisis was, the Iraqi authorities admitted that al-Qaeda 
fighters as well as weapons did cross the border from Northern Iraq to Syria.214 Similarly, 
Argumenty i Fakty’s special correspondent in Syria, while describing his experience of 
crossing the Lebanon-Syrian border, quoted a Lebanese border security officer saying 
that “only al-Qaeda fighters are crossing [into Syria] now.”215 Izvestia quoted an expert 
saying that while the Syrian National Council rejected any ties to al-Qaeda (though also 
admitting that there are some “Salafi members in the opposition who promote religious 
rather than democratic ideas”216), “there is a connection between al-Qaeda and radical 
Islamic groups among the members of the Free Syrian Army, like groups “Soldiers of 
Islam” who seek to establish sharia law in the country.”217 This expert opinion was 
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complemented by the reports from Syria in Argumenty i Fakty. For example, in one 
report, the author described his exchange with a member of the Free Syrian Army: 
“27-year-old Ayub is one of the officers of the Free Syrian Army. He was a 
member of the Syrian special forces but defected when he was sent to the city of 
Deraa and took the side of the rebels. He talks to me thinking that I am a western 
journalist; he doesn’t know that I am from Moscow: “Russians and Chinese are 
assholes, - he states bluntly. If it wasn’t for their support, Bashar would leave 
Damascus tomorrow.” He curses the West too. “Your politicians are dogs and 
cowards. If NATO troops come to Syria, we will wait till they topple Assad and 
then kill them all.” Who will be the new Syrian president doesn’t concern Ayub 
much. “Allah must rule Syria. Whoever doesn’t like it can get the hell out of 
here.”218  
 
This exchange with Ayub served to portray members of the Free Syrian Army – at 
least those who embraced radical Islam – as ruthless and violent. To underscore this 
point, another report quoted two Syrians complaining about the brutality of the 
“Islamists:” 
“I had to flee al-Khamidia,” sighs Pierre. “My parents were born there. The rebels 
stopped by our place, demanded money for the “holy war.” They took my friend’s 
Toyota, said it was needed for the revolution. God, where did this all come from 
all of a sudden? Only recently young women were strolling the streets of Homs 
wearing open dresses and eating ice-cream…” 
 
“Mohammad tells the news: last week Islamists shot three young men on the bus 
stop – for no reason. After the funeral, a local mullah spoke at the Mosque calling 
for the Muslims to stop killing each other. In the evening he was shot in the back 
next to his own house.”219 
 
Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty also emphasized that the “spread of radical Islam” 
threatened Syria’s Christians. Izvestia reported, referring to the Catholic missionary news 
agency Fides, about the raids on houses and stores in the Christian district in the city of 
Al-Kusair in April. In the same report, Izvestia noted that “Salafi television called on the 
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Free Syrian Army to attack all Christians who support Assad’s regime.”220 In turn, 
Argumenty i Fakty quoted some Christians who feared for their future or told stories of 
already experienced threats: 
“Bashar is a dictator, no doubt about that,” tells me Michelle, the owner of a 
liquor store in a Christian district. “But I don’t want Damascus to become a battle 
scene. The Islamists will crash my store right away.”221  
 
“When they started shelling our city, I got really scared,” admits a 37-year old 
refugee from Homs Victoria Marmysh. “I live right next to the Baba-Amr district 
that was seized by the Islamists. I am so grateful to my neighbor who hid me 
when rebels were raiding the houses looking for Christians.”222  
 
“28-year-old Yevkharstia with three children fled al-Kusair that was seized by the 
Islamist rebels. Local Christians were told that whoever doesn’t leave the city in 
three days, will be shot. “This is the apocalypse,” says Yevkharstia, while opening 
the water bottle for her daughter. “My grandparents and I were born in Syria but 
today we are being forced to leave because we pray to Christ and not to 
Mohammed.”223  
 
These vignettes supported the key argument advanced by both newspapers that by 
supporting Assad, Russia was supporting stability in Syria. Moreover, by elaborating the 
link between the various fractions of the Syrian opposition and the radical Islamists, both 
Russian newspapers implicitly suggested that by supporting the Syrian opposition the 
United States and their allies are also supporting, paradoxically, the Islamists, including 
al-Qaeda. Thus, according to both Russian newspapers, demanding Assad’s removal 
while also supporting the opposition was an abysmal strategy that didn’t take into 
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consideration what both newspapers presented as the rekindling of Islamic radicalism in 
the situation of political unrest.  
US alternative media coverage 
Opposition to arming Syrian rebels 
Both magazines strongly opposed the idea of arming the Syrian opposition in 
response to Russia’s military support of the Syrian government. As The Nation stated 
“arming the resistance is a dangerous idea that the administration should reject”224 
because it would “cause more harm than good.”225 Z Magazine was critical of the State 
Department “openly courting the Syrian opposition,”226 and The Nation argued that the 
US’s “ever more active and unconditional support [of the] Syrian rebels” was a “flawed 
strategy… pushed by a chorus of both conservative and liberal hawks,”227 thus 
acknowledging that such approach to foreign policy transcended the liberal-conservative 
partisan divide but not in a productive way. Similarly, Z Magazine noted: 
The calls for military intervention are coming from the media and some in 
Congress, from neo-cons who never gave up on their plans for regime change 
across the Arab world, and from hawkish liberal interventionists who again see 
military force as a solution to every human rights or humanitarian problem.228    
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One article in The Nation mocked the idea of arming the Syrian opposition, 
concluding that “it’s a project that has ‘this can’t end well’ written all over it.”229 This 
same article linked the critique of the idea of arming Syrian opposition to a larger 
concern with what the author termed “Washington’s militarized mindset.”230 The author, 
Tom Engelhardt, argued that even though “Americans may feel more distant from war 
than at any time since World War II… the militarization of the United States and the 
strengthening of the National Security Complex continues to accelerate.”231 Engelhardt 
particularly focused on what he termed “the militarization of solutions,” pointing out that 
“diplomacy, too, has been ‘militarized’” and that “diplomats work ever more closely with 
the military, while the State Department is transforming itself into an unofficial arm of 
the Pentagon.”232 While Engelhardt noted that “the process hit warp speed in the post-
9/11 years,” he also emphasized that “militarization in this country is hardly a new 
phenomenon [and] can be traced back decades.”233 Indeed, militarization marked decades 
of the Cold War too, with the focus on the arms race and nuclear threat shaping 
corresponding policies and security discourses. In the post-Cold War and post-9/11 time, 
“even [though] the US still lacks the classic look of a militarized society,”234 
“Washington’s mindset,”235 according to Engelhardt, is transforming toward a greater 
“militarization of solutions” – a perspective echoed in Z Magazine’s assertion that in the 
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case of the Syrian crisis, “Obama seems to be slipping toward militarization.”236 
Engelhardt stated: 
“If the institutions of American life and governance are increasingly militarized, 
then it shouldn’t be surprising that the problems facing the country are ever more 
often framed in militarized terms and that the only solutions considered are 
similarly militarized.”237  
 
Engelhardt gave “a little regional scorecard of what American militarization had 
meant in the Greater Middle East” from 2001 to 2012, briefly discussing the results of 
US’ involvement in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, Syria, Somalia, Egypt and 
Libya. Next, in a section titled “how to set the planet on fire and learn nothing,” 
Engelhardt remarked that “the general lack of success from 2002 on and a deepening 
frustration in Washington have just led to a stronger conviction that some recalibrated 
version of a military solution (greater surges, lesser surges, no invasions but special 
forces and drones, smaller “footprint,” larger naval presence, etc.) is the only reasonable 
way to go.”238 Engelhardt concluded with a summary that pointed to a growing 
securitization of policies and decisions in the US foreign policy, and challenged the way 
of thinking about foreign affairs as a “chessboard”: 
“Here’s a 2012 American reality then: as a great power, the US has an 
increasingly limited toolkit, into which it is reaching far more often for ever more 
similar tools. The idea that the globe is a chessboard, that Washington is in 
control of the game, and that each militarized move it makes will have a 
reasonably predictable result couldn’t be more dangerous. The evidence of the last 
decade is clear enough: there is little less predictable or more likely to go awry 
than the application of military force and militarized solutions, which are 
cumulatively incendiary in unexpected ways, and in the end threaten to set whole 
regions on fire. None of this, however, seems to register in Washington. The 
United States is commonly said to be a great power in decline, but the 
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militarization of American policy – and thinking – at home and abroad is not. It 
has Washington, now a capital of perpetual war, in its grip.”239   
 
In another article published in The Nation on January 30, 2012, Tom Engelhardt 
discussed this idea again though focusing also on the hypocrisy of Washington’s foreign 
policy that creates “red lines… that others are prohibited from crossing”240 yet continues 
to cross these same lines across the world without facing any serious consequences. 
Focusing specifically on US – Iran relations and on United States’ enduring desire to 
overthrow the Iranian government, Engelhardt developed a more general idea of 
perceived US exceptionalism as a driving force behind the legitimization of a foreign 
policy aimed at “regime change” and “military solutions” in different parts of the world: 
“Few in our world (and who else matters?) question our right to do so, though 
obviously the right of any other state to do something similar to us or one of our 
allies, or to retaliate or even to threaten to retaliate, should we do so, is considered 
shocking and beyond all norms, beyond every red line when it comes to how 
nations (except us) should behave.”241   
 
Moreover, Englehardt contended that such strategy, while having “effectiveness, 
not legality or morality, [as] the only measurement”242 is not particularly effective either 
and can only lead to “terrible miscalculation followed by inevitable tragedy.”243 This 
argument connects to the arguments of other authors listing the reasons for why the US 
should not arm the Syrian opposition.  
The first argument focused on the idea that the initially peaceful protest in Syria 
gradually turned into violent civil war where the peaceful demonstrators became 
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marginalized and the dynamic is being increasingly determined by sectarian divisions and 
tensions within the fractured opposition.244 The Nation argued that “given Syria’s deep 
sectarian divisions, [arming the rebels] would intensify an incipient civil war and further 
marginalize the nonviolent democratic opposition.”245 Z Magazine suggested that the 
State Department was “‘betraying’ the pro-Democracy forces within the opposition.”246 
Commenting on the meetings State Department officials held with the Syrian opposition, 
Z Magazine quoted Herbert London, the president of the Hudson Institute, who wrote: 
“Most of those invited, however, have links to the Muslim Brotherhood. Missing from 
the invitations are Kurdish leaders, Sunni liberals, Assyrians, and Christian spokespeople. 
According to various reports, the State Department made a deal with Turkey and Muslim 
Brotherhood representatives either to share power with Assad to stabilize the government 
or replace him if this effort fails.”247 An article in The Nation, referencing journalist Neil 
Rosen’s lecture at Columbia University in late March, echoed a similar point and warned 
that arming the rebels could “further exacerbate regional and sectarian tensions already 
evident in the opposition’s fractures:” 
“The Syrian National Council, a group of opposition exiles, is notorious for its 
infighting and according to Rosen, is disconnected from internal opposition 
leadership. The Free Syrian Army, meanwhile, has “no structural order,” Rosen 
said. It is merely a “name for a phenomenon.” Arming the opposition would 
exacerbate pre-existing divisions, which in their present form do not bode well for 
post-Assad Syria.”248  
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 Here The Nation highlights an important distinction between the Syrian National 
Council (SNC) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA), as well SNC’s “disconnect” from 
internal Syrian opposition – something the US mainstream media did not emphasize in 
their narratives. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, the US mainstream media highlighted 
the SNC’s rejection of Russia’s diplomatic initiatives in Syria, yet framed it as Russia’s  
failure to gain the trust of the Syrian opposition in general, thus oversimplifying the 
situation in order to fit it into the “great powers and their clients” and “good versus evil” 
schemes. Z Magazine advanced the argument about the questionable legitimacy of the 
SNC and the FSA by suggesting that both groups have been “manufactured” for public 
relations purposes: 
“Throughout the fall of 2011, groundwork was laid for the new policy of “helping 
to bring about” the fall of the Assad government. A semi-respectable opposition 
group was established, the Syrian National Council, led by a Paris-based exile, as 
well as an opposition militia, the Free Syrian Army. These groups were 
established as much for their public relations worth as their diplomatic value. The 
press, especially those relying on second-hand reports, need a good and evil 
dichotomy to report on, a brigade of “freedom fighters” to support against the 
brutal government thugs, and an “opposition leader” to quote on the political 
sanctity of whoever would replace Assad.”249  
 
Other articles in The Nation and in Z Magazine also emphasized that the 
opposition was divided250 and “completely lacked unity.”251 Z Magazine explained: 
“The opposition was divided from the beginning over whether massive reform or 
the end of the Assad regime was their goal. It divided still further when part of the 
opposition took up arms, and began to call for international military intervention. 
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The non-violent opposition movement, which still rejects calls for military 
intervention, survives, but under extraordinary threat.”252  
 
Both magazines also connected the issue of fractured opposition to Syria’s “deep 
sectarian divisions”253 or what one of Z Magazine’s authors called “sectarianism on the 
rise.”254 “Syria has become the epicenter of a regional Sunni-Shia conflict,”255 stated The 
Nation and explained the situation as follows: 
“… the sides have become locked into all-or-nothing positions, with more 
extremist Sunni groups determined to wipe out the regime and its supporters, and 
the regime’s constituent groups—the Alawites, primarily, along with some Druze, 
Christians and Sunni bourgeoisie—ever more fearful of rebel reprisals and 
therefore convinced that they have no choice but to fight to the finish. This zero-
sum tendency has been reinforced by the Saudi agenda, which is to bring about a 
sectarian reordering of Syria with a view to changing the balance of power in the 
Middle East.”256  
 
The idea of the “balance of power in the Middle East” was linked to a second 
argument advanced by the critics of arming the Syrian opposition. According to this 
argument, the civil war in Syria with its “sectarian overtones”257 “threatened to further 
destabilize the region” since “Syria is so intertwined with its neighbors.”258 Quoting 
Patrick Seale, an expert who has written several books on Syria, The Nation warned that 
“internal problems… threatened to reshuffle the power dynamics among Iran, Iraq, 
Turkey, Lebanon, Palestine, Israel and beyond.”259 Similarly, Z Magazine noted: 
“If the increasing sectarianism of the Syrian conflict extends beyond its borders, it 
could lead to regional conflagration involving even greater refugee flows and 
potentially battles in or around Syria’s neighbors Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey or 
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elsewhere. Already, alongside the international power interests colliding in Syria, 
there is the beginning of a Sunni-Shi’a proxy war taking shape, with Sunni Saudi 
Arabia and Qatar, and Shi’a Iran, backing opposing forces.”260   
 
Because of the complexity of Syria’s internal and regional political dynamics, The 
Nation also urged the US to “proceed with great caution,”261 which stood in stark contrast 
to the narratives in the US mainstream media that interpreted the unraveling of the civil 
war in Syria as an emergency that called for a rapid response, and blamed Russia and 
China for stalling the process by vetoing the UNSC resolutions. More detailed 
discussions of the internal and regional dynamics also shifted the focus from the “divided 
global community” and Cold War-like “spheres of influence” to the complexity of the 
situation in Syria, even though authors recognized that “the conflict has become an 
‘existential struggle between two sides,’ aided by foreign actors”262 and that “an 
increasingly bitter and polarizing civil war… has become a theater for geopolitical 
interests.”263   
Rejecting the idea of arming the Syrian opposition demonstrated both magazines’ 
intention to move away from scenarios – and corresponding discourses – that would 
resemble the dynamic of the Cold War, with “great powers” arming their corresponding 
“client states.” On the other hand, some articles explicitly referred to the situation in 
Syria, with Russia arming the Assad government and US considering arming the 
opposition as a crisis resembling the Cold War era, where “leaders of countries who fight 
proxy wars… knowingly [give] client states or rebel allies the means to commit 
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atrocities.”264 Another article warned that arming Syrian rebels “could set the stage for a 
dangerous proxy war… with Russia and Iran backing the Assad regime and the United 
States and its European and Arab allies – perhaps joined by Qaeda-affiliated Sunni 
jihadis – supporting the rebels.”265 Thus, strangely, even though The Nation critiqued any 
approach, strategy or action that could lead to a situation resembling the dynamic of the 
Cold War, its reference to the “danger of the Cold War-like situation” inevitably worked 
to recreate the very discourse of the Cold War. A similar tension marked some of the 
narratives in the next theme.  
Calls for cooperation with Russia 
Three out of nine articles in The Nation actively called for cooperation with 
Russia in order to resolve the Syrian crisis (Z Magazine focused more on a diplomatic 
approach in general as a better alternative to a militarized approach). As The Nation 
noted, “the administration must put aside its frustrations and re-engage Moscow as a full 
partner:” 
“Whether Washington likes it or not, Russia holds one of the keys to such a 
strategy (a longer-term strategy of encouraging democracy), for only Moscow has 
the leverage and influence with Damascus to persuade Assad to constrain the 
violence and allow a democratic transition. The State Department has blamed 
Russia for the latest setback, with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton calling its UN 
veto a travesty. But the administration must put aside its frustrations and re-
engage Moscow as a full partner. Such an approach would attempt to build on the 
latest Russian mission to Damascus, reportedly aimed at encouraging Assad to 
open negotiations with the opposition over political reform and a new 
Constitution.”266  
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Thus, in contrast to the US mainstream media, The Nation insisted on having faith 
in Russia’s ability to influence the situation in Syria, which included Russia’s diplomatic 
mission to Damascus. Moreover, one of the later articles also argued that “any diplomatic 
approach that excludes Russia… will be… condemned to failure.”267 The same article 
also critiqued US mainstream media for blaming Russia and China for the failure of yet 
another diplomatic mission in Syria (by Kofi Annan), stating that the US, Turkish and 
Saudi policies played their role in this failure too: 
“Much of the US media blamed Russian and Chinese intransigence for the 
collapse of the Annan mission. But as veteran Guardian reporter and Syrian 
observer Jonathan Steele has pointed out, it was US, Turkish and Saudi policy as 
much as Russian and Chinese vetoes that led to the collapse of the Annan plan. 
The US demand that Assad be removed and sanctions be imposed before 
negotiations could seriously begin, along with the refusal to include Iran in the 
process, doomed that mission.”268   
 
Another article, by Stephen Cohen, titled “Is the US Returning to the Cold War 
With Russia?” also critiqued the US for the inability and unwillingness to work with 
post-Cold War Russia as an equal partner. Drawing on the history of the US-Russia 
relations, Cohen noted that “for the American political and media establishment, US-
Russia relations always begin yesterday – without the pre-history of the relationship and 
thus without its essential political context.”269 Cohen noted further: 
“As Washington and Moscow sink deeper into another familiar cold war–like 
conflict, this time over Syria, American policy-makers and commentators, 
Democrats and Republicans alike, declare that President Obama’s “reset” of 
relations with Moscow has failed. With equal unanimity, they blame only 
Moscow, in particular President Vladimir Putin, while entirely deleting 
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Washington’s longstanding role in the deteriorating relationship, as they have 
done for more than a decade.”270  
 
Cohen’s commentary speaks directly to some of the themes discussed in the 
section on US mainstream media coverage, particularly the US mainstream media’s 
proclamations of the failed “reset” and their claims that Russia played a key role in the 
deterioration of the relations. Cohen further argues that post-Cold War US-Russian 
relations have been uneven and marked by “selective cooperation,” with the US 
demanding (and getting) concessions from Moscow without corresponding reciprocity. 
Such dynamics, Cohen argues, characterized US-Russian relations throughout the entire 
post-Cold War period, leading to periodic “cold war-like conflicts.”271 Cohen draws a 
direct and explicit parallel to the Cold War by calling the debate over Syria a “familiar 
cold war-like conflict;” the words “another” and “this time” point to a pattern, a 
repetition, suggesting that the Cold War, or at least, the Cold War-influenced dynamic of 
Russia-US relations never really ended. Cohen is deeply critical of the US approach to 
US-Russia relations, and he is not hopeful either, ending the article by noting that Mitt 
Romney’s declaration of Russia a “number one geopolitical foe” “confirmed [Cohen’s] 
worst concern – that we are on the verge of, or already in, a new cold war.”272  
Cohen’s article brings to light an interesting tension that was discussed earlier; 
this tension seems to mark any critical engagement with the Cold War discourse in the 
post-Cold War time. He critiques policies and/or discourses that draw on the Cold War 
narratives, yet while doing so, he draws on the same exact narratives, thus inevitably 
                                                 
270
 Cohen, June 18, 2012. 
271
 Ibid. 
272
 Ibid. 
   150 
 
perpetuating them further and contributing, paradoxically, to the re-articulation of the 
Cold War discourse in the post-Cold War time.    
International law and the Libyan scenario 
The Nation challenged the arguments put forth by the policy-makers and the 
mainstream media who insisted that the proponents of the resolution did not intend on 
turning Syria into another Libya because the Syrian situation was very different. Both 
magazines agreed that the Syrian crisis was different; however, they argued that this was 
precisely why neither a military intervention nor arming the Syrian opposition was a 
good idea: 
“Some who favor arming the opposition cite last year’s Libyan intervention as a 
positive example. Not only does the continuing chaos in Libya call such claims 
into question; the Syrian crisis is vastly different from Libya’s. A protracted war 
in Syria would be almost impossible to contain, and would thus destabilize 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Israel and Iraq, setting democratization back 
decades.”273 
 
Z Magazine echoed this point by quoting Kofi Annan who stated that “Syria is not 
Libya, it will not implode, it will explode beyond its borders.”274 Z Magazine also argued 
that just like the intervention did not help resolve the crisis in Libya, it will not help the 
situation in Syria: 
“Like so many other times before, the human cost of this conflict is incalculably 
high. It’s not surprising that the normal human reaction is “we’ve got to do 
something!” But exactly what any army or air force might do that would actually 
help the situation isn’t very clear. US/NATO military intervention didn’t bring 
stability, democracy or security to Libya, and it certainly is not going to do so in 
Syria.”275  
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Further, both magazines argued that the Libyan intervention went beyond the 
legal boundaries set by international law and thus “set a disastrous diplomatic precedent:” 
“The Libyan intervention also set a disastrous diplomatic precedent: by violating 
the narrowly tailored UN resolution and openly fighting for regime change, the 
Western powers infuriated Russia, China and other countries, sowing the seeds of 
their mistrust and their resistance to Security Council measures on Syria.”276  
 
“For some US supporters of western military intervention in Syria, last year’s 
assault on Libya provides the model of how to respond to a human 
rights/humanitarian crisis. They believe it was a victory for human rights when a 
couple of European leaders proposed a no-fly zone, and part of the anti-Qaddafi 
opposition eagerly accepted their offer, and part of the Arab League and part of 
Europe and part of the Obama administration and most of NATO agreed. With the 
fig leaf of Arab League approval (the African Union was sidelined as soon as it 
refused to support the military assault), the US/NATO warplanes quickly became 
the air force of the armed Libyan opposition, the “no-fly zone” was immediately 
transformed into an all-out air war and bombing campaign, and “protection of 
civilians” was instantly redefined as regime change.”277 
 
Similarly, The Nation cited the Libyan example when it argued that the first 
priority of the proponents of the resolution was not to protect Syrian civilians but to help 
the opposition overthrow the Assad regime, “much like [they] did to help the Libyan 
rebels topple Qaddafi.”278  
The Nation also argued that the Libyan precedent was at the heart of the 
opposition to the UNSC resolution on Syria as expressed by some of the UNSC 
members, while also pointing out that this reason is “not frequently mentioned:” 
“Behind the interminable discussions about what to do to help the people of Syria, 
as carnage in Syrian homes and neighborhoods fills television screens and social 
media sites, is a serious global policy debate rooted in the Libyan experience that 
is not frequently mentioned but helps explain why some Security Council 
members—not only Russia and China, but also notably India—are wary of 
authorizing any direct military-style action in Syria. Simply put, they believe that 
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resolutions passed in the belief that they would protect Libyans under threat from 
Muammar Qaddafi were hijacked by NATO and Arab League members and used 
as pretexts to arm rebel militias and overthrow the Libyan government.”279  
 
 The Nation explained to its readers that the proponents of the resolution cited the 
Responsibility to Protect policy endorsed by the UN in 2005. Under this policy, if a 
government of a sovereign state failed to safeguard its citizens from crimes and violence, 
outside nations could be asked to assist such government. The Nation explained: 
“To many, the Libyan situation met the criteria for direct action under the 
responsibility to protect doctrine; it seemed a textbook case. But in the view of 
numerous nations what happened in Libya soon became something else: an 
invitation to regime change. They are hesitant to back a similar ploy in Syria, and 
that hesitation—in addition to the very different realities of Syria, a populous 
urban nation with a strong military and political structure and entrenched cultural 
or sectarian divisions—underpins the inaction so roundly criticized around the 
world.”280   
 
Z Magazine also urged policy makers not to rely on the R2P framework because it 
“inevitably leads to outside military force”281 – a move both The Nation and Z Magazine 
explicitly critiqued.  
Hypocrisy of foreign policy and American imperialism  
Both magazines frequently argued – with some articles discussing the idea at 
length – that American foreign policy had always been marked by deep hypocrisy and 
that the case of the Syrian debate is no exception. The argument was also tied to the idea 
of the “American empire,” with Washington “declaring the world its oyster”282 and 
                                                 
279
 Crossette, February 28, 2012. 
280
 Ibid. 
281
 Bennis, June 27, 2012. 
282
 Engelhardt, January 30, 2012. 
   153 
 
“projecting its imperial power”283 worldwide. Two articles in The Nation and two in Z 
Magazine articulated the point by drawing various historical parallels. 
Edward Herman argued in Z Magazine that one of the main goals of American 
foreign policy for a long time had been the “manufacturing of failed states.”284 By a 
failed state Herman means “one that has been crushed militarily or rendered 
unmanageable by political and/or economic destabilization and a resultant chaos and is 
unable (or is not permitted) for long periods to recover and take care of its citizens’ 
needs.”285 Herman argued that “there has been a fresh stream of failed states brought 
about by US and NATO “humanitarian intervention” and regime change, carried out 
more aggressively in the wake of the death of the Soviet Union.”286According to Herman, 
“humanitarian intervention” is in fact an “imperial intervention” that leads to the 
“manufacture of failed states”287 and is often carried out in the name of US national 
security. The “national security” framework often justifies “imperial interventions” and, 
Herman suggests, “has required bases, garrisons, assassinations, invasions, bombing 
wars, and the sponsorship of killer regimes, real terror networks, and programs 
everywhere in response to terrorist threats and challenges to the “pitiful giant.”288 This 
point was echoed in Engelhardt’s article in The Nation where he stated that “Washington 
has declared the world its oyster and garrisons the planet in a historically unique way – 
without direct colonies but with approximately 1,000 bases worldwide. What is called our 
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“safety” and “security” has been made a planetary issue.”289 While Engelhardt mainly 
connected this point to his critique of the “militarized approaches” to politics (also 
expressed in his other article that was discussed earlier290), Herman described other 
strategies used during the “imperial interventions” (though he also implicitly tied them to 
the problem of growing militarization of US foreign policy). For example, Herman 
referenced the case of humanitarian intervention in Yugoslavia as a model and argued 
that a “similar program [is being attempted] today in Syria:”291   
“One frequent feature is the rise and/or recognition of ethnic group rebels who 
claim victimhood, fight their government with terroristic acts, sometimes 
designed to provoke a violent government response, and who regularly appeal to 
the imperial powers to come to their aid. Sometimes foreign mercenaries are 
imported to aid the rebels and both the indigenous rebels and mercenaries are 
often armed, trained, and given logistical support by the imperial powers. The 
imperial powers encourage these rebel efforts as they find them useful to justify 
destabilizing, bombing, and eventually over-throwing the target regime.”292  
 
 Even though Herman didn’t explicitly mention Syria in this excerpt, the parallel, 
when conceived of in the larger context of Z Magazine’s coverage, resonates with the 
magazine’s skepticism regarding the US State Department’s support of the Syrian 
opposition and therefore a critique of the idea of arming its members. Herman also 
pointed out that “imperial interventions” are always accompanied by what he terms 
“atrocities management:” 
“These programs always involve serious “atrocities management,” whereby the 
government under attack is accused of major acts of violence against the rebels 
and their supporters and is by this process effectively demonized and set up for 
more massive intervention. This was very important in the Yugoslav breakup 
wars and possibly even more so in Libya and Syria. The process is greatly helped 
                                                 
289
 Engelhardt, January 30, 2012. 
290
 Engelhardt, July 5, 2012. 
291
 Herman, August 27, 2012. 
292
 Ibid. 
   155 
 
by the mobilization of international agencies, which participate in the 
demonization by denouncing the atrocities and sometimes indicting and 
prosecuting the targeted villains.”293  
 
Z Magazine discussed the same problem in another article titled “Outraged Over 
Atrocities, Unless They are Ours” by John Laforge.294 Laforge juxtaposed the public 
outrage expressed by the US officials and mainstream mass media regarding the 
massacres in the Syrian city of Homs to a complete lack of public outcry over the killings 
of civilians, “including women and children,” in recent years in various places in the 
world by the US military forces. Laforge discussed specific examples of such killings and 
a very mild reaction of the “international community,” as well as the perpetual framing of 
these incidents as “accidental” or as “unavoidable wartime errors.”295   
Similarly, though taking a slightly different angle, The Nation questioned the 
legitimacy of US’ accusations of Russia supplying weapons to the Syrian government by 
reminding the readers that the US has frequently done the same in other parts of the 
world and at different times. The author gives a historical example of East Timor from 
1975, where the US was supplying Indonesia’s military with 90 percent of its arms and 
where “Kissinger himself described their relationship as that of a ‘donor-client’.”296 The 
article condemns both Russia and the United States for “providing military assistance to 
abusive forces half a world away”297 but the author also concludes that “big players” will 
always get away with “big geopolitics:” 
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“To be sure, it is hard to imagine a case against a Russian or American leader 
reaching an international court. Neither country has ratified the statute authorizing 
the International Criminal Court, and both can veto any Security Council referral 
to the ICC. Unfortunately, the most powerful, and those whom they protect, still 
appear to be beyond the reach of the developing architecture of international 
justice.”298  
 
Russian alternative media coverage 
Pointless veto, reckless diplomacy 
Novaya Gazeta and The New Times critiqued the Russian and Chinese vetoes of 
the UNSC resolution calling the vetoes “pointless,”299 “counter-productive”300 and “ill-
advised.”301 Novaya Gazeta argued that “because of the actions of the Russian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in the UNSC, the space for political decisions on Syria has shrunk.”302 
Novaya Gazeta also published a special report by Carol Boggert of Human Rights Watch, 
where she argued that “Russia blocked the opportunity for diplomatic negotiations 
through the UN”303 in spite of the “Kremlin’s attempts to present the veto as part of the 
effort to prevent violent conflict.”304 Both newspapers lamented that the vetoes marked a 
“point of no return”305 on resolving the situation diplomatically and that the “moment for 
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resolving the situation peacefully is lost.”306 They also noted that the vetoes resulted in 
Russia and China “finding themselves on the margins of the [diplomatic] process [on 
Syria],”307 with Russia being “kicked out of the group of states who make key decisions 
on Syria”308 while also “losing its authority within Syria.”309 Interestingly, both 
newspapers mentioned both Russia and China when discussing the vetoes, yet the 
critique was directed mainly at Russia. Novaya Gazeta also explicitly mentioned that 
while both Russia and China vetoed the resolution, “Russia faced harsher criticism 
[because] it is assumed that Russia is defending its pragmatic interests in Syria.”310 The 
New Times discussed Russia’s arms trade with Syria as one of the key reasons for the 
Russian veto: “Russia has been losing its clients in the Middle East one after another; yet 
it strives to remain a big player on the region’s arms market and that’s why it tries to hold 
on to Syria at all cost. From the perspective of international law, there is no problem here. 
The problem, however, is that these weapons are later used to kill peaceful protestors. 
But Russian political leaders refuse to think morally and ethically.”311  Here The New 
Times’ argument echoed the “arms sales” theme prominent in the US mainstream media, 
though The New Times presented the arms sales narrative exclusively from the pragmatic, 
market-oriented perspective rather than one of the “great power and its client” that 
dominated the US media coverage.  
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Novaya Gazeta and The New Times emphasized that Russia’s post-veto attempts 
at diplomatic negotiations with Assad were ridiculous312  and “no one, including Assad, 
took Lavrov’s talk about a peaceful dialogue and a new Syrian constitution seriously.”313 
Novaya Gazeta stated: “Assad promised Lavrov to ‘stop the violence regardless of its 
source.’ The very next day after the departure of the Russian delegation Syrian artillery 
shelled civilian districts of Homs with renewed brutality.”314 Here, again, the narratives 
closely resembled the doubts in the efficiency of Russian diplomacy in Syria expressed in 
the New York Times and The Washington Post and discussed earlier.  
When critiquing the “reckless diplomacy” of Russia at the UNSC in one of its 
articles, Novaya Gazeta made an interesting remark: “Russian diplomats behave as if 
they have, like in times of their youth, a powerful and merciless superpower behind them, 
with many complicit allies and client states. In 1980s the USSR unfolded its combat 
missile and air defense units in Syria and a powerful squadron with nuclear weapons was 
cruising in the eastern Mediterranean. There is nothing behind Russia’s veto now.”315 
Similarly, the author of another article noted that “the nostalgia for the times when 
‘everyone was afraid of us’ is winning positions in Russian political circles.”316 These 
references to the “Soviet times nostalgia” echo the op-ed piece published in the New York 
Times and discussed earlier where the author “explained to Americans” that Russian 
Soviet nostalgia is just a nostalgia for the times when Russia was strong, while also a way 
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to deal with the post-Cold War humiliation and multiple crises of the 1990s. Novaya 
Gazeta is deeply critical of this nostalgia and of the fact that it affects Russia’s post-
Soviet (and post-Cold War) diplomacy, yet, just like in The Nation, the critical argument 
recreates the Cold War discourse by merely referencing it.  
Hypocrisy in defending international law 
Both newspapers critiqued the argument that Russia’s veto was based on 
defending the principles of sovereignty and “non-interference” in domestic affairs of the 
independent state. Such claims, argued Novaya Gazeta and The New Times, were deeply 
hypocritical because “Russian corrupted elites were defending first and foremost 
themselves.”317 Both newspapers tied Russian diplomacy on Syria to the concerns of the 
Russian political leaders about the growing protest movement within Russia.318 “Today – 
Syria, tomorrow – Russia,” cited Novaya Gazeta319 one of the political slogans popular 
among the supporters of Kremlin’s diplomacy, arguing that “by insisting on non-
interference in domestic affairs of the sovereign state… [Russian] leaders [signal that 
they will not tolerate external support] to the growing protest movement for fair elections 
[in Russia].”320 Referring to the growing anti-Americanism among Vladimir Putin’s 
electorate, Novaya Gazeta also noted that “in light of the upcoming elections, it is more 
important for Putin to show to his electorate that he doesn’t succumb to the pressure from 
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America.”321 Novaya Gazeta concluded that “Russia’s foreign policy today works as an 
‘external cover’ for the realization of the domestic interests of the ‘national leader’.”322   
Novaya Gazeta also challenged the argument about sovereignty and non-interference in 
general, arguing that “the claims about sovereignty that date back to 1954 do not help 
resolving today’s global issues”323 and that “sacralization of state sovereignty at the 
expense of human rights more and more often leads to tragedies.”324 Novaya Gazeta also 
added that “interference from the outside has been going on for a while in Syria already 
with special forces from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard and from Hezbollah “helping Assad 
in punitive operations.”325 Both newspapers, similarly to The Nation and Z Magazine, 
expressed concerns that the conflict in Syria and the actions toward its resolution were 
becoming “increasingly militarized.”326 However, while The Nation and Z Magazine 
blamed “Washington’s militarized mindset,” Novaya Gazeta and the New Times 
emphasized that “more military officials and less diplomats are discussing the Syrian 
crisis in Moscow.”327  
Critique of anti-Western/anti-American foreign policy 
Novaya Gazeta and The New Times sharply criticized Russian foreign policy 
characterizing it as “increasingly confrontational, anti-Western, anti-American and Asia-
centric.”328 This theme was best reflected and elaborated in a long analytical piece in 
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Novaya Gazeta by Alexander Shumilin. When interpreting and explaining Russia’s “veto 
diplomacy,” Shumilin tied it to a larger trend in Russian foreign policy where “the 
perception of the West as a ‘wily adversary’ who strives to ‘destroy a powerful nuclear 
nation’ and ‘put it back on its knees’ by undermining it from within through the ‘colored 
revolutions’”329 determined “the ideological foundation of Russia’s foreign policy 
today.”330 Shumilin suggested that Russian position must be interpreted from this 
perspective. As he noted, “it looks like there is a new occasion to shake the Kalashnikov 
in the name of the big geopolitics today,”331 while also emphasizing that “the problem of 
Russia’s approach to Syria is not only rooted in geopolitics but is more so a question of 
values and ideology,” where “a break from democratic values and a theme of ‘getting up 
from one’s knees’ increasingly define Russian foreign policy.”332 Echoing a similar 
narrative in the New York Times and The Washington Post, Shumilin noted that “the 
‘reset’ of the relations with the United States seems to be ending.”333 Shumilin also noted 
that “the speed of Russia’s slipping into the ‘Cold War 2’ with the West is increasing”334 
– an argument closely resembling Stepehn Cohen’s (The Nation), except that Shumilin 
holds Russia, not the US, accountable for this trend. Shumilin is also concerned with 
“Russia’s growing cooperation with Asia on the basis of ‘countering the Western 
threat’.”335 This view, while critical, also re-introduces the view of global politics as the 
East-West antagonistic dichotomy and struggle.  
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Conclusion 
The New York Times and The Washington Post supported the official position of 
the United States in the diplomatic debate, defending the resolution and critiquing the 
resolution’s opponents. In doing so, they focused more heavily on criticism of the 
opponents, and, more specifically, on criticism of Russia, and on the idea of the “global 
community” being divided along the lines of “spheres of influence.” Both newspapers 
blamed Russia (and to a lesser extent China) for undermining the efforts of the 
“international community” in finding a peaceful resolution to the Syrian crisis. The 
narratives accused Russia of being intransigent and hypocritical; both newspapers 
communicated in their texts that Russia’s arguments about Syria’s sovereignty were only 
a cover-up for Russia’s real desire to keep its influence – and arms contracts – in the 
region. Both newspapers dismissed all of Russia’s arguments and alternative diplomatic 
efforts as attempts to buy time for Assad rather than as a genuine desire to solve the 
crisis. The articles also remarked on the worsening of US-Russia relations but blamed 
Russia – and specifically President Putin – for it. The coverage glorified members of the 
Syrian opposition and used their rejection of Russia’s proposals as an additional 
argument that marginalized Russia’s position in the debate. Additionally, the coverage 
highlighted the calls for “isolating” and “shaming” Russia on the international stage. 
Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty presented a very similar coverage, except that the 
roles of the heroes and villains were reversed. Russia was presented as the only rational 
and sincere actor in this debate, while the West – and the US specifically – was vilified as 
an actor who plotted military intervention and tried to use the resolution to go around the 
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international laws that protected Syria’s sovereignty. The arguments of the resolution 
supporters were presented as irrational and “driven by sensational media coverage.” In 
addition, the Russian mainstream accounts presented Assad as perhaps not a perfect ruler 
but surely a guarantor of stability in Syria who also enjoyed popular support. Syrian 
opposition, in contrast, was depicted as fragmented, with those fractions of it that had 
“foreign support” being tied to Islamic extremists.  
The coverage by both Russian and US mainstream media – especially when 
juxtaposed to each other – gave an impression of two strategic communication campaigns 
launched in support of the two conflicting policies rather than of journalistic coverage. 
Clearly, both sides vilified the opponents in order to legitimize their own political 
perspectives. In doing so, the US mainstream media relied more heavily on various 
elements of the Cold War, vilifying Russia by linking it to its Soviet past. Thus, Vladimir 
Putin was linked to KGB, “spying missions,” anti-democratic trends and anti-Western 
foreign policy; Russia was frequently mentioned alongside with China, Iran and North 
Korea; and Russian arms trade with Syria – a narrative that in fact could be presented as 
clearly capitalistic and “post-Cold War” – was linked to the Soviet past through images 
of the “Soviet battle tanks” and “Soviet-designed rocket launchers.” The only narrative 
that somewhat let Russia off the hook was one of the “threat of radical Islam.” Russia’s 
concern for security in the face of “Islamic extremism” seemed to be the only condition 
under which the US mainstream media were willing to discuss Russia’s position in the 
debate without vilifying Russia or dismissing its arguments as insincere and illegitimate. 
This painted a picture of political reality where the compromise between conflicting 
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parties – who also happen to be former Cold War adversaries – can only be imagined if 
the two find a common enemy. In other words, an alternative to the security discourse of 
the Cold War is another security discourse – a newer and clearly a more powerful one in 
the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era – the discourse of “Islamic threat.” Thus, the reality 
of global politics and international affairs presented by the two US mainstream media 
through their coverage of the debate on Syrian resolution was defined first and foremost 
by security discourses, with the key message being that the two opponents can only 
become friends when they find a common enemy.  
The Russian mainstream accounts relied more heavily on the discourse of 
America’s post-Cold War world domination, structuring the narratives in ways that 
problematized it and challenged it. The readers were reminded of previous “democracy 
promotion” and “peace restoration” campaigns that turned into military interventions. 
The frustration with the Western media coverage of the conflict served to convey the 
message of the “evil mastermind” also being a skillful manipulator of global public 
opinion. Russian mainstream media accounts also incorporated the discourse of the 
“threat of radical Islam” in their coverage with the goal of proving the Western 
perspective wrong and irrational. The coverage conveyed the message that by supporting 
the Syrian opposition, the West supported al-Qaeda. This, in turn, communicated to the 
readers that the “evil mastermind” in fact was prone to making important geopolitical 
decisions without carefully weighing all options, scenarios and potential consequences.   
The Nation and Z Magazine offered interpretations of the debate on the peace 
resolution in Syria that challenged the narratives constructed by the New York Times and 
   165 
 
The Washington Post and also in some ways corresponded with the narratives featured in 
Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty. In commentaries on the debate in general and on its 
various aspects, such as the possibility of intervention, a prospect of arming the Syrian 
opposition, Russia’s role in the debate, and the issue of the mounting violence in Syria, 
both magazines critiqued US official policy regarding the crisis and the UNSC debate, 
yet they did not succumb to the “global diplomatic divide” narrative and did not 
automatically support the arguments advanced by Russia. While many of the arguments 
mirrored those advanced by the Russian mainstream media, the discussions in The Nation 
and Z Magazine did not give an impression of being part of a strategic communication 
campaign. For example, both magazines featured elaborate critiques of the 
“Washington’s militarized mindset” and called for diplomatic approaches – including 
those that would involve Russia – to crisis’s resolution. Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty 
highlighted the same points. However, it was clear from the analysis that all these points 
were underscored in the Russian mainstream media in order to vilify the West, while in 
The Nation’s and Z Magazine’s case the concerns of authors for global peace and justice 
were evident from the way the arguments were presented. Thus, the same elements of 
various discourses were articulated differently by the Russian mainstream and the US 
alternative media, bringing to light the differences in political agendas and ideologies that 
guided the ways in which the narratives on the debate were articulated: conservative and 
pro-establishment in Russian case and progressive and fundamentally anti-establishment 
in the US alternative media case. 
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Surprisingly, the US alternative media did not comment on the security discourse 
of the “Islamic extremism” structuring the narratives of the US mainstream and being the 
only condition under which Russia’s arguments could be considered worthy of attention. 
The way in which this discourse informed the US mainstream media narratives certainly 
complemented the larger idea about “securitization of diplomacy” advanced by The 
Nation and Z Magazine.  
Novaya Gazeta and The New Times covered the debate in ways that mirrored the 
US mainstream media coverage. Both sharply criticized Russia’s and China’s veto, 
accused Russia of hypocrisy in claiming that it defended international law and embraced 
diplomatic approaches to the crisis’s resolution. Similar to the US mainstream media, 
Russian alternative media argued that Russia’s position in the debate made it significantly 
harder to move forward with diplomatic solutions. One key difference, however, was that 
the Russian alternative media did not connect Russia’s present to Russia’s Soviet past in 
their criticisms. Instead, they presented a more sober picture of reality where Russia’s 
pragmatism, manifested in its concerns about continuing the arms trade with Syria (not 
just arms supplies to it) drove Russia’s policy and its position in the debate. They did 
remark, however, on Russia’s “nostalgia for the Soviet past,” but stressed in their 
accounts that this was not an ideological nostalgia but rather one that reflected the desire 
to be powerful again and to be taken seriously by other powerful actors on the world 
stage, especially by the United States. Additionally, Russian alternative media pointed 
out that Russia’s position in the Syrian debate reflected its domestic political struggles. 
Thus, by sharply critiquing Russia’s position in the debate – and highlighting the same 
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points of concern brought up by the US mainstream media – Russian alternative media 
still presented a more complex picture of reality and rearticulated Russia’s political 
identity as more multidimensional and complex.
 
Chapter 4: The Death of Hugo Chávez 
One of the key points of contention that made up the Cold War was the 
fundamental disagreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on what 
socio-economic principle - capitalism or communism/socialism - is best for society and 
the world. Active promotion of these respective socio-economic paradigms (and 
corresponding practices) in American and Soviet spheres of influence was at heart of the 
Cold War. Just like the Soviet Union faced opposition in much of Eastern Europe and 
several Soviet Republics as they embraced the capitalist lifestyle, the United States and 
its model of capitalism has always been challenged by the Latin American states. In 
1999, almost ten years after the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the USSR, 
Hugo Chávez was elected President of Venezuela. His vision of “socialism of the 21st 
century” drove his domestic and foreign policies, with the former focusing on poverty 
reduction, expansion of government-subsidized healthcare and education, nationalization 
of several key industries (including especially Venezuela’s oil industry) and the latter 
emphasizing anti-imperialism, opposition to the United States and its foreign policy, and 
Latin American regional integration. Chávez closely aligned himself with the 
governments of Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua, energizing what some analysts 
have termed a “pink tide” in post-Cold War Latin America. Chávez’s extraordinary 
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charisma combined with Venezuela’s vast oil resources allowed him to successfully 
implement many of the projects that made the lives of Venezuela’s poor better, although 
the drawbacks associated with the process and the results alienated much of Venezuela’s 
middle-class population. Nevertheless, the success of these projects, as well as Chávez’s 
electrifying international presence communicated to the world that despite the proclaimed 
victory of capitalism in the Cold War, socialism was not quite dead. While the United 
States and Venezuela were clear adversaries, Russia partnered with Chávez’s Venezuela 
on a number of projects, particularly in the oil industry and in arms trade.  
When Hugo Chávez died in March of 2013 after a long battle with cancer, news  
media around the world responded immediately, presenting a wide range of 
interpretations of Chávez’s persona and his legacy. This chapter addresses the question of 
how the ideas associated with the socialist model of socio-economic development – the 
model that has “lost” the Cold War, according to the dominant interpretation of the end of 
the Cold War – are being discussed and presented to the audiences by various Russian 
and US news media in the post-Cold War time. Thus, the way Russian and US 
mainstream and alternative media write about Chávez and his legacy serve as a test of 
how the two nations articulate their understandings and interpretations of socialism - one 
of the key elements of the Cold War discourse - in the post-Cold War era, when the 
neoliberal capitalist model drives the global economy and global communication. The 
chapter also aims to discover how the ways in which Russian and US news media 
articulate the meaning of Chávez’s socialist legacy speak to the evolution of Russia’s and 
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United States’ own post-Cold War political identities and what tensions and 
contradictions mark this evolution.  
The chapter asks the following questions: How is Chávez’s persona presented? 
How is Chávez’s legacy discussed? What links are being made between Chávez’s 
persona and his legacy? How is Chávez’s vision of the “socialism of the 21st century” 
discussed? How do different media communicate to their audiences what makes 
Chávez’s death newsworthy? To what extent (if at all) other elements of the Cold War 
discourse are being incorporated into the discussions and what other discourses structure 
the narratives produced? Finally, what ideological positions and political agendas can be 
discerned from the ways in which different media make sense of Chávez’s legacy? 
The chapter analyzes the articles published during the two weeks following Hugo 
Chávez’s death: March 5 – 18, 2013. The New York Times published 21 article, The 
Washington Post – 11, Izvestia – nine and Argumenty i Fakty – six. Three articles came 
out in The Nation, eight in Z Magazine, two in Novaya Gazeta and three in The New 
Times.  
 US mainstream media coverage 
Hugo Chávez – charismatic dictator, idiosyncratic autocrat  
Both the New York Times and The Washington Post acknowledged that Hugo 
Chávez was an extraordinary person, but their accounts presented a picture of someone 
who was full of contradictions magnified by the strength of his character, will and 
charisma. Both newspapers admitted in almost every report that Chávez was a “gifted, 
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charismatic orator with a keen ability to connect with the poor masses,”1 a “dreamer with 
a common touch and enormous ambition,”2 “… a man who loved the limelight – a 
loquacious and bombastic leader known to give speeches lasting up to 10 hours”3 and “a 
populist hero leading the masses out of darkness.”4 Yet most articles emphasized that 
Chávez was “idiosyncratic and unpredictable.”5 One New York Times article, referencing 
a New Yorker article from 2001, cited Dr. Edmundo Chirinos, a psychiatrist who knew 
Chávez as a patient, describing Chávez as “a hyperkinetic and imprudent man, 
unpunctual, someone who overreacts to criticism, harbors grudges, is politically astute 
and manipulative, and possesses tremendous stamina, never sleeping more than two or 
three hours a night.”6 To complement this portrait, the Washington Post listed some of 
the strange and capricious policies and laws passed by Chávez.7 Describing Chávez as a 
“charismatic socialist”8 and a “populist leftist,”9 both newspapers remarked that “for an 
international left that was yearning for a passionate and magnetic leader, Mr. Chávez was 
a blessing.”10 Yet both newspapers emphasized that “the autocratic Mr. Chávez”11 
“mercilessly taunted and insulted those who disagreed with him, calling them fascists, 
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good-for-nothings, traitors, oligarchs, reactionaries and puppets of the United States.”12 
The New York Times called Chávez a “master of political insult.”13 The Washington Post 
echoed this statement, describing how Chávez, “combative in olive green uniform and 
red beret, … called his opponents “degenerates” and “squealing pigs,” referred to the 
Catholic Church hierarchy as “devils in vestments” and labeled critics 
“counterrevolutionaries.”14  
Both newspapers frequently emphasized military undertones in Chávez’s 
communication style. For example, in one of the articles, The Washington Post quoted 
Chávez talking about the revolution in forceful, almost violent terms: “Oligarchs tremble, 
because now is when the revolution is going forward,” he warned in 2000, after the 
constitution had been redrawn and a new legislature dominated by his allies had taken 
over. “This is going to be delicious; we are going to deliver a knockout punch to the 
counterrevolution.”15 Similarly, the New York Times commented on the significant role 
military officials played in Venezuela’s politics, pointing out that “the influence of the 
armed forces… reflects the efforts of Mr. Chávez… to imbue society with military 
ideals.”16 Another article contended that “[Chávez] stacked his government with generals, 
colonels, and majors, drawing inspiration from the leftist military officers who ruled Peru 
and Panama in the 1970s.”17  
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Both newspapers described Chávez as an autocrat who “dominated Venezuelan 
politics for 14 years with his charismatic personality, populist policies and authoritarian 
methods.”18 It is important to note that this quote comes from an opening sentence of the 
New York Times editorial devoted to Chávez’s death. The sentence sets the interpretive 
framework for the readers right away, highlighting the most important aspects of Hugo 
Chávez’s personality and legacy, as understood by the New York Times’ editorial board. 
Indeed, all articles in the New York Times and The Washington Post pointed out that 
Chávez’s government “was marked by old-fashioned patronage and authoritarianism,”19 
stressing that Chávez singlehandedly controlled Venezuela’s politics and economy and 
did not tolerate those who disagreed with him. “He purged opponents from the national 
oil company, expropriated the land of others and imprisoned retired military officials who 
had dared to stand against him,”20 stated the New York Times, while The Washington Post 
featured a similar statement: “He was able to take control of the courts, the congress and 
all other institutions, while forcing some of his toughest opponents into exile.”21 
Hugo Chávez’s “increasingly autocratic rule”22 led, according to both 
newspapers, to the deep divisions within the country – another prominent theme in the 
coverage by US mainstream newspapers. 
Deep divisions in Venezuela 
Both newspapers frequently emphasized that Chávez leaves behind a “bitterly 
divided”23 and “polarized”24 country, where, as The Washington Post suggested, “his 
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supporters lionize him as a courageous rebel determined to take on the elites, and his foes 
paint him as a dangerous demagogue and strongman.”25 Similarly, the New York Times 
stated that “he inspired a fierce, sometimes religious devotion among his supporters and 
an equally fervent animus among his opponents.”26 Both newspapers put the blame for 
these divisions directly on Chávez, arguing that he “mined and deepened the divide 
between the masses of Venezuela’s poor and the middle and upper classes”27 and that it 
was “his rule [that] widened society’s divisions.”28 Both newspapers used various means 
of illustrating this argument. For example, the detailed descriptions of the scenes of 
Venezuela’s masses mourning Chávez’s death were frequently juxtaposed to the detailed 
descriptions of middle or upper-class Venezuelans celebrating it or at least not feeling 
devastated by the loss. The following excerpt from one New York Times article illustrates 
this point well: 
“Mr. Chávez's death prompted a massive outpouring of grief from his supporters 
as thousands waited outside the funeral for a chance to enter later to see his glass-
covered coffin. But many other Venezuelans stayed home and expressed hope that 
his passing would lead to change. 
''I hate the anti-Chavistas with all my heart,'' said Nancy Cadena, 45, who sells 
plantains and bananas in a street market in Petare, a poor neighborhood. ''They 
don't want the poor people to catch up.'' 
A few miles away in a middle-class neighborhood, Luisa Mercedes Pulido, 69, 
said that while she and her sister Elenora, 64, were on opposite sides of the 
national divide, they got along fine as long as they avoided politics. 
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''She has her point of view that she isn't going to change, and I have mine that I'm 
not going to change,'' she said. ''But it seems incredible to me that intelligent, 
thoughtful people, at this stage, continue to think as they do when what we have 
received from Mr. Chávez is misery, corruption, murders and a total reduction in 
our quality of life and so much crime. I don't understand how they cannot see 
that.''29 
 
 The polarized reactions among Venezuelans to Chávez’s death were also 
frequently put in a curious geopolitical context of Venezuela-US antagonism. For 
example, the New York Times published two articles on March 5, 2013. One article 
depicted pro-Chávez Venezuelans in Venezuela devastated by his death and “crying 
openly in sadness and fear of what would come next.”30 Another one featured anti-
Chávez Venezuelan immigrants in Miami where “news of his death elicited outpourings 
of raucous celebration and, to many, cautious optimism for the future.”31 The two stories 
published on the same day conveyed the idea that anti-Chávez Venezuelans immigrated 
to the United States, reaffirming that “being pro-Chávez equals being against the US, and 
being anti-Chávez equals being pro-US”  
What stood out the most within this theme of “deep divisions” was how both 
newspapers clearly linked Chávez’s supporters and opponents to specific – and polar – 
categories of poor versus rich, rural versus urban, emotional versus rational, violent 
versus peaceful, perpetrators versus victims, masses versus elites, uneducated versus 
educated and finally socialist versus capitalist and, by extension, anti-American versus 
pro-American. Articles systematically highlighted how the poor masses were religiously 
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devoted to Chávez,32 how they were highly emotional,33 mostly older, uneducated,34 
coming from rural areas35 and either involved in crime or having propensity toward 
violence.36 At the same time, Chávez’s opponents comprised a wealthy minority of 
educated, rational, mostly younger and urban working professionals who embraced 
capitalism (and America) and who were frequently the victims of crime37 in Venezuela 
and thus did not just leave the country but escaped it (or dreamed of escaping it one 
day).38  
Another interesting, and somewhat similar, geopolitical twist to this theme was 
evident in another New York Times article talking exclusively about Cuba and people’s 
reaction there to Chávez’s death.39 The article cited two people: a 48-year-old woman (no 
mention of her occupation), clearly a supporter of Chávez, with a very emotional 
response to his death; and a 39-year-old man, an engineer, who chose not to disclose his 
last name for security reasons (meaning that he probably wasn’t a supporter of either 
Chávez nor the Cuban political system), who was more skeptical (and therefore more 
rational) and talked about economic implications of Chávez’s death for Cuba. Here, 
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again, the New York Times built on gender and class stereotypes, implicitly connecting 
them to political and ideological views.  
The myth of socialism 
While acknowledging that Hugo Chávez’s socialist vision and charismatic 
persona made him the “champion of the poor”40 who gave them a voice,41 “awoke a 
people”42 and “brought better living conditions to millions of poor Venezuelans,”43 the 
New York Times and The Washington Post repeatedly emphasized that this was not due to 
socialist policies but rather due to Venezuela’s oil wealth. Moreover, both newspapers 
reiterated that Chávez’s “redistributionist policies”44 “left the country’s economy in 
tatters and its cities plagued by crime.”45 The following quotes – one from the New York 
Times and one from The Washington Post – illustrate this point well: 
“There is no denying his popularity among Venezuela's impoverished majority. 
He won elections by devoting a substantial share of the country's oil income to 
building public housing, creating health clinics and making affordable food 
available to the poorest citizens. But there have also been shocking levels of 
corruption, shoddy construction, chronic shortages of basic goods, and neglect in 
the investment needed to maintain and increase oil production. Billions have been 
squandered through inept and careless management. And the financial ability to 
sustain Mr. Chávez's social programs has been seriously eroded.”46  
 
“Venezuela did lower poverty. But job creation came through inefficient, bloated 
and corrupt state agencies. The country is more reliant than ever on oil sales, 
imports more food than before and is buffeted by power failures and violent 
crime.”47  
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Every single article in both newspapers mentioned Chávez’s “rocky economic 
record,”48 “economic orthodoxy,”49 Venezuela’s “crippled economy,”50 “high inflation 
and chronic shortages of basic goods”51 and its “lowest cumulative rate of economic 
growth among the seven largest economies in South America since 1999.”52 These 
assessments of Venezuela’s economy were accompanied by equally prominent references 
to Venezuela’s “soaring crime,”53 “highest rates of violent crime,”54 “horrific crime 
rate,”55 “cities plagued by crime,” 56 and Caracas becoming “one of the world’s most 
dangerous cities,”57 “more dangerous than Baghdad.”58 
Such evaluations of Venezuela’s economy and crime rates were contrasted with 
equally frequent statements about Venezuela’s “world’s biggest oil reserves,”59 and about 
the country being “one of the world’s great oil powers,”60 the “South American energy 
giant,”61 an “oil-rich country of 29 million,”62 as well as about oil being “at heart of 
Venezuela’s economy.”63  
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The juxtaposition of vast oil resources and struggling economy implied that 
socialist system was not well equipped for managing Venezuela’s natural resources. In 
fact, two articles – one in the New York Times and one in The Washington Post – 
explicitly addressed this topic, critiquing Chávez for “poorly managing” Venezuela’s oil 
reserves, production and revenues.64  As the author of the article in The Washington Post 
concluded, “The refineries are in shambles. Fields are in decline. New investment is 
stagnant… Chávez did not deliver the sort of social revolution needed, but instead left 
Venezuela with high inflation, declining oil output and corruption.”65 
In addition, constant reminders of the dire material conditions in the country 
served to convey the idea that socialism ran counter to one’s material and physical well-
being, no matter how much this vision “pumped up the country’s pride”66 among the poor 
majority.  
To further reinforce the idea of socialism being a utopian vision, the New York 
Times and The Washington Post argued that Venezuelans supported Chávez exclusively 
because of his charisma, oratory skills and “visceral connection to the poor masses.”67 In 
the larger discursive context comprised of the themes that presented socialism in a 
negative light, comments on Chávez’s “cultlike following”68 and “religious fervor [with 
which] Chávez was adored”69 painted a picture of mass delusion and unsubstantiated 
devotion rather than informed and sincere support and loyalty. Such narrative implied 
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that people’s empowerment was solely dependent on Chávez and therefore his socialist 
vision didn’t really empower them; rather, it enslaved them like a religious cult or a 
totalitarian political system would. The narrative was supported by multiple direct quotes 
from ordinary Venezuelans who mourned Chávez’s death, and whose pronouncements of 
devotion had a strong totalitarian feel to them: 
"He gave us the instructions and we will all follow them. We are all Chávez," said 
Elia Cuba, a 59-year-old accountant.”70   
"He did so much for us, and as long as we Venezuelans keep that in mind, then 
everything that he did hasn't died," said Maria Andrade, 54. "Now is the time 
when we need to keep in mind the values Hugo Chávez gave us."71  
 
 Additionally, the descriptions of the crowds of mourners also were constructed in 
ways that involved totalitarian undertones, giving prominence to such elements as, for 
example, the synchrony in the movements of the masses, the “clenched fists thrusting in 
the air” in unison, and – a small but significant detail – the red shirts worn by the 
mourners: 
“This week, many rank-and-file Chavistas - dressed in red, their eyes red from 
crying - spoke on the street of how they would continue to follow the directions of 
their dead leader.”72 
 
“The multitudes in red shirts, clenched fists thrusting in the air -- a dominant 
image of the political movement that President Hugo Chávez left behind -- 
convey a sense of followers united and loyal to the father of their revolution and 
his designated heir, Nicolás Maduro.”73 
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While on the one hand these images conveyed a sense of unity and determination, 
and therefore an idea that “the revolution will continue without Chávez,” they also, on the 
other hand, demonstrated that Chávez was the only guarantor of the socialist revolution 
and with his death the vision of socialism will also wither.  
The idea of socialism having no future after Chávez’s death was also expressed 
through discussions of Chávez’s relations with other Latin American leaders. While both 
newspapers acknowledged that Chávez had a strong influence in the region, they also 
insisted that just like in domestic politics, the influence of his socialist vision was based 
exclusively on his charisma and Venezuela’s oil wealth. Both newspapers argued that 
regionally, Latin American states did not follow the socialist path74 and only supported 
Chávez because of his subsidized oil: “Chávez… was one of the loudest voices in Latin 
America, pushing a vision of regional unity and defiance of Washington, sweetened with 
cheap oil shipments to needy neighbors. But the legacy of Mr. Chávez’s Bolivarian 
revolution remains more limited than he would have liked.”75 The Washington Post 
explained: “Big, democratic Brazil and smaller fast-developing countries such as 
Uruguay, Chile and Peru were diplomatically close but followed an economic and 
political path far removed from Venezuela's. Their governments are market-friendly and 
attuned to social needs, combining those philosophies to register fast economic growth 
and lift millions out of poverty. They also place an emphasis on good ties with the 
Obama administration.”76 Interestingly, the New York Times published an op-ed piece by 
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Luiz Inácio Lula de Silva, the former President of Brazil who worked closely with Hugo 
Chávez on several projects. In the article, da Silva praised Chávez’s passion for Latin 
American integration and overall painted a portrait that stood in stark contrast to the 
image of Chávez constructed in all other New York Times (and Washington Post) articles. 
However, next day the New York Times featured a report that, while acknowledging da 
Silva’s contribution and perspective, rushed to point out that Chávez was nevertheless a 
“very polarizing figure:”77 
“In an opinion article published in The New York Times on Thursday, former 
President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, whose policies are credited with the 
country's strong economic growth and poverty reduction, lauded Mr. Chávez for 
his commitment to improving the lives of his country's poor. 
And he praised him for his pursuit of regional unity, including his role in starting 
groups like the Union of South American Nations, the Community of Latin 
American and Caribbean States and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas. 
But some analysts point out that Mr. Chávez also clashed with some regional 
leaders and undermined efforts at integration that did not mesh with his 
ideological views. And his fiery clashes with the United States were seen by many 
as counterproductive.”78 
 
The same article also added that “while poverty went down significantly during 
Mr. Chávez's years as president, other countries, like Brazil, Peru and Colombia, made 
progress in reducing poverty while following paths very different from that of Mr. 
Chávez.”79 This statement reinforced the idea that first, there were other (and better) 
ways to improve the lives of poor majorities than socialism, and second, that other Latin 
American states preferred the non-socialist path of development.  
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Geopolitics and relations with the United States 
Discussions of Chávez’s foreign policy and his role in global and Latin American 
regional politics were very prominent in the coverage by the New York Times and The 
Washington Post. Both newspapers frequently pointed out that “[Venezuela and 
America] have had rocky relations”80 and that “[Chávez’s] principal theme [in foreign 
policy] seemed to be taunting the United States.”81 The New York Times mentioned how 
Hugo Chávez called George W. Bush a “devil” in his 2006 speech at the United Nations82 
as well as how he called Barack Obama a “clown,” following up with the tweet in which 
“Mr. Chávez decried both Mr. Obama and his ‘gringo imperialist government.’”83 Both 
newspapers emphasized the “anti-American thrust of [Chávez’s] foreign policy”84 in 
multiple ways.  
First, both newspapers highlighted the fact that two American military attaches 
were expelled from Venezuela right before the official announcement of Chávez’s death. 
Of particular interest is the placement of this piece of information by the New York Times 
in its first report on the topic of Chávez’s death. The detail about the expulsion of the 
attaches comes up in the fourth sentence of the report, and seems to be oddly placed amid 
the details depicting the transformations in Caracas caused by the breaking news: 
“In short order, police officers and soldiers were highly visible as people ran 
through the streets, calling loved ones on cell phones, rushing to get home. 
Caracas, the capital, which had just received news that the government was 
throwing out two American military attachés it accused of sowing disorder, 
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quickly became an enormous traffic jam. Stores and shopping malls abruptly 
closed.”85 
 
By bringing up the detail of the expulsion of the American military attaches, the 
article immediately introduces the theme of geopolitics and sets up the readers to 
interpret the events in Venezuela – and Venezuelan identity – from an “anti-US” 
geopolitical lens. The incident was mentioned in one of the early Washington Post 
editorials as well, and in this piece the incident was presented as an indicator of 
Venezuela’s stubborn refusal to improve relations with the United States despite the 
attempts of the Unites States to reach out. The editorial also mentioned the accusations 
that the United States was to blame for Chávez’s illness: 
“Anticipating the death of Hugo Chávez, the Obama administration began 
reaching out months ago to his designated successor, Nicolas Maduro, in the hope 
of bettering US-Venezuelan relations. On Tuesday, that strategy absorbed a body 
blow: Hours before revealing that Mr. Chávez had died of cancer, Mr. Maduro 
tried to blame the United States for his illness, and he expelled two US military 
attaches on charges of "proposing destabilizing plans" to the armed forces. So 
much for the "reset" with Caracas.”86  
 
It is interesting that the editorial mentioned the “reset” – a term usually applied to 
Russia-US relations, and one that was initially introduced to harmonize the relations but 
gradually grew to signify the failures associated with the “reset attempts.” Here the term 
is applied to Venezuela, and, just like in cases of discussions of Russia-US “reset” in the 
US mainstream media, the United States is presented as a party that constantly tries to 
reach out, so the failures of the “reset” are blamed on another party.  
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This implicit reference to Russia and to Russia-US troubled relations was 
complemented by explicit and overwhelmingly frequent references to Venezuela’s ties 
(and Chávez’s friendships) with “assorted rebel groups, rogues and pariah 
governments.”87 As The Washington Post stated, “the United States and Venezuela were 
barely on speaking terms during Chávez's 14 years in office as Chávez accused 
Washington of a heavy-handed approach to the hemisphere and forged friendships with 
Cuba, Iran and others that the United States views as troublesome.”88 Similarly, the New 
York Times emphasized that “[Chávez’s] legacy is strained by… the embrace of 
malevolent foreign leaders like Bashar al-Assad of Syria and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of 
Iran.”89 The New York Times provided a bit of context reminding the readers of other 
recent international issues involving these leaders: “Mr. Chávez forged close ties with 
fellow OPEC member Iran, in defiance of the United States-led effort to isolate that 
country over its nuclear program. And Mr. Chávez shipped oil to Syria despite 
international repudiation of President Bashar al-Assad's aggressive response to an 
internal uprising.”90 More than a half of the articles analyzed for this case study 
mentioned in one form or another Chávez’s friendships with the “rogue states,” with most 
articles focusing on “communist Cuba, a country Chávez revered and whose octogenarian 
leadership gave him inspiration.”91 The discussions of Cuba-Venezuela relations, 
however, were marked by two key narratives: one tying Chávez to Cuba to further vilify 
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him and his socialist vision, and the second one testing the ground for improving 
relations with Cuba now that Chávez’s charismatic presence is not an issue.  
Discussions of Venezuela’s close ties to Cuba were also contextualized within the 
geopolitical framework of Chávez’s relations with other Latin American states, his desire 
“to unite the region and erode Washington’s influence”92 and his leadership of “a group 
of nations intent on reducing American influence in the region.”93 As the New York Times 
pointed out when talking about Chávez’s role in Latin America, “With a defiant anti-
imperialist discourse, he injected energy into a sector of the Latin American left and led a 
group of nations, including Cuba, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Bolivia, with leftist 
governments dedicated to diminishing American influence. And he helped form and 
strengthen Latin American identity and tilted the balance further away from the United 
States.”94 Similarly, The Washington Post proclaimed: “On the world stage, Mr. Chávez 
set Venezuela on a collision course with Washington, blaming American foreign policy 
and US-style capitalism for much of Latin American ills.”95 At the same time, The 
Washington Post emphasized that “… his ALBA block attracted as members only the 
anachronistic regime in Cuba and some of the poorest countries in the region”96 while the 
countries considered by The Washington Post more “normal” “were put off by Mr. 
Chávez’s revolutionary, anti-US, anti-capitalist rhetoric.”97 This narrative overlaps with 
the one discussed in the previous theme where both newspapers made it clear that more 
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“successful” countries in Latin America did not embrace Chávez’s socialist vision and 
sided more closely with the United States.  
Russian mainstream media coverage 
Extraordinary leader and a friend of Russia 
Both Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty reiterated in their articles that Hugo Chávez 
was “a close friend of Russia”98 who did not view Russia as “just another resource 
supplier,”99 and that’s why Russia valued this friendship and partnership.100 The articles, 
and especially the editorials, described Chávez as an “outstanding leader,”101 “an 
extraordinary and strong person who looked into the future and always set his bar very 
high,”102 a brave warrior “who could only be defeated by an incurable illness,”103 “an 
incarnation of people’s soul”104 and a “knight of freedom who brought independence to 
Latin American states.”105 One editorial in Argumenty i Fakty praised Chávez as someone 
who seemed “as if he came from another epoch – an epoch of desperate lonely heroes 
ready to challenge the Evil and fight it without demanding a reward.”106 An editorial in 
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Izvestia underscored that Chávez was “a leader, not a master,”107 which meant that his 
followers – and specifically his “young brother” Maduro – will not give up Chávez’s 
principles and will continue his anti-imperialist course.108 Another author of Izvestia 
editorial shared his personal experience of observing Chávez speaking (or rather 
performing!) in front of an audience of Russian academics during one of his visits to 
Russia. The author was struck by the “personal charm” of Chávez who “talked for two 
hours non-stop, quoted Marx and the Bible, recited poetry,”109 and concluded the 
editorial with the description of Chávez as “not just a left-wing socialist but a poet, an 
artist, a commando, a revolutionary, A Robin Hood, and of course, a people’s soul.”110   
One report in Izvestia was devoted to the initiative of the Communist Party of 
Russia to name several streets in Russian cities, including Moscow, after Hugo 
Chávez.111 The article discussed the initiative enthusiastically and positively, though it 
noted that the party “Fair Russia” and human rights experts in Russia were skeptical 
about the idea and “urged not to approach the question emotionally.”112 This detail 
matters in the context of Russian domestic politics – and in the context of the next theme 
– because “Fair Russia” is a Parliamentary opposition party that is least loyal to the 
Russian government and is often viewed, along with human rights experts, as “pro-
Western.”  
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Anti-American rhetoric 
The editorials in both newspapers explicitly praised Chávez for his anti-American 
rhetoric and admired his courage in “stepping on the tail of the hydra of American 
imperialism, … and spitting on the damned Monroe doctrine.”113 They applauded 
Chávez’s ability to “never fear anyone, to say what he thought, and to meet with the 
leaders of the states that the United States declared ‘rogues.’”114 The same editorial also 
mentioned how Chávez called George W. Bush a “devil” at the 2006 United Nations 
meeting and added that “Americans could not forgive this, but it was impossible to scare 
Chávez; it was only possible to kill him.”115 Here the author implicitly referenced the 
accusations that the US Special Forces inflicted Chávez with cancer. Later in the editorial 
the author in fact stated that “it will take time for us to find out if Chávez’s illness, along 
with several other cases of Latin American leaders being diagnosed with cancer, was a 
twist of fate or whether it was the result of the activities by the special forces of one very 
democratic nation under the flag with stripes and stars.”116 Two more articles in 
Argumenty i Fakty brought up this question in a similar way as well.117 
The narrative of anti-Americanism serving as a basis for Russia-Venezuela 
friendship came through in the articles discussing the prospects of Russia-Venezuela 
relations after Chávez’s death. For example, Izvestia, quoting a prominent Russian 
politician, suggested the following reasons for Nicolas Maduro being the preferred 
candidate for Russia: “A candidate who will maintain close ties with Russia is obviously 
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better for us. Today it is Maduro because the opposition will first and foremost try to 
restore relations with the United States, while Maduro will continue, at least at the initial 
stages, the previous foreign policy course.”118 This quote exemplifies how the article 
counts on the readers’ already-existing assumption that anyone who is pro-Russia must 
also be anti-US Here relations with Venezuela are evaluated and presented through the 
reductionist lens of pro-US versus anti-US paradigm. Venezuelan opposition is bad for 
Russia because it is pro-US – no other reasons are mentioned. Maduro, however, is better 
because he promised to follow Chávez’s course, which in foreign policy means being 
anti-US Again, no other reasons for Maduro being the preferred candidate are mentioned. 
The language of the narratives comprising this theme closely resembled the language 
familiar to many Russians who remember the Cold War era and the language of the 
Soviet media. The Cold War discourse was particularly prominent in structuring the 
narratives within this theme. At the same time, the narratives within this theme coexisted 
with other, very different narratives within the next theme. 
The future of business 
The most prominent theme characterizing the Russian mainstream news media 
coverage was marked by pragmatic concerns about the future of Russia’s business with 
Venezuela. Six out of nine articles in Izvestia and two out of six articles in Argumenty i 
Fakty (two out of the three longest and most substantial ones) were devoted to the 
discussion of the future of Russia-Venezuela partnership in oil industry and arms trade. 
The articles conveyed a sense of grave concern by Russian policymakers about possible 
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regime change in Venezuela, and therefore possible termination of valuable contracts. 
Articles repeatedly mentioned that Venezuela’s purchases of arms from Russia 
constituted one third of Russia’s overall arms exports119 and that “Chávez conducted a 
very profitable business with Russia, which radically transformed Venezuela’s army;”120 
equally important was the fact that Russia had five large ongoing oil projects in 
Venezuela121 – a result of the preferential access to Venezuela’s oil resources Russian 
investors enjoyed. As one of the articles pointed out, “after the death of “the great 
Commandante,” the world, and Russia, is anxious to know if the politic of Hugo Chávez 
in Venezuela’s oil industry will continue or if it will change dramatically.”122 Authors 
speculated about possible challenges and competitors Russia could face if the new 
Venezuelan government changed Chávez’s political course and the corresponding 
economic policies and practices.  
While this narrative worked to construct and present Russia and Venezuela as two 
business partners rather than ideological comrades – clearly a narrative of post-Cold War 
capitalism and also globalization – the discussions in Izvestia and Argumenty i Fakty also 
revealed that this business partnership was possible largely because of Russia’s Soviet 
legacy and Chávez’s perception of this legacy playing a role in Russia’s post-Soviet 
politics. For example, one article explicitly mentioned that “Chávez thought that Russia 
was a reincarnation of the USSR and would support his global initiatives. Meanwhile 
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Moscow preferred to develop economic relations rather than political ones.”123 This 
interpretation constructed the image of Russia as a pragmatic actor who did not mind 
taking advantage of its socialist legacy as long as it benefited its present capitalist 
economy.  However, the recognition of the important role that the Cold War legacy 
played in sustaining this post-Cold War economic partnership was reflected in other 
articles. For example, one editorial in Izvestia discussed the potential threats that the 
death of Hugo Chávez could pose for the Russian economy. The article speculated that 
the new Venezuelan government might be “not as extremely leftist as under Chávez… it 
will be more moderate, more pragmatic, which means it will be more open for 
partnerships with the civilized world, and not only with Comandante’s “friends.” This 
means there will be fiercer competition for the markets, economic projects, etc. Russian 
business is not very used to conducting business in such environment, to put it mildly.”124  
Two narratives overlapped within this theme. One the one hand, the 
overwhelming attention that both newspapers paid to the Russian-Venezuelan economic 
partnership in their coverage of Chávez’s death pointed to a very pragmatic – and 
capitalist – view of Russia-Venezuela relations within the Russian dominant political 
discourse. On the other hand, however, the nature of anxiety expressed by the Russian 
elites (and reflected in the media narratives) about the future of economic partnership 
with Venezuela revealed that the “business” conducted under the conditions of 
preferential treatment guaranteed by Chávez’s socialist vision and policies was much 
more desirable for Russia. In other words, the media narratives presented a reality in 
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which Russia preferred Chávez’s socialist model because it allowed Russia to engage in 
capitalist practices.  
Venezuela – a role model for Russia 
The last narrative identified in the Russian mainstream media coverage of Hugo 
Chávez’s death compared Russia’s and Venezuela’s “similar oil-based fates,”125 
concluding that “Venezuela distributed its wealth in a more fair and just way.”126 In 
discussing the legacy of Hugo Chávez, several commentators contrasted his socialist 
vision and practices with the capitalist path of development Russia embraced in the 
1990s, explicitly praising Chávez’s approach as a much better one. The following excerpt 
illustrates this point well: 
“Chávez refused to negotiate with big business about their social 
responsibilities. He simply took everything away from all of them, instead of 
making an example out of one. The proceeds went primarily to free healthcare 
and education. In Russia, meanwhile, the commercial insurance model was being 
given Roman triumphs. Chávez didn’t bother with national projects like 
“affordable housing”, or palm off mortgage schemes on Venezuelans; he 
nationalized the cement factories that had been controlled by foreign companies, 
because, as he said “while you all are here living it up, regular folks don’t have a 
place to live!” While RAO UES (Unified Energy System of Russia) was turning 
into a conglomerate of confidence scams, Venezuela continued nationalizing its 
energy sector. While Russia was in a fuss about attracting foreign investment, 
Chávez threw out American companies like Exxon and ConocoPhillips by the 
seat of their pants.”127 
 
The author of another article – an editorial in Argumenty i Fakty – made similar 
points, applauding Chávez for “nationalizing large enterprises because they must serve 
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the interests of the people, not the interests of the oligarchs.”128 The author also noted that 
“the oil industry, the main source of income for the country, must serve the development 
of healthcare, education and other social projects, and not the Olympic games, World 
Cups and the building of business centers.”129 While the author didn’t make a direct and 
explicit comparison with Russia, the references to the oligarchs, Olympics, the World 
Cup and the business centers made it clear that the critique was directed at Russia’s 
current large scale projects.  
US alternative media coverage 
A grandiose visionary and a maker of dreams 
Both The Nation and Z Magazine portrayed Chávez as “a grandiose visionary and 
a maker of dreams,”130 someone who was “larger than life”131 and who “meant the hope 
of a better life, and the means to organize to accomplish it… for members of Venezuela’s 
grassroots movements.”132 Both magazines underscored that Chávez was genuinely 
devoted to making the lives of Venezuela’s people better and people responded to it by 
equally genuine love and devotion.  
When discussing Chávez’s style of governance, with one of its cornerstones being 
his public appearances and speeches that were not “regular cabinet meetings,”133 Oscar 
Guardiola-Rivera wrote in Z Magazine that “all this talking and direct contact meant the 
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constant reaffirmation of a promise between Chávez and the people of Venezuela.”134 
People responded and paid him back, most notably in 2002 when they demanded his 
release from prison after the US- sponsored coup d’état.   
One of the articles in Z Magazine communicated this sense of connection between 
Chávez and Venezuelans through the following quote: “‘Chávez is like a guide. Chávez 
is a door – the door for the struggles that we want to carry out,’ said Iraida Morocoima, of 
Venezuela’s Urban Land Committees in 2009, ‘But in the other side of that door are the 
people.”135 Another article emphasized Venezuelans’ genuine love for Chávez, noting 
that they had “truly a love affair with ‘their’ president”136 and pointing out “it was these 
people who had, more than any other group, experienced a dramatic improvement in their 
material conditions. They experienced at first-hand what can happen when a government 
is prepared to stand up for the poor and marginalized.”137 
Authors glorified Chávez as someone who “inspired a twenty-first century world 
to fight for justice, to stand with dignity before bullying powers that seek to impose their 
will on others. He raised his voice when no others would and had no fear of consequence, 
because he knew that truth was on his side.”138 Similarly, another author called Chávez “a 
leader who embodied the region’s mass yearning for social justice and independence 
from US dominance.”139 
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When talking about Chávez empowering Venezuelans, authors in The Nation and 
Z Magazine also highlighted that this empowerment expanded beyond Venezuela, 
inspiring others throughout the world who shared Chávez’s vision: 
“Hugo Chávez galvanized the Venezuelan people into taking centre stage in the 
country’s political process. He was a leader and a teacher but above all someone 
that demonstrated an unwavering faith in the principle that the people are the best 
architects of their freedom. In doing so he inspired not only millions of 
Venezuelans, but millions more around the world who believe in the urgency of 
building an alternative.”140 
  
Misrepresentation in the mainstream US media 
Both The Nation and Z Magazine highlighted in their articles that “anti-Chávez 
mass media campaign systematically distorted events in Venezuela”141 and that even 
when reporting on Chávez’s death the “mainstream editorials continued their media spin, 
decrying Chávez as a despot who led the country to ruin, amid marginal gains for the 
poor.”142  
Four articles out of ten in Z Magazine were specifically devoted to critiquing the 
mainstream media coverage of Chávez’s persona, his politics and now his death, 
reviewing the coverage by such US media as the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, 
the CNN, The Washington Post, Newsweek, ABC World News, Fox News, CBS Evening 
News, the New York Post, Time magazine, NBC Nightly News, MSNBC, as well as 
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some British mainstream media, such as the BBC, The Guardian, The Independent, and 
The Telegraph.143  
In the opening sentence of her article in Z Magazine, Eva Golinger boldly stated 
that “most of what you read or hear in mass media about President Hugo Chávez is 
always negative, his faults exaggerated, his discourse distorted and his achievements 
ignored. The reality is quite different.”144 In addition to offering a different kind of 
Venezuelan reality to the readers, Golinger, as well as other contributors pointed out 
some of the key flaws in the mainstream media coverage of Chávez and Venezuela. 
For example, as Pablo Navarrete suggested, “rather than try to explain Chávez’s 
appeal to large sectors of the Venezuelan population or understand the process of radical 
change underway in the country, the West’s media class preferred to focus almost 
entirely on the figure of Chávez.”145 Even when the mainstream media made attempts to 
talk about the people’s support of Chávez and/or their involvement in politics, they still, 
as Gabriel Hetland reiterated in his piece in The Nation, portrayed Chavistas as “mindless 
drones,”146 while in reality – and Hetland demonstrated it in his article – Chavistas were 
very diverse and the movement was multidimensional. The authors argued that the 
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“distorted picture of Venezuela generated by the media”147 was partially a result of the 
minimal engagement – as Pablo Navarette stated, “a deeper understanding of the 
specificities of the Venezuelan case is a prerequisite for purging prejudice”148 – but for 
the most part it was a result of “the US media eagerly playing up” to the interests of the 
US government who “deemed [Chávez] a threat to US interests.”149 
A vision and a reality of a just society  
The Nation and Z Magazine wrote with admiration about Chávez’s vision of the 
“socialism of the twenty-first century” and listed – with gratitude and appreciation – the 
concrete material and social gains that Venezuelan society achieved because of Chávez’s 
vision and policies. When talking about Chávez’s vision, several contributors mentioned 
the model of participatory democracy that “gave voice to those previously excluded from 
politics”150 Another author described what he saw in Venezuela during his visit – from 
government-supported community radio and television stations being run by young 
people to government-subsidized supermarkets for the poor, and to the free cultural 
festivals on the streets of Caracas, concluding that “all this felt like being transported to 
another planet, one where social justice and social dignity were a priority.”151 He 
concluded the article with an assessment of Chávez’s Venezuela as a “noble 
experiment… that at its core was seeking to create a society where human needs are 
prioritized over corporate needs”152 
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Additionally, four articles referred to impressive statistics documenting dramatic 
poverty reduction rates in Venezuela,153 pointing out that “this is not just numbers, this 
translates into profound changes in the lives of millions of Venezuelans who today eat 
three meals a day, own their homes and have jobs or access to financial aid.”154 
Finally, one article in The Nation and one in Z Magazine also discussed the 
important role race played in Venezuela’s politics and the contribution of Chávez to the 
struggle against racial discrimination not only in Venezuela but also worldwide. The 
Nation noted that “the esteem in which Chávez was held by the majority of Venezuelans, 
many of them dark-skinned, was matched by the rage he provoked among the country’s 
mostly white political and economic elites”155 – a crucial point that the US mainstream 
media conveniently avoided. Another piece, by Janvieve Williams Comrie, eloquently 
titled President Hugo Chávez and Race: the Shift from Avoidance to Inclusion 
emphasized the point that Chávez “represented a refreshing lesson on upholding human 
rights, rather than talking about them, through his prioritization of African descendent 
issues and politics, not only within Venezuela, but also outside of Venezuela.”156 Among 
other examples illustrating this statement, the author highlighted the fact that Venezuela 
has been helping Afro descendant communities in New Orleans and the South Bronx 
since 2005 by “providing [the poor and low income families] with discounted heating oil, 
free energy saving light bulbs… during the winter months, and providing grants to 
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community-based organizations to build self-sustaining institutions such as worker-
owned cooperatives, and holistic healthcare for women.”157 
Russian alternative media coverage 
Extraordinary person but an autocratic ruler 
Novaya Gazeta and The New Times described Chávez as a “strong leader”158 and 
an “extraordinary person who didn’t leave anyone feeling indifferent about him – for 
various reasons.”159 Novaya Gazeta also noted that Chávez had “managerial talents and a 
natural ability to persuade people that he was right.”160 The newspaper painted a portrait 
of a quirky, extravagant and groovy man who could didn’t mince words and said what he 
thought both domestically and on the global arena. Like all other media analyzed in this 
study, Novaya Gazeta recalled how Chávez called George W. Bush a “devil” in 2006, 
though the way Novaya Gazeta phrased the sentence conveyed a mild disapproval of 
such behavior. Novaya Gazeta also mentioned that Chávez “liked art, wrote poetry and 
short stories… and was extraordinarily hardworking and prolific.”161  
At the same time, both newspapers stressed that Chávez was an autocratic ruler 
because he “built a ‘power vertical,’ bending all branches of power under his will and 
turning them into institutions that produced top-down decrees.”162 Both newspapers 
highlighted the fact that Chávez died on the 60th anniversary of Stalin’s death. Novaya 
Gazeta mentioned it twice in the same article: in the opening and in the closing sentences, 
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pointing out that this coincidence was “symbolic.”163 The New Times compared the 
chaos, despair and what it expected to be a fight of pro-Chávez elites for power in post-
Chávez Venezuela to what it saw as similar dynamic in post-Stalin USSR.164 The New 
Times underscored that a sense of uncertainty after the death of a strong leader was a 
“marker of all autocratic regimes.”165    
Chaos in Venezuela 
Both newspapers painted a bleak picture of Venezuela’s political, economic and 
social life. They presented Chávez’s model of twenty-first century socialism in a negative 
light, pointing out that his “socio-economic policies implied the strengthening of the 
government’s role, nationalization of key industries and limiting the role of the private 
capital.”166 The results of this “incompetent management”167 included decreases in oil 
production, poor functioning of the sea ports, closure of many factories, dramatic 
increases in imports of food and domestic goods, highest inflation on the continent and 
rampant crime. 168 The New Times presented statistical data for each of these problems. 
Both newspapers acknowledged that Chávez’s policies improved the lives of the poor 
Venezuelans. That’s why – explained Novaya Gazeta – he enjoyed such wide support 
among the poor majority. The New Times, however, insisted that Chávez’s “generous oil 
revenue supported social policies”… contributed to the poor masses becoming over 
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reliant on Chávez’s social support programs.169 One article in The New Times discussed 
the creation of what it termed “the poverty committees” in the barrios and stated: “The 
committees received money straight from the budget – this led to the incredible 
popularity of the president. And to incredible scrounging. Because the heads of these 
committees often had questionable reputations.”170 The article then quotes one of these 
committee heads who, as The New Times described, “showed up with a gun tucked into 
the back pocket of his shorts:” “have you seen the posters with the portraits of Chávez 
and his friend Lukashenko? – asks Julio spitefully – “Well, Lukashenko sent to 
Venezuela demountable wooden houses. These houses were given to residents of barrios 
for free but they quickly sold them to our people and went back to barrios. And we re-
sold those houses and made good money.”171 This quote is illustrative of the overall tone 
The New Times adopted when talking about Venezuela as a corrupt country with counter-
productive socio-economic policies and people who did not want to work as a result of 
such policies. The New Times also devoted substantial attention to crime, also connecting 
it to Chávez’s social programs and giving chilling statistics that supported The New 
Times’ claim that “Caracas became the most dangerous capital on the planet.”172 In 
another article that talked about the events in Caracas immediately following the news of 
Chávez’s death, The New Times highlighted that fact that all stores were quickly closed 
down, explaining it in the following way: “there is a rumor going around that now the 
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supply of government subsidized goods will be terminated and the poor masses will start 
looting the stores.”173 
Conclusion 
A comparative analysis of the coverage of Hugo Chávez’s death by Russian and 
US mainstream and alternative media shows that socialism as a model of socio-economic 
organization and perhaps also as an ideology or system of beliefs remains a polarizing 
topic, especially in the United States. The analysis shows how in the US mainstream 
media socialism was clearly vilified through vilification of Chávez, his governance and 
his legacy. Socialism was equated with poverty, crime, instability, bizarre and irrational 
governance, and inability to effectively manage the country’s vast natural resources. 
Socialism was also equated with authoritarianism, despotism and mass delusion.  
In contrast, the US alternative media praised Chávez’s socialist vision and 
highlighted the positive improvements in Venezuelan society. They put accent on 
Chávez’s devotion to social justice, human rights and empowerment of the marginalized 
communities, arguing that people themselves recognized Chávez’s sincere commitment 
to making their lives better and thus their devotion was equally sincere and genuine. 
Thus, the pictures of socialist Venezuela painted by the US mainstream and 
alternative media were drastically different. While the former presented to the readers a 
gloomy place plagued by poverty and rampant crime, the latter described “another 
planet” with neighborhood assemblies, government-subsidized supermarkets and free 
cultural festivals on the streets. The differences in how US mainstream and alternative 
media covered Chávez’s death and made sense of his socialist vision and legacy shows 
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that socialism remains a divisive topic in the United States, and that the lines of 
ideological division between the mainstream and alternative (though also decidedly 
leftist) media had not changed since the late 1940s when James Aronson – the founder of 
the National Guardian – wrote the following: 
 “The National Guardian regarded United States policy as the chief source of the 
world’s problems. It did not as policy advocate socialism as an alternative, but insisted 
that it be discussed as a possible alternative, and not as a horrid word. It offered a 
sympathetic presentation of news of the socialist world, while reserving the right to be 
critical. It held that the peace of the world depended upon an acceptance by the people of 
the West that socialism was here to stay. Whether the peoples of the Western world liked 
it or not was irrelevant.”174 
 
It is also notable how the media that continue discussing socialism as an 
alternative also focus on the pressing issues of race, gender and class and their 
indispensible connection to politics. In contrast, mainstream media either avoid these 
questions altogether or link those in privileged positions – male, educated, rich and white 
– to what these media articulate as preferred and legitimate social, economic and political 
models (though, again, in accounts about Chávez’s death both the New York Times and 
The Washington Post avoided mentioning race altogether, though it clearly lingered in 
the descriptions of Chávez’s supporters and opponents). 
Russian mainstream media coverage of Chávez’s death and his legacy resembled 
the US alternative media accounts in parts where it glorified Chávez as a charismatic 
leader with the genuine commitment to improve the lives of his people, as well as the 
leader who “stood up to the West.” At the same time, the coverage by Izvestia and 
Argumenty i Fakty also conveyed a sense that all Russia was concerned about after 
Chávez’s death was the future of its arms contracts and oil projects – a profoundly 
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pragmatic narrative showing that even though Chávez was “a friend of Russia” and 
deserved that several streets in Russia be named after him, the profits that were now in 
danger were the number one priority. One might argue that this finding is not surprising 
in the context of contemporary global economy and that there are no “true friendships” in 
politics, yet, for example, the US alternative media did not rush to wonder about what 
would happen to the heating oil in South Bronx now that Chávez is gone. In fact, Russian 
mainstream media pointed out themselves that the symbolism of “comradery solidarity” 
with Chávez only mattered to Russia as long as it guaranteed it access to Venezuela’s 
markets and oil fields. At the same time, the concerns about the future of trade and 
business – a profoundly capitalistic narrative – coexisted with the narrative of nostalgia 
for socialism, as evidenced by the praise given in several reports to Chávez’s 
management of oil wealth, and a critique of Russia’s more capitalist approach to the 
management of its own.  
These two divergent narratives – one signifying a sharp departure from the 
communist ideology, and thus from the Cold War discourse, and another one pointing to 
acute nostalgia for the Soviet past and thus, especially combined with the narrative of 
anti-Americanism, reminding the readers of the Cold War and the ideological struggle – 
are articulated within the coverage as one coherent narrative. One could argue that this 
coexistence of the nostalgia for the Soviet past with rampant consumption and 
pragmatism is precisely what defines Russia’s post-Cold War identity and this is also 
exactly what makes it so difficult for the US dominant culture (and mainstream media) to 
make sense of the post-Cold War Russia, as other cases in this project demonstrate. The 
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idea of one embracing elements of capitalism and socialism at the same time seems to be 
beyond the range of political possibilities as they are articulated within the US 
mainstream political (and media) discourse.  
Lastly, like in previous cases, the mainstream US and the alternative Russian 
media discourses on Chávez and his legacy resembled each other. This finding is not 
surprising given that both Novaya Gazeta and The New Times emerged in the early 1990s 
accompanying the political and ideological trend that condemned and rejected socialism, 
citing the “failed experiment” of the USSR as a “never again” kind of cautionary tale. 
The Russian alternative media’s negative descriptions of Chávez’s legacy serve to 
counter the nostalgia for the Soviet past prominent in the Russian mainstream media 
accounts, reminding – hence the link of Chávez’s death to the birthday of Stalin – of the 
dark side of Russia’s socialist past. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In this project I approach mass media as crucial sites of meaning making. 
Moreover – and most importantly – I view meaning making as a process that is inherently 
political in a sense that the choices that are made in the process of construction of media 
narratives are never random or accidental. They are a result of mass media being situated 
within the fields of political, ideological and cultural production, comprising sites of 
political, ideological and cultural struggle. As media create meanings for their audiences, 
they draw on a variety of discourses available to them – as Teun van Djik noted, “the 
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construction of news is a reconstruction of available discourses”1 – but the range of 
available discursive possibilities is contingent upon the historical, political, social and 
cultural circumstances within which these media function. In turn, the notion of struggle 
implies that within any given society and at any historical moment there exist competing 
interpretations of reality, though not all of them are equally powerful in a sense that not 
all interpretations are viewed as equally legitimate and acceptable by all actors. Thus, 
when I ask in this project to what extent do the Russian and the US media narratives 
about the post-Cold War events rely on or depart from the discourse of the Cold War, I 
am interested in discovering to what extent the powerful discourse of the past continues 
structuring the narratives – and therefore the meanings – of the present in spite of the fact 
that the material reality of the post-Cold War present is drastically different from the 
Cold War past. At the same time, keeping in mind the notion of discursive struggle and 
contestation, this study aimed to discover what other narratives and discourses comprised 
the discussions of the events analyzed in this study as different Russian and US media 
made sense of them and interpreted them for their audiences. From the perspective of 
Stuart Hall’s theory of articulation, this project examined how various elements of the 
Cold War discourse were articulated – but also re-articulated – by various media given 
these media’s national, political and ideological affiliations. 
It is also important to note that I engaged with this project as a culturally situated 
scholar and individual, as someone who Abdul JanMohammed calls a “specular border 
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intellectual.”2 The specular border intellectual is “caught between two cultures… [and] 
subjects the cultures to analytic scrutiny rather than combining them.”3 As Karim Karim 
elaborates, “instead of becoming disoriented and out of place, [a specular border 
intellectual] uses the vantage point that she occupies to view horizons difficult for others 
to envision.”4 In addition, a specular border intellectual “must disengage personally from 
allegiances to any one culture, nation, group or institution… to the extent that these are 
defined in monologic, essentialist terms.”5 Indeed, as I think back to this study’s opening 
story – my puzzlement and confusion over the vastly different stories that the Russian 
and the US mainstream media told in August of 2008 – I realize that what truly struck me 
then was not so much the difference in the stories presented but the lack of complexity 
within the opposing narratives, a similar lack of complexity in presentations of the 
“political Other” and, consequently, the degree of vilification of the “political Other.”  I 
would argue that it was precisely the comparative perspective – the everyday condition of 
me “living between the cultures” – that allowed me to question not so much “whose side 
the truth was on” that summer but the very mode of discursive engagement which, by 
virtue of being confrontational and uncompromising ran counter to the idea of the post-
Cold War world and to my own experiences of living, working and learning in Russia 
and in the Unites States in the post-Cold War world. Additionally, growing up in a multi-
ethnic family with history of political dissent, I have always been acutely aware of the 
                                                 
2
 Abdul R. JanMohammed, “Worldliness-Without-World, Homelessness-as-Home: Toward a Definition of 
the Specular Border Intellectual,” in Edward Said: a Critical Reader, ed. Michael Sprinkler (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 1992).  
3
 Ibid, 219. 
4
 Karim H. Karim, “Making Sense of the ‘Islamic Peril.’ Journalism as Cultural Practice,” in Journalism 
After September 11, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan (New York: Routledge, 2002), 111. 
5
 JanMohamed, 238. 
   208 
 
indispensible connection between culture, politics and power and of the existence of 
multiple cultures – and thus multiple interpretations and discourses – within any given 
national culture. To me, Edward Said’s statement that “no culture is understandable 
without some sense of … creative provocation from the unofficial to the official”6 always 
rang true. Thus, by bringing alternative media’s narratives into this project, I tried to 
show that just like no domestic issue can be adequately understood without taking into 
consideration the dynamic between dominant and alternative voices, no international or 
global issue can be understood without elaborating this dynamic as well.  
There is, however, one caveat that I must acknowledge. I realize and admit that 
my choice of specific media outlets for the analysis in this project automatically put them 
in the position of “representing” the “dominant” and the “alternative” in Russia and in the 
US, which, given the cultural, political and media diversity in both countries,  comes off, 
quite ironically, as essentialist and reductionist. I acknowledge this limitation but also 
insist that this design nevertheless enriched the project. The inclusion of some of the 
“sources of creative provocation” – and their narratives – in the analysis allowed 
elaborating the links between culture, politics and power, as well as determining when, 
where and how the meanings of the events and issues comprising the post-Cold War 
world might be re-articulated. 
In this project, I asked the following questions: 
RQ1: To what extent (if at all) does the discourse of the Cold War inform and 
structure the narratives created by the Russian and US mainstream and alternative 
media as they cover the events and controversies examined in this project? 
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RQ2: What other discourses of international affairs and global politics can be 
identified? 
RQ3: How do the ways in which various discourses are articulated within the news 
media texts analyzed in this project expose the relations of symbolic domination and 
subordination that constitute the post-Cold War political and media environment, and 
how do these relations work to construct the identities of the actors involved in the 
events analyzed in this study? 
RQ4: What possibilities and limitations for discursive transformation can be discerned 
from the analysis of overlaps and contradictions among the narratives, and how do 
these possibilities and limitations expand the theoretical debate on power struggles 
between the forces of nationalism and globalization in the post-Cold War era?  
My analysis demonstrates that certain elements of the Cold War discourse 
continue structuring the narratives that different Russian and US media produce as they 
make sense of various events that occur in the post-Cold War time. The mainstream 
media in both countries relied particularly strongly on the narrative of "spheres of 
influence," especially in cases of the war in South Ossetia and the diplomatic debate on 
the peace resolution in Syria. The US mainstream media articulated this narrative by 
linking Russia's response to the war in South Ossetia to what was presented as Russia's 
desire to regain power in the post-Soviet space. Similarly, Russia's support of Assad was 
linked to Russia's desire to not lose power in the Middle East. In turn, Russian 
mainstream accounts articulated the narrative of "spheres of influence" by linking US 
support of Georgia to the American desire to expand NATO eastward (and thus expand 
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the sphere of influence) in case of the war in South Ossetia. In case of the Syrian debate, 
Russian mainstream accounts insisted that the peace resolution is nothing more than an 
attempt by the US and its allies to overthrow Assad and expand their influence in the 
Middle East.  
 The narrative of the "spheres of influence" was also articulated by highlighting 
the "sponsor-client" nature of the relationships between Russia and South Ossetia and 
Russia and Assad's Syria in US mainstream accounts, while the Russian mainstream 
accounts emphasized in a similar way the relationships between the US and Georgia and 
the US and the Syrian opposition. The emphasis on the sponsor-client relationship was 
strengthened by a recurring narrative of arms sales or arms supplies to the clients, 
evoking memories of the Cold War “proxy conflicts.” The narrative of the "spheres of 
influence" was also complemented by the one of two "great powers" competing for 
dominance on the global arena. It is interesting how the articulation of this specific 
narrative required the US mainstream media to link Russia and its post-Cold War politics 
to its Soviet/Cold War past by presenting Russia as a "resurgent power" (not "emerging 
power," for example), by focusing overwhelmingly on Vladimir Putin's KGB past, spying 
missions, and even comparing Putin to Stalin. These articulations suggest that the 
mainstream US media find it difficult to make sense of Russia's post-Cold War politics 
without tying it to Russia's Soviet past. In this case, Russia's Soviet legacy – and the 
narratives associated with it – present powerful barriers for re-articulation even twenty 
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Moreover, tying Russia to its Soviet past 
works to construct the “enemy Other” in nationalist terms as it simultaneously helps cast 
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the American national identity in terms that affirm the United States’ commitment to 
peace, democracy and justice.  
 In turn, Russian mainstream media accounts clearly portray the US (or in some 
instances "the West") as a "great power." However, the recognition of the West's 
"unmatched power" - a narrative contradicting the discourse of the Cold War as it speaks 
to the notion of the post-Cold War US hegemony - overlaps with the bitterness over 
"Russia's lost power" that underlines the articulation of this narrative. The bitterness 
points to the narrative of Russia's regret over the lost power and the desire to restore the 
"balance of power," suggesting that the Russian mainstream media construct the narrative 
of the "Cold War nostalgia." This narrative points explicitly to Russia’s desperate and 
ongoing attempts to redefine its post-Cold War national identity, and to the seeming lack 
of any meaningful post-Cold War options. The case of the coverage of the death of Hugo 
Chávez by the Russian mainstream media strengthens this point. The analysis suggests 
that Russian mainstream media struggle to re-articulate the image of strong post-Cold 
War Russia without tying it – implicitly or explicitly – to the Soviet legacy, as the 
narrative of praising Chávez’s socialist politics as a role model that Russia should have 
followed in the 1990s (instead of embracing “the Western capitalist vision”) demonstrate. 
Thus, while the US mainstream media present a picture of reality where the only model 
of powerful Russia is the one of Soviet Russia against which the US identity as an 
“indispensible nation” fighting for democracy and world peace can be constructed, the 
Russian mainstream media reinforce this narrative by offering a picture of reality where 
the national identity of post-Cold War Russia is defined as fundamentally anti-US or anti-
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West.  
 The discourse of the Cold War also manifested itself in the ways in which the US 
mainstream media juxtaposed democracy and authoritarianism in their accounts, tying 
democracy and those who embraced it to “good” and authoritarianism to “evil,” while the 
Russian mainstream media condemned American democracy as profoundly hypocritical. 
In case of the war in South Ossetia, the US media presented Georgia as democratic and 
Russia as autocratic, while Russian mainstream media presented Georgia as an 
authoritarian regime masquerading as a democracy and in doing so following the lead of 
the United States. In case of the Syrian debate, the US mainstream media highlighted that 
the US and its allies supported the Syrian opposition's demands for democracy while 
Russia was supporting autocratic Assad. The Russian mainstream accounts, in turn, 
insisted that the Western "democracy talk" was nothing more than an excuse for 
intervention. In case of Chávez’s death, the US mainstream media emphasized the link 
between socialism and authoritarianism, juxtaposing authoritarianism to democracy and 
thus presenting the picture of reality where socialism and democracy can not coexist.  
 One of the most striking discoveries in this project was the incorporation of the 
discourse of the “threat of Islamic terrorism” into the discussions of the diplomatic debate 
on the peace resolution in Syria. On the one hand, the incorporation of this discourse 
suggests a departure from the discourse of the Cold War insofar as it both introduces a 
new “centerpiece” of global politics and presents a “common ground” (or a common 
enemy?) that can take Russia-US relations out of what one foreign policy analyst termed 
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a “Cold War autopilot.”7 On the other hand, however, a bigger question arises of whether 
the substitution of one security discourse with another really brings any meaningful 
change to the very nature of discussions of global politics in the post-Cold War world, 
especially if one accepts the argument that the forces of globalization are replacing 
nationalism as a guiding principle for conducting – and discussing – global politics. In 
fact, several scholars pointed out the conceptual similarities between the two security 
discourses.8 In his critique of Samuel Huntington’s thesis of the “clash of civilizations,” 
Edward Said noted how the thesis – and the overwhelming attention paid to the “Islamic 
civilization” in it – “is in fact a recycled version of the Cold War thesis that conflicts in 
today’s and tomorrow’s world will remain not economic or social in essence but 
ideological… In effect then, the Cold War continues, but this time on many fronts, with 
many more serious and basic systems of values and ideas like Islam and Confucianism 
struggling for ascendancy and even dominance over the West.”9 Thus, while it may seem 
like the discourse of the “threat of radical Islam” presented a departure from the Cold 
War discourse when it came specifically to Russia-US relations, the incorporation of this 
discourse in texts about the debate on the peace resolution in Syria did not advance the 
confrontational, “us versus them” framework for presenting and interpreting global 
conflicts. This finding calls for a further deeper examination of the role, meaning and 
roots of binary thinking as a way of interpreting reality and global politics. In some ways, 
binary logic underlines what Clifford Geertz termed “totalizing conceptions,” identifying 
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moving away from this way of thinking as one of the greatest intellectual challenges of 
the post-Cold War era. Interestingly, Geertz denies mass media the ability to present 
reality (or realities?) in a meaningful way, as he asks “surely, we are not reduced… to 
thought-bites and wondering attentions of the evening news?” before formulating his call 
for a “new way of thinking” about politics and the world in the post-Cold War era. Yet 
the media environment is also quite complex and media not only play a crucial role in 
shaping our understanding of the world around us, but different media play different roles 
and assume different goals in this process.  
The ways in which the alternative media both in Russia and in the US attempted 
to rearticulate the meanings of the events in the case studies demonstrated both the 
alternative ways of thinking about the events in the post-Cold War time and the 
persistence of the Cold War discourse. On the one hand, alternative media elaborated 
some of the aspects of the events in each case study that the mainstreams media omitted: 
the human tragedy aspect of the war in South Ossetia as well as the connections between 
the political elites of the states involved in the conflict critical for understanding of the 
conflict’s dynamic; the complex nature of the Syrian opposition in case of the Syrian 
debate; the emphasis that Chavez’s political and economic vision placed on the questions 
of social justice and the ways in which this vision and politics helped the disadvantaged 
not only in Venezuela but in other countries too, including the United States. This is not 
surprising as, once again, these media’s explicitly articulated goal is to challenge the 
mainstream narratives by, among other things, focusing on topics that are absent from the 
mainstream accounts. On the other hand, most of the alternative media’s narratives 
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focused on critique of the narratives offered by the mainstream media, either implicitly – 
by critiquing the policies that the mainstream media reinforced in their accounts – or 
explicitly, by engaging in critique of specific mainstream media texts. By doing so, the 
alternative media inevitably engaged with the same discourses that they critiqued, 
possibly perpetuating them further. On the one hand, this is not surprising as it shows 
precisely how ideologies work. Stuart Hall explains this dynamic by pointing out that 
“even journalists who write within the muckraking tradition often seem to be inscribed by 
an ideology to which they do not consciously commit themselves, and which, instead, 
‘writes them.’”10 On the other hand, it raises – once again – the question of how could 
one re-articulate a particular discourse without simultaneously relying on the very same 
structures that contribute to perpetuation of this discourse.  
Another interesting finding that spans all three case studies is that generally the 
narratives of the US mainstream media shared several similarities with the narratives in 
Russian alternative media and the narratives in the Russian mainstream media shared 
similarities with the US alternative media. This dynamic itself is reflective of the Cold 
War ideological set up where the dissent in each of the great powers aligned closer with 
the dominant ideology of the opponent. While the post-Cold War politics is not driven by 
the same type of ideological struggle, the symmetry between the narratives advanced by 
domestic dissent and foreign opponents is striking. This suggests that while the substance 
of the Cold War antagonism had disappeared in the post-Cold War period, the form, or 
the style of discursive engagement stayed the same. Interestingly, some international 
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relations scholars point out a similar trend in Russia-US relations. For example, Richard 
Sakwa suggests that the post-Cold War era “is one of a ‘cold peace’,” where a “cold 
peace” is a “mimetic cold war.”11 Sakwa argues that “while a cold war accepts the logic 
of conflict in the international system and between certain protagonists in particular, a 
cold peace reproduces the behavioral patterns of a cold war but suppresses acceptance of 
the logic of behavior.”12 I would argue that these “behavioral patterns” are supported by 
and articulated through the combinations of various narratives that are informed by the 
discourse of the Cold War. The narratives that support these patterns are also nationalistic 
at their core as the discussions revolve around questions of national interest and 
international competition.  
The ways in which various elements of the Cold War discourse work in Russian 
and US mainstream and alternative media texts to create meanings of events and 
construct the identities of the actors involved bring to mind Karl Marx’s discussion about 
the power of tropes from the past to structure the politics of the present. Marx wrote: 
“Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not 
make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, 
given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a 
nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with 
revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before, 
precisely in such epochs of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of 
the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in 
order to present this new scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed 
language.”13  
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Marx’s reference to the “revolutionary crisis” as a moment when the “borrowing 
of names, battle slogans and costumes” occurs is particularly profound, as it points 
precisely to what seems to be the paradox of the Cold War discourse in the post-Cold 
War world: the mismatch between the material reality of geopolitics and the discourses 
constructed to make sense of geopolitics. Moreover, the notion of the “revolutionary 
crisis” takes us back to the immediate aftermath of the Cold War – the 1990s – when the 
end of the Cold War led to what Zaki Leïdi called the “universal crisis of meaning:”14 
“Our feeling of an exceptionally strong change in the world order after the fall of 
the Berlin Wall is coupled with our equally enormous inability to interpret it, to give it 
meaning. Though all the upheavals we experience daily can have several meanings, 
nothing indicates they have a meaning, if by meaning we imply the triple notion of 
foundation, unity and final goal: ‘foundation’ meaning the basic principle on which a 
collective project depends; ‘unity’ meaning that ‘world images’ are collected into a 
coherent plan of the whole; and ‘end’ or ‘final goal’, meaning projection towards an 
elsewhere that is deemed to be better.”15 
 
One could argue that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 gave the world a 
new meaning and a “triple notion of foundation, unity and final goal.” Yet in cases 
analyzed in this project the grand narrative of the “war on terror” does not seem to be of 
central importance, even though it appears in the discussions of the Syrian debate. The 
roots of the disconnect that manifests itself in often diametrically opposite articulations of 
events in Russian and US mainstream and alternative media may be indeed located in the 
unresolved “crisis of meaning” of the post-Cold War and pre-9/11 decade. Have we truly 
understood and internalized the meaning of “post” in “post-Cold War”?  An interesting 
theoretical parallel is instructive here. Eric King Watts discusses the meaning of “post” in 
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rhetorical formulation of “postracial America.”16 He suggests that in moments when 
“post” gets added to any term as a way to signify “the liberation of previously unheard 
voices and unseen bodies, the ‘post-’ comes equipped with and resonates with ideations 
of freedom, disorder, and closure – something ‘ends’ and something else ‘breaks’ out.”17  
However, simply “post-ing” something as a way of imagining it being “past-tense” does 
not help to break from the issues that the term being “post-ed” carries. Adding “post” to 
“race” in the moment of “spectacular celebration regarding the emergence of ‘postracial’ 
America”18 (the election of President Barack Obama) did not solve the “race problem” 
because postmodernity failed to deconstruct “race” on the first place. Similarly, one could 
argue, adding “post” to “Cold War” in the moment of celebration (the collapse of the 
USSR) did not solve the “Cold War problem.” Watts adds another dimension to the 
discussion by stating that the “break” put between “post” and “race” was also a 
“wound.”19 The wound introduced “inconvenience” associated with “an awful and 
intimate angst sitting in the gut of those folks who sensed deep down in their organic 
psyches that “postracial America meant a ‘post-White’ America.”20 This idea of 
inconvenience relates well to a similar inconvenience of encountering a post-Cold War 
“world disorder” instead of a much more desired “new world order.”21 It is the 
convenience of order that makes the grand narrative of the Cold War so appealing both in 
conducting foreign policy and in creating media narratives about it. In fact, several 
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authors wrote about the convenience of the Cold War discourse. For example, John 
Mearsheimer wrote in August 1990 that “we may… wake up one day lamenting the loss 
of the order that the Cold War gave to the anarchy of international relations.”22 Similarly, 
though twenty years later, Steven Belletto remarked that “in the post-Cold War world, 
there have been the sense that despite the domestic scares and threats of nuclear 
destruction, the Cold War was oddly comforting because it was somehow manageable 
and known: its two clearly defined antagonists could be counted on to play by certain 
rules.”23 This idea of convenience, combined with the desperate need to find meaning in 
times of political and intellectual crisis might give a clue as to why the Russian and the 
US media, including at times the alternative media, continue drawing from the toolbox 
they inherited from the Cold War era when they struggle to make sense of events that 
expose the disagreements between the old-time Cold War rivals but that take place in the 
environment that is drastically different from the one during the Cold War.  
This project analyzed media texts. However, what makes this analysis important 
is the argument that ultimately the narratives comprising these texts influence in one way 
or another how these media’s audiences view the post-Cold War world and make sense of 
global politics. One of the key limitations of this study is that it took the media texts that 
it analyzed out of the context of the hybrid media environment within which they exist in 
the post-Cold War era of social media, YouTube, blogs and comment sections on the 
digital platforms of traditional media. While audiences always had the power of 
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interpreting the narratives produced by the media in their own unique ways, the post-Cold 
War media and communications environment presents actors other than institutional 
media with opportunities to create alternative interpretations of events and disseminate 
them worldwide through “horizontal communication networks.”24 This condition takes 
the question of the Cold War discourse in the post-Cold War world onto a new level, 
opening up several avenues for further inquiry. First, it would be important to examine 
the dynamic between media texts and audience-produced texts to compare, for example, 
the discussions of global politics that the institutional media (both mainstream and 
alternative) offer to the discussions unfolding in online forums or blogging platforms or 
even in the comment sections of those institutional media. To what extent are the 
narratives produced by the institutional media similar or different from the audience-
produced ones? Does the discourse of the Cold War inform the audience-produced 
narratives in the same way as it informs the narratives produced by institutional media? 
How do the similarities and differences between media and audience-generated narratives 
complicate the meaning-making terrain in the post-Cold War environment?  
Another important aspect of the hybrid media environment is that not only the 
lines between the producers and consumers are blurring but the lines between various 
formats of media texts are blurring too. In the post-Cold War media environment, 
audiences easily and naturally navigate among multiple media as they search – often 
simultaneously – for information, news and entertainment. The notion of the multimedia 
environment calls for expanding textual and discourse analysis of any phenomenon 
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beyond strictly one format. Thus, an important direction to pursue in order to expand and 
deepen the analysis of the significance of the Cold War discourse in informing the 
discussions – and the public understanding – of global politics in the post-Cold War 
world would involve the analysis of popular culture texts as well as the texts produced 
within the so-called infotainment format.  
As I finalize this project, the war in Ukraine continues to unfold and the Russia-
US relations continue to deteriorate. Almost every week I see an article come out with the 
term “Cold War” in the headline.25 I hear news of toughening of sanctions on Russia and 
of NATO forces conducting military exercises in Latvia, thirty five miles from the 
Russian border.26 I also hear news of Russia allocating more and more resources from its 
already shrinking budget to increasing its military might, including the reassessment of 
the capabilities of its nuclear arsenal.27 I also observe – from consuming Russian media – 
how the anti-Western and anti-American rhetoric is growing stronger. I keep asking 
myself, how did we get here? What and where have we missed? How, to paraphrase Karl 
Marx, did we allow the spirits of the past to haunt us to the point when discourse is 
increasingly turning into reality? Most importantly, what, if anything, can be done and 
what could be the role of media in this process? Through this project I hoped to show that 
                                                 
25See, for example, “The next Cold War May Have Already Begun,” The National, accessed June 23, 2015, 
http://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/the-next-cold-war-may-have-already-begun; Jonathan Beale, 
“Moving Ever Closer to a New Cold War,” BBC News, accessed June 24, 2015, 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33237439. 
26
 Eric Schmitt and Steven Lee Myers, “NATO Refocuses on the Kremlin, Its Original Foe,” The New York 
Times, June 23, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/24/world/europe/nato-returns-its-attention-to-an-
old-foe-russia.html. 
27
 Jonathan Tirone, “Vienna Forum Hears Warnings of a New U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Race,” 
Bloomberg.com, accessed June 23, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-24/u-s-risks-
weapons-race-as-russia-adds-warheads-senate-stalls. 
 
   222 
 
the opportunities for discursive re-articulation can be located on the intersections of 
multiple – and different – discourses. I tried to use my vantage point of a “specular 
border intellectual” to demonstrate that multiple – and competing – interpretations of 
reality manifest themselves in stories that various media tell us. However, the central 
problem seems to be that these media “talk past each other,” drawing borders between 
“us” and “them,” between “good” and “evil,” “right” and “wrong.” All of this is 
happening in the “era of globalization” when communication channels are plenty and 
open, and when power – including discursive power – is becoming more and more 
diffused. Thus, one of the key opportunities for strategic intervention lies, perhaps 
trivially, in education, and most importantly, in diversification of media education. 
Diversification includes internationalization but is not limited to it. In other words – and 
my engagement with alternative media in this project aimed to stress this point - 
understanding of a foreign Other is never complete without the understanding of a 
domestic Other. The era of globalization calls for a media education that would 
emphasize the interplay of local and global, and the roles of history, politics and power 
within this interplay. It is my hope that such approach would help us deal with global 
crises in ways that would enable us to turn the moments of emergency into the moments 
of emergence.  
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